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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Opportunity is one of America’s most cherished and powerful ideals.  It has drawn 
millions to our shores in search of a better life, and it sustains the dreams of those born 
here.  It is articulated in the seminal ideas and documents of the nation’s founding, such 
as the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights.  It is 
reinforced in the human rights laws that the United States helped to craft a half-century 
ago and has sought to champion around the world.  Americans have fought to protect 
opportunity during periods of great conflict and challenge such as World War II and 
during the civil and human rights struggles that marked the latter half of the twentieth 
century. 
 
Today, however, after more than a half-century of progress, opportunity in the United 
States is at a crossroads.  The nation has made great strides in building a middle class, 
creating a safety net, and erecting legal protections against official segregation and overt 
exclusion of marginalized groups.  But that progress is incomplete and, in a number of 
important areas, our country is losing ground.  Our nation faces important decisions about 
ensuring that the historic steppingstones to opportunity – a college education, an 
affordable home, a job that pays a living wage, and economic security like access to 
quality healthcare – do not continue to slip out of reach for everyday Americans.  We 
face the challenge of addressing persistent inequality of opportunity for people of color in 
many aspects of life – from education, to hosing, to healthcare, to political participation, 
to criminal justice – and the continuing obstacles that women face to full participation in 
the economic and political life of the nation.  As a nation of immigrants, our country 
faces the challenge of ensuring that newcomers have the opportunity to contribute to and 
become part of our society free of exploitation and exclusion.  And as a nation that 
believes in the importance of a chance to start over, we have important decisions to make 
about the role of rehabilitation and incarceration in our criminal justice system. 
 
This report assesses the nation’s progress toward protecting and expanding opportunity 
for all Americans.  If the promise of opportunity is a core national commitment, it is 
essential to measure our success in fulfilling that commitment, just as we measure our 
economic health and our military preparedness.  By gauging how the nation fares in 
providing opportunity, we can build on our successes and address those areas where we 
are falling short.    
 
Drawing on a broad range of research, we find that opportunity is at risk for all 
Americans.  For example, as a growing number of businesses reduce or eliminate health 
care benefits, more and more U.S. workers face serious health and financial risks.  And 
high rates of uninsurance have broad effects on health care costs and access, even for the 
insured.  Moreover, some groups of Americans are facing multiple barriers to 
opportunity.  For example, people who live in high-poverty, predominantly minority 
communities are more likely to face poorly funded schools, inadequate public 
transportation to jobs, environmental hazards, high crime rates, and a lack of 
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representation on the public airwaves and in government.  These obstacles build on one 
another and compound over time, combining to erode opportunity. 
 
Through bold leadership and innovative policies, the nation’s elected leaders can ensure 
the promise of opportunity in America.  This report encourages our policymakers to: 
 
 Regularly assess the impact of public policies on opportunity; 
 Modernize safety net programs that help people meet their basic needs, starting 
with equitable and affordable health care for all Americans; 
 Build Americans’ skills to adapt to a global economy, evolving technology, and 
an increasingly diverse population; 
 Renew a commitment to human rights in the United States; 
 Prioritize crime prevention and rehabilitation over increased incarceration; and 
 Protect voting rights and promote political participation. 
 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
This report assesses the nation’s progress toward protecting and expanding opportunity 
for all Americans.  We define opportunity as follows: 
  
Opportunity means that all individuals have a fair chance to achieve their 
full human potential.  Ensuring that  fair chance requires equal treatment, 
economic security and mobility, a voice in decisions that affect us, a 
chance to start over after misfortune or missteps, and a shared 
responsibility for each other as neighbors and fellow Americans. 
 
In deriving this definition and the indicators that measure it, we considered the rich body 
of social science research about different aspects of opportunity.  We surveyed studies 
come from a variety of academic disciplines including economics, sociology, public 
health, political science, education, psychology, and law.  In this effort and throughout 
the development of this report, we consulted with a distinguished group of experts on the 
theoretical and practical dynamics that make up opportunity, the types of access and 
social assets that serve as stepping stones to opportunity, and the practical ways of 
measuring opportunity’s components.   
 
From that body of research and consultation we worked with our advisors to identify, 
extract, and report reliable data--overwhelmingly from U.S. Census and other federal 
governmental sources--that measure our nation’s progress in providing opportunity for 
all.  Finally, we submitted our methodology to another distinguished group of scholars 
that included members of our initial advisory groups and outside experts.  These 
individuals are listed in the Acknowledgments section at the beginning of this document. 
 
No body of data can fully capture an idea as rich and complex as opportunity in America, 
and this report is no exception.  Measuring and reporting every aspect of opportunity 
experienced by the diverse individuals and communities that make up the U.S. population 
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would have been impossible.  In addition, we encountered significant limitations in the 
data related to opportunity that government and other institutions collect.  For example, 
data are often unavailable or are inadequate for many racial and ethnic minority groups 
other than African Americans and Hispanics.  Nonetheless, we believe that The State of 
Opportunity in America represents a comprehensive effort to measure our society’s 
progress toward achieving our national ideal – a Land of Opportunity. 
 
We measure progress based on six interrelated dimensions and principles of opportunity:  
 
Mobility.  Everyone who works hard should be able to advance and participate fully in 
the nation’s economic, political, and cultural life.  Any poor child in America should be 
able to fulfill her or his full potential; economic status at birth should not pre-determine 
ultimate achievements or assets. 
 
Equality.  Access to the benefits, responsibilities, and burdens of our society should exist 
without discrimination or inequality based on race, gender, nationality, socioeconomic 
status, or other aspects of what we look like or where we come from.  Nor should 
favoritism, nepotism, or corruption work to shut out disfavored groups or perpetuate a 
privileged class. 
 
Voice.  We embrace democracy as a system that depends on the ability of all of us to 
participate in the public dialogue.  The voting booth, the town square, the street corner, 
and the op-ed page remain important, and have been joined by broadcast and electronic 
media.  This aspect of the American ideal provides not only freedom from censorship, but 
key opportunities to participate in our society’s political, cultural, and intellectual life. 
 
Redemption.  Human beings are not fixed in their abilities or motivations; they evolve 
and develop based on available options, incentives, and support.  Current ability is not the 
same as future potential.  People who falter in their efforts deserve a chance to get back 
on their feet; those who break societal rules warrant not just punishment, but also the 
opportunity for rehabilitation, redemption, and a second chance. 
 
Community.  We are part of a common national enterprise, linked in our successes and 
challenges, and responsible to each other as well as to ourselves.  We value diversity as a 
strength, and strive to evolve with our changing population.  
 
Security.  Regardless of skills or abilities, no one should be denied access to a basic level 
of education, health, and economic well-being.  Without this basic protection from 
exploitation, it is impossible to access the other rights and responsibilities that society has 
to offer. 
 
HOW CAN THE NATION EXPAND OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL? 
 
This report holds important implications for policymakers, civic leaders, and all 
Americans concerned about the state of opportunity in the United States.  Its findings 
include some major gains that should be a source of national pride, and that we must 
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work together as a society to maintain.  In particular, increased rates of college 
enrollment for some Americans, gains in the number of women and people of color 
elected to political office, and freedom from violent crime are real, if incomplete, success 
stories. 
 
The findings also show, however, that our progress has stalled in many areas, and that for 
some of the most important measures, opportunity is actively shrinking for millions of 
Americans.  Findings such as the huge and growing number of uninsured Americans, the 
unprecedented number of Americans behind bars, a growing wealth gap, and the rising 
costs of college, housing, and other opportunity stepping stones for working families 
raise grave concerns. 
 
The findings also demonstrate that some groups of Americans--including Americans of 
color, low-income Americans and, frequently, women and immigrants--are facing 
multiple barriers to opportunity that often combine to deny the promise of the American 
Dream.  These groups must grapple with disparate obstacles like wage inequality, 
reduced access to credit and homeownership, unequal health care access and treatment, 
inadequate political and media representation, and the disproportionate impact of law 
enforcement practices.  Research evidence shows that Americans’ attitudes toward 
people of other groups have improved considerably in past decades.  But discrimination, 
stereotypes, and implicit biases still play a powerful role in determining the opportunity 
and life outcomes of millions of Americans. 
 
Without renewed national commitment and concrete policy changes to reverse these 
negative trends, the promise of opportunity for all is at great risk for current and future 
generations.  Fulfilling the promise of opportunity for all will be one of the great 
challenges of the twenty-first century.  It will require bold leadership from our 
government, civic, and business leaders; creative and effective solutions; and the 
sustained political will of the American people.  Fortunately, a significant body of 
pragmatic policies has proved effective in expanding opportunity in concrete and 
measurable ways.  The State of Opportunity report recommends six types of policy 
approaches, described below. 
 
1. Planning for Opportunity 
 
Experience shows that it is important to consider all aspects of opportunity when 
fashioning new policies and programs that will affect Americans’ life chances.  With 
these principles in mind, we recommend that: 
 
 Governments use a new policy tool--an Opportunity Impact Statement--as a 
requirement for publicly funded or authorized projects like school, hospital, or 
highway construction, or the expansion of the telecommunications infrastructure.  
The statements would explain, based on available data, how a given effort would 
expand or contract opportunity in terms of equitable treatment, economic security 
and mobility, and shared responsibility, and they would require public input and 
participation. 
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 Land-use, zoning, and transportation policies actively promote opportunity by 
encouraging the development of mixed-income communities; reversing the 
isolation of highly segregated racial, ethnic, and high-poverty communities; 
supporting public transportation that helps people commute from areas of high 
unemployment to areas of high job growth; and planning regionally to address 
inequality among urban, suburban, and rural communities. 
 Government make expanding opportunity a condition of its partnerships with 
private industry, for example, by requiring public contractors to pay a living wage 
tied to families’ actual cost of living, insisting on employment practices that 
promote diversity and inclusion, and ensuring that new technologies using the 
public electromagnetic spectrum include public interest obligations and extend 
service to all communities.  
 
2. Modernizing the Safety Net 
 
Well-crafted programs that enable people to meet the basic needs of their families have 
lifted millions of Americans out of poverty and sustained millions more in times of crisis 
or transition.  Despite the popularity and proven success of Social Security, the federal 
and state Child Health Insurance Program, and food assistance for low-income families, 
these programs are increasingly under-funded and reach fewer and fewer Americans in 
need.  We recommend modernizing the traditional safety net by focusing on moving 
Americans from poverty and crisis to economic security and mobility.  These 
recommendations include: 
 
 Rapidly moving toward a system of high quality, equitable, and comprehensive 
health care that covers all Americans’ basic health needs; 
 Expanding state and federal food assistance programs such as food stamps and 
school lunches  to serve all children and adults in need,  and providing incentives 
for grocery stores to  stock affordable, nutritious foods in low-income urban and 
rural communities; 
 Scaling up successful pilot programs that help lower income families to save, 
build assets, and acquire financial skills. 
 
3.  Updating Skills  in a Changing America 
 
Americans are in the midst of monumental changes fueled by a global economy, rapidly 
evolving technology, and an increasingly diverse population.  The new American reality 
demands new skills and knowledge. We must ensure that all Americans have access to 
the education, training, and information needed to embrace the opportunities of the new 
century.  Our recommendations include: 
 
 Expanding job training programs focused on quality jobs in the new economy and 
tailored to the differing skills and needs of different workers;  
 Reducing financial barriers to college by increasing the share of need-based 
grants over student loans and improving private sector participation through 
scholarship aid.   For example, federal Pell Grant awards should be doubled and 
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state, federal, and private financial aid better integrated, in order to create a 
complementary system that allocates resources more efficiently. 
 Creating effective and inclusive immigrant integration policies that educate new 
Americans about their rights and responsibilities in the workplace, political 
participation, and the naturalization process, while better equipping our 
institutions and communities to incorporate diverse new members.  An important 
element of these policies is assisting new Americans in learning English and 
providing multilingual access to necessities like health care and basic rights like 
voting.  
 
4.  Renewing America’s Commitment to Human Rights 
 
Some of the greatest strides in advancing American opportunity emerged from the 
twentieth century movements for racial equality, women’s rights, and workers’ rights.   
The findings of this report show that this work is not yet complete and that what is 
needed is both vigorous enforcement of existing anti-discrimination protections and a 
new generation of human rights laws that address evolving forms of bias and exclusion.  
Our recommendations include: 
 
 Increasing the staffing and resources that federal, state, and local agencies devote 
to enforcing anti-discrimination laws in voting, employment, housing, education, 
lending, criminal justice and other spheres.  This includes using data more 
effectively to better detect potential bias, for instance, by comparing companies’ 
workforce diversity with the composition of an area’s qualified workforce.  
 Assisting employers and other institutions committed to providing a fair and 
diverse environment, for example, by promoting model performance evaluation 
practices, greater cultural fluency, and other tools to counter bias and exclusion.  
 Crafting new human rights laws that complement existing civil rights protections 
by addressing subconscious and institutional biases more effectively, protecting 
economic and social rights like the right to education, and correcting exclusion 
based on socioeconomic status and other characteristics not fully covered by 
current laws. 
 
5. Prioritizing Prevention, Rehabilitation, and Reentry 
 
The last two decades have seen significant progress in reducing violent crime, but also a 
leap in the number of nonviolent and drug-addicted women and men in jails and prisons, 
large racial disparities among the incarcerated, and new barriers to the reentry of people 
with criminal records into productive society.  We recommend a set of policies that build 
on successful crime prevention strategies while fostering rehabilitation and productive 
reentry, including:  
 
 Expanding community policing--a crime prevention strategy that emphasizes 
community input, collaboration, and tailored responses to crime and disorder.  
These approaches have a demonstrated track record of improving police-
community relations and community satisfaction. 
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 Increasing the availability of substance abuse treatment, including using it as an 
alternative to incarceration.  Emerging research suggests that “drug courts”--
specialized judicial proceedings that provide substance abuse treatment, testing, 
supervision, and a range of other coordinated services for people addicted to 
drugs who might otherwise face incarceration--are effective in reducing 
recidivism, increasing retention of addicted people in treatment, and saving 
taxpayer money.  Where possible, these programs should allow successful 
participants to avoid a criminal record that will hamper their future progress. 
 Basing criminal sentencing on individualized culpability, control, and 
circumstances.  Mandatory minimum sentencing policies have exacerbated racial 
and ethnic inequality in incarceration rates, significantly increased the number of 
women behind bars, and led to many unjust sentences, while doing little to deter 
crime.  Replacing these policies with sentencing based on the circumstances of 
each case will reduce racial inequality and adverse impacts on women while 
better promoting public safety and the interests of justice. 
 Reviewing criminal justice practices to identify and address the junctures at which 
stereotypes and discrimination currently influence the outcome. 
 Restoring voting rights and removing other barriers to the reentry into society of 
people who have been incarcerated. 
 
6.  Strengthening Our Democracy Through Stepped Up Leadership 
 
National leadership is necessary to protect democratic participation and to promote 
diverse involvement in the American political process.  Voting and political participation 
are among our most cherished federal rights; the federal government has the greatest 
authority and responsibility to protect them.  Our recommendations include: 
 
 Establishing minimum federal standards for voting equipment and procedures, 
including straightforward voter registration requirements, nationwide voting 
hours, and federal guidelines to verify voter identity.  Meeting these standards 
will require federal support to help local authorities improve training, machinery, 
and polling stations. 
 Vigorously enforcing the Voting Rights Act and fully implementing the Help 
America Vote Act, while providing greater assistance to new Americans and 
others in obtaining and exercising the right to vote. 
 
Finally, we urge government leaders to take up the challenge, begun by this report, of 
measuring our progress in providing opportunity to all Americans.  This includes 
gathering the demographic data and other information necessary to determine how 
different groups of Americans are faring.  (see Box 2)
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Chapter 2 
MOBILITY 
 
Mobility is perhaps the most cherished of American opportunity values--and is the 
dimension of opportunity that comes to mind most frequently when Americans are asked 
what opportunity means to them.  Mobility is the belief that everyone who works hard 
should be able to advance and participate fully in the economic, political, and cultural life 
of the nation.  Mobility means that any poor child in America should be able to fulfill her 
or his full potential, and that economic status, gender, race, ethnicity, and nationality 
should not pre-determine one’s ultimate achievements or assets. 
 
Public policies in the United States have sought to protect and expand mobility by 
opening avenues for education, homeownership, entrepreneurship, and wealth creation.  
Indeed, when our national policies have focused on strengthening the opportunity for 
mobility--through policies such as the G.I. Bill, Pell Grants, and federally guaranteed 
home loans--we have made great strides in improving our nation’s economic strength and 
cohesiveness.  This was true even though these policies largely excluded women, non-
whites, and others in the years prior to anti-discrimination legislation enacted in the 
1960s.   
 
In recent years, however, important aspects of mobility for many Americans have 
stagnated or declined.  These trends have occurred despite some significant gains in 
dimensions of mobility, particularly in areas such as educational attainment.  This chapter 
assesses opportunity for mobility along several dimensions including education, 
economic mobility, homeownership, and the distribution of wages and wealth across 
demographic and socioeconomic groups.  This assessment reveals several areas where 
opportunities for mobility have improved, as well as areas where such opportunities are 
stagnant or declining. 
 
Box 2:  Has the Nation Ensured Mobility for All? 
Major Gains in Mobility 
 Rates of college enrollment are increasing for many groups and are rising most rapidly 
among women, particularly some women of color. 
 Women- and minority-owned businesses are increasing and gaining a larger share of all 
business revenue. 
Areas of Limited, Mixed, or No Progress 
 Today, virtually all large school districts have greater levels of segregation of minority 
and low-income students than in 1986, despite modest progress toward desegregation in 
the 1970s. 
 While high school dropout rates have generally declined for all groups since the late 
1960s, some schools--disproportionately poor and minority--continue to experience 
high dropout rates. 
 Recent studies find that economic mobility is limited, particularly for individuals in the 
bottom socioeconomic tiers, as well as for African Americans and Hispanics. 
 While the share of workers earning poverty-level wages has declined and the proportion 
earning three times the poverty rate has increased since 1973, significant wage 
inequality on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender persists.  
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 Despite modest increases in homeownership over the last 35 years, racial, ethnic, and 
income disparities in rates of homeownership are large and persistent. 
Areas Where Mobility Has Declined 
 The cost of a college education is increasingly out of reach for low- and moderate-
income families, as tuition has far outpaced family income and financial aid has not 
increased proportionally. 
 Large wealth disparities are increasing among socioeconomic groups.  The top 5 percent 
of households own nearly 60 percent of the nation’s wealth--a proportion that has 
steadily increased since 1983. 
 
 
Core to our national consciousness is the idea that Americans’ economic, educational, 
and social advancement should depend on their effort and ability rather than on their 
circumstances at birth.  Where we start out in society should not pre-determine where we 
end up, nor should the country have rigid caste lines or perpetuate a privileged class.  
Americans rightly see economic and social mobility as central to opportunity and vital to 
achieving the American Dream.  And their belief in a fair chance at mobility for 
themselves and their families helps to power their optimism, productivity, and 
perseverance in tough times as well as prosperous ones. 
 
Because we believe that class distinctions should be surmountable through effort and 
determination, and that Americans’ human potential is vast, we expect that our nation’s 
social categories will be fluid and unpredictable, that many people will move up or down 
the socioeconomic scale over their lifetimes, and that families will change their status 
over generations.  We expect, moreover, that taken as a whole, our national mobility will 
be primarily upward, toward greater economic success and human achievement over 
time. 
 
The U.S. Constitution reflects this commitment to mobility over caste in its prohibition of 
titles of nobility or “corruption of blood,” and in its systematic move away from slavery, 
patriarchy, and the privileges of a landed gentry and toward the guarantees of equal 
protection of the laws, universal suffrage, and universal privileges and immunities for all 
Americans.  As Alexis de Tocqueville noted in 1835 in his seminal Democracy in 
America, American mobility nurtures in its people a deep belief in the limitless potential 
of themselves and their countrymen, “Equality suggests to the Americans the idea of the 
indefinite perfectibility of man,” he wrote.  The experience of the frontier, migration and 
immigration, recovery from the Great Depression, and the post-World War II rise of the 
middle class served to galvanize this ideal.  
 
These values are also reflected in human rights laws.  For example, the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination condemns the practices of 
colonialism, segregation, and apartheid that enforce caste systems and limit mobility.i  
And the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides that “every 
person has the right to an education that will prepare him to attain a decent life, to raise 
his standard of living and to be a useful member of society.” ii   
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Several opportunity vehicles have long served as springboards to mobility in the United 
States.  A high school diploma, a college degree, and, increasingly, an advanced degree 
have helped to catapult generations of Americans from poverty and working-class status 
into the middle class and, sometimes, affluence.  And, in addition to its economic 
benefits, education advances human knowledge and development in ways that benefit 
society as well as the individual.  Similarly, a decent job at a living wage not only 
provides economic advancement through wages, savings, and freedom from debt; it also 
provides the leisure time that is essential to creativity, entrepreneurship, and spiritual 
advancement.  Homeownership, too, has long been an investment in economic mobility 
and in strong communities and social networks that aid in broader advancement.  And, 
though more obscure, tax policy is also key to the mobility of our society, because it 
determines the extent to which wealth will be concentrated and perpetuated by privileged 
families from generation to generation or invested in expanding opportunity and 
prosperity for all. 
 
This chapter assesses the nation’s progress toward protecting and expanding mobility for 
all.  Economic mobility is the centerpiece of this assessment.  But mobility is also a 
function of access to high-quality educational opportunities, the ability to afford a home 
of one’s choosing, and the degree to which the nation helps all children have the best 
possible start.  Mobility is also influenced by trends in the distribution of wealth and 
income.  A systematic concentration of wealth in a few hands runs counter to American 
ideals of fair play.  Mobility is assessed here by several indicators, described below. 
 
About the Data in this Chapter 
 
We derive specific measures of mobility from many sources such as surveys of economic 
and human rights, reports on national economic and labor force trends (e.g., the 
Economic Policy Institute’s State of Working America report), and relevant research 
literature. iii  We include measures of trends in:  access to quality educational 
opportunities (as measured by levels of racial and income segregation in K-12 education, 
access to comprehensive, high-quality child care, high school degree attainment and 
dropout rates, and access to higher education); economic mobility (as measured by 
estimates of income gains or losses over time among people in different income quintiles 
and among different racial and ethnic groups); the distribution of wealth and wages; 
homeownership; and other measures.  As with data in other chapters, most of the trend 
data presented here draw on cross-sectional or survey data; few longitudinal data are 
available that might allow more conclusive interpretations of trends over time.  Our 
conclusions are therefore offered with caution.  In a few instances, trend data are not 
available for important measures, but rich contemporary data provide an indication of the 
degree of opportunity for mobility.  In these instances, we present data, but not 
conclusions about trends. 
 
Data are drawn largely from federal sources such as the U.S. Census Bureau and the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.  Several notable exceptions exist--for example, we draw on 
data collected by The College Board to assess trends in college education financing.  
Most of the data reported here are available from other published sources.  However, The 
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Opportunity Agenda sought assistance for data collection and analysis of trends in a few 
specific areas; these original analyses of federal data are noted where they appear.   
 
Several limitations of the data should be noted.  For instance, federal guidelines require 
the collecting and reporting of population data based on five racial groups (white, African 
American or black, Asian American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Pacific Islander) 
and two ethnic groups (Hispanic or non-Hispanic).iv  But these guidelines were issued in 
1997, and federal data collected prior to that year often fail to disaggregate these groups.  
In many cases, data are unavailable for all groups except whites, African Americans, and 
Hispanics.  
 
Further, these broad racial and ethnic categories often fail to adequately capture the 
diversity within U.S. racial and ethnic groups, which may vary considerably on the basis 
of immigration status or nativity, primary language, cultural identification, and area of 
residence.  A full assessment of opportunity should include a consideration of how 
opportunity varies along these dimensions.  Where possible, we present subgroup 
information such as variations among Asian-American and Hispanic nationality groups. 
 
Similarly, federal data are rarely presented disaggregated by both race and ethnicity and 
measures of social class or socioeconomic status.  Yet the opportunity barriers for low-
income whites may differ in important ways from those of better-off whites and some 
minorities.  We encourage researchers to examine how opportunity indicators differ by 
race, ethnicity and income, and to explore their interaction. 
 
EDUCATION 
 
Access to high-quality education is widely recognized as being essential to mobility, both 
for individuals and communities.  This is particularly true in the new millennium, as a 
growing share of workers either use technology on the job and/or are working in high-
technology sectors.  Yet the quality of education varies considerably in the United States 
by race, ethnicity, citizenship and/or immigration status, gender, family socioeconomic 
status, and geography (e.g., rural, suburban, or urban residence).  Educational inequality 
starts early in life, beginning with uneven access to high-quality, center-based early 
childcare.  It persists through K-12 education in the form of public schooling that is often 
separate and unequal on the basis of race, ethnicity, geography, family income and 
language status.  And it continues in higher education that is inaccessible for many 
because of insufficient financial resources and/or inadequate academic preparation. 
 
The Persistence of Segregation in Education 
 
Racial, ethnic, and class segregation in schools--largely the consequence of residential 
segregation--is strongly correlated with classroom outcomes, as has been widely 
demonstrated.v  Predominantly minority and high-poverty schools have less experienced 
and fewer certified teachers, higher teacher turnover, poorer instructional quality, fewer 
Advanced Placement courses, poorer test scores, and higher dropout rates.  For example, 
in 2001, rates of high school dropout in predominantly minority schools were nearly 20 
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percent higher than in majority white schools.  In 2002, half of predominantly minority 
schools had dropout rates of over 40 percent, as did two-thirds of those schools that 
enrolled fewer than 10 percent white students.vi  High-poverty and predominantly 
minority schools are so systematically unequal relative to majority-white schools that 
some researchers have concluded that they are “institutions of concentrated 
disadvantage.”  School segregation is therefore an important measure of opportunity for 
mobility. 
 
Despite fifty years of legal precedent and policy at federal, state and local levels to 
desegregate schools, rates of school segregation have failed to decline, and are showing 
signs of increasing.  High levels of resistance in many communities to school 
desegregation efforts, coupled with court-ordered dissolution of desegregation plans, 
have halted the movement to create more integrated public schools.  Today, over 40 
percent of K-12 students in the United States are nonwhite, and the great majority of 
them attend predominantly minority schools (see Figure 2-1).vii  A study examining racial 
isolation of African-American and Latino students in the nation’s 239 largest school 
districts found that despite considerable integration through the mid-1980s, virtually all 
large school districts have experienced increasingly lower levels of integration:  Since 
1986, African-American and Latino students have become more segregated from 
whites.viii  And a study of private schools found that white private school students are less 
likely than whites attending public schools to be exposed to racial and ethnic minority 
students.ix 
 
Figure 2-1.  Percent of Students from Each Racial and Ethnic Group in  
Minority Schools, 2002-2003
Source:  Orfield and Lee, 2005
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
50-100% Minority 90-100% Minority 99-100% Minority
Type of School
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
White
African
American
Latino
Asian
American
Native
American
 
 
 
Mobility  18 
 
Access to High-Quality, Early Childcare 
 
Substantial and growing research demonstrates that high-quality early child education 
programs produce substantial benefits, particularly for children in poverty and in other at-
risk conditions, their families, and for society at large.  Early child education programs 
have improved long-term educational outcomes for children, and are associated with 
lower dropout rates, reduced crime, increased employment, and less reliance on social 
service and safety net programs.x 
 
Increasing the quality and availability of early child education programs is an important 
opportunity policy, particularly in light of the need for childcare among working parents.  
Over two-thirds of U.S. households have both parents or a single parent working outside  
the home, and about three of five (13 million) children under age six are cared for during 
the day by someone other than a parent.xi  But for many low-income families, the cost of 
adequate childcare severely restricts childcare options at best, and is prohibitive at worst.  
Childcare assistance can make a significant difference in improving childcare options.  A 
study comparing wages and work supports in ten U.S. communities found that childcare 
assistance can reduce a low-income family’s out-of-pocket expenses by as much as 35 
percent.xii 
 
Given the high costs and paucity of appropriate childcare, it is not surprising that low-
income working families, as well as many racial and ethnic minority families, are less 
likely to have children enrolled in early child education programs (see Figure 2-2).xiii  
While these families are disproportionately reliant on programs such as the federally 
funded Head Start program, children from higher income families remain far more likely 
than children from low-income families to attend a center-based early childhood 
preschool.  As shown in Figure 2-3, children from families in the highest income quintile 
are more than three times more likely to attend such programs than children from families 
in the lowest income quintile.xiv   
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Figure 2-2.  Percent of Kindergartners Who Had Attended Center-
Based Preschool by Race and Ethnicity, 1998
Source: Lee and Burkham, 2002
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Figure 2-3.  Percent of Kindergartners Who Had Attended Center-
Based Preschool, by Income Quintiles, 1998
Source: Lee and Burkam, 2002
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High School Degree Attainment and Dropout Rates 
 
High school degree attainment in the United States is high overall--nearly nine in ten U.S. 
adults (87 percent) have obtained a high school diploma or general education equivalency 
degree.  But rates of high school degree attainment haven’t increased dramatically since 
1975, when 83 percent of U.S. adults held a high school degree or equivalent.  And while 
African Americans have considerably narrowed the high school degree attainment gap 
with whites (only 71 percent of African Americans held high school degrees in 1975, 
compared to 89 percent in 2004), Hispanics remain well behind on this indicator.  The 
rate of high school degree attainment among Hispanic adults has held steady at just above 
or slightly below 60 percent for the last twenty years (see Figure 2-4).xv 
 
Figure 2-4.  High School Completion Rates by Race/Ethnicity
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics,  2004
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The percentage of young adults who have dropped out of high school has declined for the 
nation overall: Only about one in eight persons age 18 to 24 left high school prior to 
obtaining a diploma in 2002, compared to about one in five in 1967.  Encouragingly, high 
school dropout rates have declined among all racial and ethnic groups in the United 
States over the past thirty-five years.  Some of the most dramatic declines have occurred 
among Hispanic young adults, who have experienced a 25 percent decline in dropout 
rates since 1972, and African Americans, who have experienced a 64 percent decline in 
dropout rates since 1967.  Significant racial and ethnic gaps in high school dropout rates 
persist, however.  Hispanic youth, for example, are four times more likely to drop out 
than are white youth (see Figure 2-5).xvi 
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These federal data often mask considerable problems of high dropout rates that are not 
“captured” in federal definitions, and therefore underestimate dropout rates.xvii  Overall, 
only about two-thirds of all students who enter 9th grade will graduate on time with 
regular diplomas in 12th grade. Three-fourths of white students will graduate on time, 
while only about half of Black, Latino, and Native American students earn regular 
diplomas alongside their classmates.xviii  And a study by the Educational Testing Service 
found that despite apparent declines in dropout rates noted in federal data, the high school 
completion rate declined in all but seven states between 1990 and 2000.  In ten states, 
high school completion rates declined by 8 percentage points or more.xix 
Figure 2-5.  Percentage of High School Dropouts, Age 18-24 Years
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2004
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Access to Higher Education 
 
College Enrollment.  Rates of college enrollment in the United States are low relative to 
the proportion of high school graduates.  About 40 percent of U.S. females and one-third 
of U.S. males age 18 to 24 were enrolled in college in 2002.  On the positive side, the 
proportion of women enrolling in college has nearly doubled between 1967, when only 
about one in five women age 18 to 24 were enrolled in college, and 2002, when nearly 
two in five women were enrolled in college.  African-American women have experienced 
some of the most dramatic increases in college enrollment, as rates of matriculation 
among this population have nearly quadrupled over the past thirty-five years (from 10 
percent in 1967 to 37 percent in 2002).  Male enrollment, however, has remained 
relatively stagnant, following a decline from a high of 35 percent in 1969 to 26 percent in 
1979.  Moreover, racial and ethnic gaps in college enrollment persist, despite the fact that 
rates of college enrollment have increased for some racial and ethnic minorities, such as 
African-American men and women.  Hispanic women and men continue to have the 
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lowest college enrollment rates (24 percent and 16 percent, respectively) of any racial or 
ethnic group, and African-American male enrollment has remained relatively stagnant at 
about 26 percent over the last decade, following increases in the 1970s and 1980s (see 
Figures 2-6 and 2-7).xx 
 
Figure 2-6.  Percentage of Female High School Graduates Age 18-24 
Who Are Enrolled in College, 1967-2002
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2004
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Figure 2-7.  Percentage of Male High School Graduates Age 18-24 Who 
Are Enrolled in College, 1967-2002
Source: US Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2004
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
19
67
19
69
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
ALL
White
African
American
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific-
Islander
Note: Data for Asian/Pacific Islander Americans are not available prior to 1999. 
 
 
College Degree Attainment.  As of 2004, fewer than three in ten U.S. adults age 25 to 29 
had obtained a bachelor’s degree or higher.  In addition, significant disparities exist 
among racial and ethnic groups in college degree attainment--gaps that have not 
narrowed significantly despite a dramatic rise in the number of students of color who 
gained access to college in the 1970s and 1980s.  For example, the percentage of African 
Americans with a college degree increased from 10 percent in 1975 to 18 percent in 
2000, but this rate has leveled off since then.  Similarly, the percentage of Hispanics 
holding college degrees hasn’t improved since 1985, when 11 percent of the Hispanic 
adult population held a college degree (see Figure 2-8).xxi 
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Figure 2-8.  Degree Attainment by Race and Ethnicity, Bachelor's 
Degree or Higher
Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics, 2004
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Financial Barriers to College Enrollment.  The high cost of tuition is a barrier to 
opportunity for students who come from middle- and low-income families.  Grants have 
been a vital source of financial aid to these students, and federal government programs 
such as the Pell Grants target aid to low-income students for whom post-secondary 
education would otherwise be unaffordable.  Since 1983, however, the increase in tuition 
costs at both public and private four-year institutions has greatly outpaced the increase in 
median family income (see Figure 2-9).  In response, many public and private institutions 
have greatly increased sources of financial aid, but most of the aid is in the form of loans 
rather than grants.  Moreover, the increased aid is not targeted at low- and middle-income 
families.  Sources of merit-based aid have increased relative to sources of need-based 
aid.xxii 
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Figure 2-9.  Inflation-Adjusted Changes in Tuition, Family Income, and 
Student Aid, 1983 to 2004
Source: The College Board, 2004
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ECONOMIC MOBILITY 
 
The chance to “get ahead” economically is central to the American Dream.  The 
optimism of the United States--the spirit that attracts newcomers and sustains lifelong 
residents--is grounded in the belief that any person in this country can achieve economic 
advancement, regardless of where she or he starts.   
 
How accurate is this belief?  Are economic rewards in America available to all based on 
effort and talent?  Can everyone succeed and reap the benefits of hard work?  Some 
studies of economic mobility published prior to the 1990s found that mobility in the 
United States was “significant and . . . remained stable over time.”xxiii  These studies also 
found that the share of people who moved into different income quintiles was greater 
when longer timeframes were studied.  Over a ten-year period, for example, as many as 
60 percent of people switched income quintiles, while about one-quarter to one-third 
moved into a different income quintile from year to year.xxiv 
 
More recent studies, however, find less mobility and a greater likelihood that those in the 
bottom and top quintiles will remain there.  These studies show that people in the lowest 
income quintiles experience the least mobility, with estimates ranging from 19 percent to 
38 percent average annual mobility among those in the lowest income quintile over a ten-
year period.xxv  A study that followed more than 6,000 individuals and families with 
children born between 1942 and 1972 found that 42 percent of those born in the bottom 
income quintile remained in this group on follow up, while another 24 percent moved up 
only to the next income quintile.  Movement from the bottom quintile to the top was 
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unlikely: Only 7 percent of those starting out at the bottom were among the top quintile 
on follow up (see Figure 2-10).xxvi  In addition, women, minorities, and other 
demographic groups who are disproportionately in the bottom income group are more 
likely to be stuck at the bottom.  For example, one analysis found that fewer than 20 
percent of whites born into families in the bottom income decile remained there as adults, 
compared to 42 percent of African Americans in the same circumstances.xxvii  Another 
study found that African Americans and people living in female-headed households were 
more likely to be chronically poor--that is, living in poverty for 24 consecutive 
months.xxviii  Moreover, whites are more likely to move up from the bottom than they are 
to fall from the top income group; the opposite is true for African Americans.xxix 
 
Figure 2-10.  Where Those Born in the Poorest 20 Percent of the 
Population Ended Up as Adults
Source:  Hertz, 2003, as reported by the Century Foundation, 2004
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A cohort analysis of U.S. Census Bureau data reveals that white households gained more 
in real income than African-American and Hispanic households between 1974 and 2004.  
This analysis, prepared for The Opportunity Agenda by the Washington, D.C.-based 
Economic Policy Institute, assesses median household income for those age 25 to 34 in 
1974, then again for those age 35 to 44 in 1984, for those age 45 to 54 in 1994, and for 
those age 55 to 64 in 2004.  This analysis examines age cohorts across decades, but does 
not follow the same people from one decade to the next.  White households enjoyed an 
average income increase of more than $20,000 between 1974 and 1994, before seeing 
these gains cut in half by 2004.  But African-American and Hispanic median household 
income lagged far behind that of whites at each measurement point, and increased to a 
smaller degree than did white household income (see Figure 2-11).xxx 
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Figure 2-11.  Real Median Household Income, by Race 1974-2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute Analysis of Current Population Survey Data, 2005
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Distribution of Wealth 
 
Wealth is unequally distributed in the United States, but some periods of time have been 
characterized by greater wealth inequality than others.  Today, the top 1 percent of 
households owns about one-third of household wealth, and the next 4 percent owns an 
additional 25 percent.  The bottom 80 percent of households own about 15 percent of the 
nation’s wealth.  This distribution has been fairly consistent over the last twenty years.  
But two recent trends are worthy of note: Between 1983 and 2001, the proportion of 
national wealth increased for the top 5 percent (from 54 percent to 59 percent), while the 
bottom four-fifths of households saw their share of national wealth decline from 19 
percent to 16 percent (see Figure 2-12).xxxi  
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Figure 2-12.  Distribution of Wealth by Wealth Class, 1983-2001
Source: Wolff 2004, as reported by Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2005
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Stock market wealth--in recent years, a major source of growth in family wealth--is also 
unequally distributed.  While the share of stock market wealth owned by the top 1 percent 
of stock-owning households declined from 41 percent in 1995 to 35 percent in 2001, 
stock wealth increased from 41 percent to 43 percent for the next 4 percent of stock-
owning households during this same period.  The top 5 percent of stock-owning 
households, therefore, maintained a disproportionately large (77 percent) share of stock 
wealth, a percentage largely unchanged over the last fifteen years.  During this same 
period, the bottom 40 percent of stock-owning households barely maintained a foothold 
in the stock market, holding about 1 percent or less of stock (see Figure 2-13).xxxii   
 
Mobility  29 
Figure 2-13.  Distribution of Stock Market Wealth by Wealth Class, 
Selected Years, 1989-2001
Source:  Wolff, as reported by Mishel, Bernstein, and Allegretto, 2005
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HOMEOWNERSHIP 
 
Homeownership, long acknowledged for its beneficial impact on household wealth and 
stabilizing impact on communities and families, has slightly increased nationally, from a 
rate of 65 percent homeownership in 1979 to 68 percent in 2003.  Homeownership has 
increased for all income quartiles, as well as for all racial and ethnic groups.  Hispanics 
saw the greatest gains in rate of homeownership, from just over forty percent in 1989 to 
47 percent in 2003 (see Figure 2-14).xxxiii  But large gaps in homeownership are found 
among income, racial, and ethnic groups.  In 2001, for example, nearly nine in ten of top 
income quartile households owned homes, compared with just over half of the lowest 
income quartile households.  Moreover, the rate of homeownership growth has 
disproportionately favored higher income groups.  Between 1970 and 2003, 
homeownership among the top income quintile grew by over 10 percent, while slightly 
declining among the lowest fifth of wage earners (see Figure 2-15).xxxiv  African-
American and Latino households are also far less likely to own homes than are whites.  
Although this gap is narrowing slightly, it is large and has persisted for decades.   
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Figure 2-14.  Homeownership Rates by Race, 1970-2004
Source: Economic Policy Institute analysis of U.S. Census Data, 2005
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Figure 2-15.  Change in Homeownership Rates by Income Quartiles, 
1970-2003
Source: Economic Policy Institute analysis of U.S.Census Data, 2005
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Mortgage Lending 
 
The vast majority of American homeowners must obtain mortgage loans to purchase their 
homes.  But a significant body of evidence shows that minority loan applicants continue 
to face discrimination when attempting to obtain a mortgage loan--discrimination that 
may, in part, explain the racial and ethnic gap in homeownership rates.  One of the largest 
and most significant studies to date, conducted by the Boston Federal Reserve Bank, 
assessed loan denial rates among white, African-American, and Hispanic applicants using 
a sample of about 3,000 loan applications for conventional mortgages in the Boston area 
in 1990.  Controlling for a variety of applicant, loan, and property characteristics, the 
study found that the rejection rate for African-American and Hispanic applicants was 82 
percent higher than for white applicants.  The statistical controls used in this study 
demonstrate that the racial difference in rejection rates occurred among comparable loan, 
property, and applicant characteristics.xxxv  Critics of the study charge that many 
methodological problems limit the study’s ability to draw conclusions.  A major 
reanalysis of the study’s data, however, finds that the large differences in loan approval 
rates between white and minority applicants cannot be explained by methodological 
problems, omitted variables, or other errors.xxxvi More recent studies using a range of 
controls have yielded similar findings. 
 
Subprime Lending 
 
Another barrier to homeownership for many in low-income communities and 
communities of color can be found in the type and quality of loan products available to 
consumers.  Prime loans--loans offered by banks and other commercial lending 
institutions at prevailing interest rates--are the most desirable home loans, and as such are 
typically only available to borrowers with good credit.  In contrast, subprime loans 
feature higher interest than prevailing rates, and as a result are often the only lending 
option available to those with credit blemishes.  But subprime lending can also crowd out 
prime lending in traditionally underserved communities, restricting the kinds of loan 
options available in these communities and increasing the likelihood that some 
individuals will fall victim to predatory and deceptive lending practices.xxxvii 
 
A recent analysis of federal home lending data conducted by the Washington, D.C.-based 
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) found that African Americans and 
Hispanics, women, and low- or moderate-income borrowers are much more likely to have 
subprime loans than prime loans in the vast majority of the nation’s 331 Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSAs).  In all MSAs, for example, women borrowed a higher 
percentage of subprime loans than prime loans, and in only 5 of 331 MSAs did prime 
loans exceed subprime loans among African-American borrowers.  In more than three-
quarters of the nation’s MSAs, a greater share of subprime than prime loans is found in 
predominantly minority census tracts.  And in 98 percent of these MSAs, prime lending 
lagged behind subprime lending in low- to moderate-income census tracts.  Moreover, the 
NCRC’s analysis revealed that the portion of subprime loans taken out by minorities and 
women increased with higher levels of racial and ethnic housing segregation within 
census tracts.xxxviii 
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At the request of The Opportunity Agenda, the NCRC analyzed federal data to assess the 
share of subprime loans relative to prime loans in low-income communities and 
communities of color.  Using whites as the reference group, the NCRC found wide 
disparities in the prevalence of subprime home purchase loans, refinance loans, and home 
improvement loans.  African Americans, American Indians/Alaska Natives, Pacific 
Islanders, and Hispanics all relied more on all types of subprime loans than did whites.  
These disparities increased among more affluent borrowers of color.  For example, low- 
to moderate-income African Americans are three times more likely than low- to 
moderate-income whites to have subprime loans.  But moderate- to upper income African 
Americans are nearly four times more likely than similarly situated whites to be 
dependent on subprime loans.  Similarly, moderate- and upper income American Indians, 
Pacific Islanders, and Hispanics were more dependent on subprime loans relative to 
whites than were their low- and moderate-income peers (see Figure 2-16).xxxix   
 
Figure 2-16.  Disparity Ratio, Subprime Home Purchase Loans, by 
Race, Ethnicity, and Income
Source:  National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2005 
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When analyzed by the demographic composition of census tracts, a similar pattern 
emerged.  Low- and middle-income borrowers in substantially minority census tracts 
were nearly twice as likely as low- and middle-income borrowers in substantially non-
minority tracts to receive subprime loans.  Yet this disparity ratio increased slightly 
among middle- and upper income borrowers.  And although low- and middle-income 
borrowers in substantially foreign-born census tracts are less dependent on subprime 
loans than are low- and middle-income borrowers in non-substantially foreign-born 
tracts, their middle- and upper income peers are over 1.5 times more likely than those in 
non-substantially foreign born tracts to receive subprime loans (see Figure 2-17).xl 
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Figure 2-17.  Disparity Ratio, Subprime Home Purchase Loans, by 
Type of Census Tract
Source:  National Community Reinvestment Coalition, 2005
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FAMILY INCOME 
 
Median family income has steadily increased over the last fifty years.xli  Growth in family 
income has historically been relatively equally distributed across all income levels.  In the 
last four decades, however, families at the highest income levels have seen greater 
average annualized income growth than have families at the lowest income levels (see 
Figure 2-18).xlii 
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Figure 2-18.  Annualized Growth of Family Income by Quintiles, 1966-
2003
Source: Economic Policy Institute Analysis of U.S. Census Data, 2005
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WOMEN- AND MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESSES 
 
Women-owned businesses have increased both in number and share of all business 
receipts.  Nearly 6.5 million women-owned businesses earned receipts totaling nearly $1 
trillion in 2002.  These figures represent a 20 percent increase in the number of women-
owned businesses since 1997, and a 16 percent increase in receipts.xliii  Sole 
proprietorships, which are nearly two-thirds of all businesses in the United States, are 
increasingly operated by women, whose numbers increased from 5.6 million in 1990 to 
7.1 million in 1998.  Women’s sole proprietorships increased their share of receipts 
during this period from 15 percent of the total to 18 percent.  Nonetheless, women-owned 
businesses remain a much smaller proportion than, for example, women’s representation 
in the workforce.  And these businesses are disproportionately concentrated in the 
services industries, as nearly 70 percent of all total net income among women sole 
proprietorships occurred in these fields.  The top two types of women sole business 
ownerships were in door-to-door sales and childcare.xliv    
 
Minorities have made marked progress in rates of business ownership over the last 
twenty-five years.xlv Minority firms have seen revenues rise by about 10 percent 
annually, and these firms grew at rates three times higher than non-minority businesses 
between 1992 and 1997 (see Figure 2-19).xlvi  The percentage of businesses owned by 
minorities increased from 7 percent in 1982 to 15 percent in 1997, the last year that the 
Bureau of the Census and the Small Business Administration published estimates of 
minority business ownership.xlvii  But the proportion of minority-owned businesses 
remains far below the proportion of non-white groups in the country.  In terms of the 
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“density” of business ownership, or rate of business ownership per capita, whites are two 
to four times more likely than African Americans and Hispanics to own a business.xlviii  
In addition, minority businesses are more likely to be in low- and no-growth sectors, and 
are disproportionately dependent on personal and family financing over business loans or 
other capital investment.xlix 
 
Figure 2-19.  Number of All Firms and Minority-Owned Businesses, 
1982-1997
Source:  The Boston Consulting Group, 2005
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WAGE DISTRIBUTION 
 
The distribution of wages across income groups has shifted significantly over the last 
three decades, as an increasing share of workers are earning higher incomes.  The 
proportion of workers earning poverty-level and sub-poverty-level wages (0-75 percent 
of poverty) has also declined over the last three decades.  But the share of low- to middle-
income wage earners remained relatively stagnant in this period (see Figure 2-20).l  
Moreover, as will be discussed in the chapter on Equality, wage inequality grew sharply 
between 1973 and 2004.  During this period, male workers in the lowest income brackets 
saw their wages decline in real dollars, while men in the highest income brackets enjoyed 
large wage gains.  And while women’s wages increased at all income levels, women in 
the highest income brackets enjoyed the greatest real wage gains relative to lower income 
female workers, and these gains did not eliminate the gender gap in wages.li 
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Figure 2-20.  Percentage of Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 1973 to 2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Distribution For White Men 
 
White male wage earners saw greater gains between 1973 and 2004 than did most other 
racial, ethnic, and gender groups, as the proportion of this group earning 300 percent of 
the federal poverty level doubled.  But the proportion of white male low- and middle-
wage earners declined, while the segment of these workers earning poverty-level wages 
remained stable and low (see Figure 2-21).lii 
 
Figure 2-21.  White Male Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 1973 to 2004
Source: Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Distribution For White Women 
 
White females saw the greatest gains of any group in wages since 1973, as the proportion 
of this group earning wages three times the poverty rate and above increased nearly 
fivefold, and the proportion earning twice the poverty rate nearly doubled.  At the same 
time, the proportion of white women earning poverty- and sub-poverty-level wages 
declined sharply.  But the share of white women earning near-poverty (100 percent-125 
percent of poverty) or moderate (125 percent-200 percent of poverty) wages remained 
stagnant (see Figure 2-22).liii  And as discussed in the chapter on Equality, the wage scale 
for white women remains far below that of white men.  
 
Figure 2-22. White Female Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 1973 to 2004
Source: Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Distribution For African-American Men 
 
Since 1973 African-American male wage earners have experienced modest growth in the 
proportion of workers earning incomes twice and three times greater than the federal 
poverty level.  Moreover, the proportion of African-American men earning poverty-level 
wages declined by nearly a third since 1992.  But the share of low- and middle-income 
wage earners (those earning between poverty-level and 200 percent of poverty) has been 
stagnant or declining since 1973.  And the rate of growth in wages among African-
American men has been far slower than for other groups (see Figure 2-23).liv 
 
Figure 2-23.  African-American Male Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 
1973 to 2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Distribution For African-American Women 
 
An increasing share of African-American women has joined the ranks of high and 
moderately high wage earners since 1973, as the proportion of this group earning 200 
percent and 300 percent of poverty wages or more have more than doubled.  At the same 
time, the proportion of African-American women earning poverty-level wages or below 
has declined sharply, particularly since the mid-1990s.  But these women continue to earn 
far less than their white male and female counterparts, even at similar educational levels 
(see Figure 2-24).lv  
 
Figure 2-24.  African-American Female Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 
1973 to 2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Distribution For Hispanic Men 
 
Since 1973 the share of Hispanic males earning poverty-level or near-poverty-level 
wages (100 percent-125 percent of poverty) has increased, while the proportion of this 
group earning moderate wages (125 percent-200 percent of poverty) has declined.  At the 
same time, the proportion of Hispanic males earning wages two and three times or more 
greater than poverty level has remained largely stagnant.  The proportion of Hispanic 
males earning very low (0-75 percent of poverty) or poverty-level wages has declined 
sharply, however, since the mid-1990s.  While the distribution of wages among Hispanic 
men can be expected to tilt toward the lower end of the wage scale as a result of 
immigration, these data nonetheless suggest that Hispanic men have seen little progress 
toward a more equitable distribution of wages (see Figure 2-25).lvi 
 
Figure 2-25.  Hispanic Male Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 1973 to 
2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Distribution For Hispanic Women 
 
Over the last thirty years, a declining percentage of Hispanic female workers earned 
poverty-level wages, and an increasing share earned incomes two and three times greater 
than poverty wages.  In 1973 60 percent of Hispanic female workers earned poverty-level 
wages; this percentage declined to 45 percent in 2004.  During the same period, the 
percentage of Hispanic women earning 200 percent or more of the poverty level 
increased by nearly fivefold.  They remain, however, disproportionately represented 
among low and very-low wage earners (see Figure 2-26).  As with Hispanic men, 
immigration plays a significant role in trends in wage distribution among this group. 
 
Figure 2-26.  Hispanic Female Wage Earners by Poverty Level, 1973 to 2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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HOW CAN THE NATION PROTECT AND EXPAND MOBILITY FOR ALL? 
 
Renewing socioeconomic mobility requires that we ensure access to quality education, 
homeownership, and other gateways to wealthbuilding and human development.  Our 
recommendations include measures that reduce financial barriers for everyday 
Americans, as well as greater safeguards against discrimination, isolation, and exclusion. 
 
Investing in Comprehensive, High-Quality Early Childcare and Child Education 
 
Early child development programs provide substantial benefits to the children and 
families they serve, as well as to society as a whole.lvii  These programs, which typically 
target low-income and other at-risk children, include a range of educational services, as 
well as (in some cases) health and nutritional services, and adult education and parenting 
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classes.  Several studies of programs such as the Perry Preschool Project, the 
Abecedarian Early Childhood Intervention Program, Head Start, and Early Head Start, 
find that these programs improve academic performance, decrease the likelihood of 
criminal behavior, and enhance earnings later in life.  Investments in early child 
education programs have been found to save, on average, more than $3 for every $1 
spent, by avoiding costs for remedial and special education, criminal justice, and welfare.  
A recent analysis finds that if all of the nation’s three- and four-year-old children living 
in poverty were enrolled in a high-quality early child education program, the net gains for 
budgets at all levels of government would exceed costs by $31 billion (in 2004 dollars) 
by 2030.lviii 
 
Rather than expanding, however, early child education programs are in danger of decline.  
For example, over the last twenty years, the educational level of early child education 
teachers has fallen, as the percentage of teachers with a college degree declined from 43 
percent in 1983 to 30 percent in recent years.  In large part this decline is driven by 
stagnant wages among the early child teaching workforce.  From 1984 to 1997, the wages 
of early child education teachers rose only 43 cents per hour in adjusted dollars.lix  
Renewed federal, state, and local leadership is needed to expand early child education 
programs, with the greatest expansion targeted to low-income communities.  One 
estimate is that expanding such programs to enroll all low-income three- and four-year-
old children would initially cost about $19 billion per year.  But within thirty years, this 
investment would improve worker skills, reduce poverty and crime, and increase tax 
revenues.lx  Teacher training and pay should also be improved significantly, to attract 
better educated teachers to the field and create incentives for existing childcare workers 
to improve their skills.lxi 
 
Promoting Socioeconomic and Racial Diversity in Public Education 
 
Passage of the 2001 No Child Left Behind Act elevated the importance of addressing 
racial, ethnic, and gender-based inequality in K-12 education.  Education policymakers at 
federal, state, and local levels are placing greater priority on improving educational 
performance for all groups and closing achievement gaps.  Laudable success in raising 
achievement among low-income and minority students in a few settings has been 
reported.  But unless addressed, high levels of school segregation threaten to undermine 
narrower, system-based or curricular reform efforts to improve educational attainment. 
Schools that have high percentages of low-income and minority students are 
overwhelmingly more likely to offer poorer quality educational experiences, have fewer 
resources, and have lower educational outcomes among students than are mixed-income, 
racially integrated, or minority white schools.  As Orfield and Lee (2005) note, “those 
who argue that because there are segregated schools that succeed we need not worry 
about segregation are engaged in a fallacy of using exceptions to the rule to prove a 
relationship” [italics added for emphasis]. lxii  
 
More and more court-ordered desegregation plans in many American communities have 
been dissolved, including even voluntary plans.lxiii  And the movement to provide 
vouchers to students as a means of encouraging school transfers threatens to increase 
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educational segregation, given relatively higher levels of segregation in private schools.  
School desegregation efforts, however, should not be abandoned.  Because much of the 
racial, ethnic, and income segregation in schools is caused by residential housing 
segregation, strategies to increase housing integration, such as those discussed in the 
chapter on Security, can help to stimulate school desegregation.  Other housing and land 
use policies, such as efforts to stimulate the development of mixed-income housing, 
should be designed to avoid the concentration of poverty and racial and ethnic isolation in 
schools.  School districts that are considering abandoning desegregation plans should 
assess the social and economic impacts of high levels of segregation, and they should 
create incentives such as high-quality magnet and charter schools that consciously seek to 
increase racial/ethnic and income diversity in schools.lxiv  In other parts of the country, 
where racial and economic segregation often correspond closely with school district lines, 
voluntary interdistrict choice programs have had success in placing children in lower 
poverty public schools.   Programs in St. Louis, Boston, and Minneapolis permit city 
children to transfer to suburban public schools.  In Hartford a two-way voluntary 
desegregation program places more than 1000 city children in suburban schools each 
year, with twice that number of suburban children coming to Hartford-based interdistrict 
magnet schools.lxv 
 
Efforts by some school districts to decrease income segregation in schools have resulted 
in better educational outcomes among low-income students, supporting research showing 
that low-income students have better educational outcomes when they attend middle-
class schools.lxvi  In Wake County, North Carolina, for example, the county school 
district’s effort to limit the concentration of low-income students to no more than 40 
percent within a school has resulted in dramatically improved test scores for African-
American and Latino children.  The school district encompasses the entire county, 
making it easier to assign students to schools across urban and suburban areas.  The 
district has created magnet programs in lower income areas, attracting students with a 
range of family incomes, and it has assigned students from low-income communities to 
schools in higher income areas.lxvii 
 
Improving Access to Higher Education by Reducing Financial Barriers 
 
Access to a college education is increasingly out of reach for students from low- and 
moderate-income backgrounds, as the costs of tuition and other fees are rising more 
sharply than income.  Between 1980 and 2000, the share of a low-income family’s 
earning required to pay for one year at a public four-year college increased from 13 
percent to 25 percent.  At the same time, sources of need-based student aid are declining.  
By the mid-1990s the maximum federal Pell Grant paid for only about one-third of the 
average college cost at a public four-year institution, a sharp decline from the mid-1970s, 
when these grants covered over 80 percent of costs.lxviii  Student loans, increasingly a 
major source of financial aid, constituted nearly 70 percent of federal student assistance 
in 2002-2003, and non-need-based aid constituted more than 40 percent of all financial 
aid.  Not surprisingly in light of these trends, despite the fact that college enrollment rates 
are increasing, fewer than half of college-qualified low-income students went to college 
in 2000, compared with nearly eight in ten high income students.lxix  The U.S. 
Mobility  45 
Department of Education’s Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance 
estimates that families of low-income, college-eligible high school graduates face an 
average annual unmet need of $3,800, and the shortage of grant aid will result in over 4 
million students being unable to attend a four-year college by the end of this decade.lxx 
 
Reducing financial barriers to college will require increasing the share of need-based 
grants, reducing dependency on student loans, and improving private sector participation 
through scholarship aid.  Federal Pell Grant awards should be doubled and the program 
fully funded, to increase the availability of need-based grants.  State-based financial aid, 
as well, should emphasize need-based assistance, and state, federal, and institutional 
financial aid policy must be better integrated, to create a complementary system that 
allocates resources more efficiently.lxxi  Finally, colleges and universities should make 
every effort to hold the line on tuition and fee increases, and offer reduced or no-cost 
tuition for academically qualified students from impoverished or low-income families. 
 
Homeownership and Lending Policieslxxii 
 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974 outlaw 
disparate treatment of applicants--the use of different underwriting standards for different 
groups in mortgage lending.  And the courts have generally interpreted federal civil rights 
laws as outlawing lending practices that have a disparate impact.lxxiii  Disparate impact 
discrimination occurs when policies or practices have the effect of discriminating against 
a particular group, and either 1) the practice cannot be justified on the grounds of 
business necessity or 2) the practice’s disparate impact can be avoided through less 
discriminatory alternative policies that meet the same business objectives.     
 
However, the current fair-lending enforcement system fails to adequately protect 
Americans who may face lending discrimination.  Inadequate standards exist for 
determining when disparate impact discrimination has occurred, and agency procedures 
are not designed to identify disparate impact.lxxiv  Moreover, studies demonstrate that 
current procedures also fail to identify cases of disparate treatment.lxxv  These fair-lending 
enforcement procedures also insulate some discriminating lenders from investigation, in 
that they focus only on a subset of possible discrimination indicators.lxxvi 
 
Drawing on federal guidelines established by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission to assess disparate impact in employment practices, Ross and Yinger (2002) 
offer a set of guidelines for underwriting systems that can be used to identify disparate 
treatment or disparate impact mortgage lending discrimination.  These guidelines draw on 
multivariate, performance-based procedures to determine the impact of underwriting 
systems as a whole on different racial and ethnic groups, to set high standards for prima 
facie cases of discrimination, to evaluate “business necessity” claims, and to establish 
fairness principles that prohibit practices that disproportionately hurt minority applicants.  
Ross and Yinger propose that assessments of how underwriting systems may be 
discriminatory should be based on loan approval regression analyses, which explain loan 
approval decisions for a sample of lenders based on applicant, loan, and property 
characteristics, and loan performance data, which can evaluate discrimination in loan 
Mobility  46 
approval and can be adapted to test for “redlining,” or unlawful exclusion of certain 
communities from loan consideration.  Fair-lending enforcement agencies must collect 
and assess lending and loan performance data to generate these analyses, and new 
provisions to the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act should require all lenders to report 
standardized performance indicators, loan characteristics, and originator identifiers.lxxvii  
These provisions require resources and effort.  Absent their implementation, fair-lending 
enforcement agencies are rendered ineffective in the effort to address discriminatory 
lending practices. 
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Chapter 3 
EQUALITY 
 
Equality was central to the United States’ founding, with the declaration that “all men are 
created equal.”  Our nation’s history has witnessed a gradual evolution of that core 
principle from an acceptance of slavery toward an egalitarian vision that embraces the 
inherent equality of all people.  Equality is embodied in our Constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection under law and in the other Civil War amendments.  Epic social 
movements of the last two centuries have moved our country, in fits and starts, further 
toward the reality of equal opportunity.   
 
Equal opportunity is also central to the system of international human rights that the 
United States helped to craft after World War II and the horrors of the Holocaust.  The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that “All human beings are born free and 
equal in dignity and rights.”  It goes on to guarantee all people equal protection of the 
law, equal pay for equal work, equal access to education, equal access to public service, 
equal rights to marriage, and an equal right to vote, among other protections.lxxviii  
Virtually every human rights document contains a similar guarantee of equal treatment.  
And the conventions on the elimination of racial discrimination and discrimination 
against women make concrete the affirmative obligations of all nations to provide equal 
opportunity.  The race convention, for example, requires governments “to review 
governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and 
regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination 
wherever it exists.”  And it recognizes the need, in some cases, for measures that 
affirmatively promote the inclusion of members of previously excluded groups “as may 
be necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
 
Equal opportunity requires that we all have access to the benefits, burdens, and 
responsibilities of our society regardless of race, gender, class, religion, sexual 
orientation, or other aspects of what we look like or where we come from.  It requires 
proactive efforts to remake our institutions in ways that ensure fairness and inclusion.  
Equal opportunity also means treating similarly situated people similarly, while taking 
account of human, cultural, and other differences.  It means, for example, that a person’s 
race, gender, religion, or sexual orientation should be irrelevant to her or his ability to 
receive a quality education or to buy a home.  It also means, however, that the health care 
women and men receive should be appropriate to their different needs.  It means 
considering the needs of Americans who use wheelchairs in designing a home, a bus, or a 
courthouse.  Expecting Americans who have not yet mastered English to navigate a legal 
system conducted only in English is not equal opportunity.  Nor is treating Native 
American tribes--endowed by our Constitution with a sovereign status equal to the fifty 
states--as if they were just like other community groups.  Equal opportunity is not 
treating everyone identically but, rather, treating everyone as equal. 
 
Ensuring equal opportunity in the twenty-first century demands a nuanced understanding 
of the progress that we’ve made as a nation, as well as the nature of contemporary bias 
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and systemic inequality.  It requires understanding, for example, how stereotypes based 
on gender, race, and other social characteristics can come together in unique ways that 
require individualized attention.  Ensuring equal opportunity means not only ending overt 
and intentional discrimination, but also rooting out subconscious bias and reforming 
systems that unintentionally perpetuate exclusion.  Ensuring equal opportunity requires 
acknowledging that we are all capable of bias and discrimination, including against 
members of our own group.  And it requires addressing the overt discrimination and 
bigotry that remain in society without suggesting that those are the only kinds of 
inequality worthy of our attention. 
 
Unquestionably, the United States has become more equal in the forty-plus years since a 
series of landmark civil rights laws prohibited discrimination in housing, employment, 
education, and other sectors of American life.  Yet inequality persists, and bias, often 
subtly expressed, continues to harm opportunity for women, people of color, immigrants, 
and low-income families.  Evidence in this chapter shows that the nation has witnessed 
major gains in equality in some areas over the last four decades, but that in many other 
areas equality is stagnant or declining. These findings are summarized in Box 3. 
 
 
 
About the Data in this Chapter 
Box 3: Has the Nation Protected Equality for All? 
Major Gains in Equality 
 The gender gap in wages is declining, largely as a result of gains in wages earned by 
women, but women still earn significantly less than men at comparable education 
levels; 
 An increasing share of women and women of color are assuming managerial and 
leadership positions in corporate and business sectors, although their numbers 
remain small relative to women’s levels of representation in the professional 
workforce. 
Areas of Limited, Mixed or No Progress 
 Although some evidence suggests that housing discrimination declined slightly 
between 1989 and 2000, audit studies continue to find high levels of housing 
discrimination against racial and ethnic minorities; 
 Although legal protections against employment discrimination have improved the 
job options of many Americans, studies demonstrate that employment 
discrimination against women and minorities persists. 
Areas Where Equality Has Declined 
 Wages are becoming more unequal across all income and education levels.  Those 
at the top end of the income and education scales are making more today than they 
did thirty years ago, and those at the bottom end of the income and education scales 
are making less today than thirty years ago (adjusted for today’s dollars); 
 The nation’s criminal justice laws and policies, particularly with respect to drug 
enforcement, are resulting in the disproportionate incarceration of people of color, 
and a dramatic jump in the incarceration of women and juveniles. 
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This chapter summarizes research on equality and equality of opportunity in several 
areas.  We draw principally on published analyses of federal data.  These include Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) data, which provides information on the 
hiring of individuals from protected classes in the workforce.  Similarly, data from the 
Bureau of Justice Statistics of the U.S. Department of Justice allow a broad overview of 
how various groups fare in the criminal justice system.  Where necessary, The 
Opportunity Agenda has also drawn on the expertise of researchers and policy analysts to 
produce original analyses of these data.  Finally, we review studies that measure 
inequality in today’s housing and employment settings to assess the extent to which 
discriminatory treatment persists.  More such studies are needed to determine if the 
likelihood of discrimination will change over time. 
 
We review measures of equality of opportunity in four major areas:  housing, 
employment, wages, and criminal justice.  In some cases trend data are lacking or are not 
comparable due to differences in population groups studied or methodologies used.  In 
these instances we draw cautious conclusions about trends.  As noted in previous 
chapters, federal data often lack complete information for some racial and ethnic 
minorities.  We hope that federal data in the future will more completely assess equality 
of opportunity for these populations. 
 
HOUSING INEQUALITY 
 
The Fair Housing Act of 1968 improved the housing options of many racial and ethnic 
minorities seeking to purchase a home or to obtain rental housing.  But racial and ethnic 
discrimination in housing persists, as demonstrated by several studies, including large 
studies sponsored by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). 
 
HUD’s major studies of discrimination in metropolitan housing markets, initiated in 
1977, use audit studies, or “paired tester” methodologies.  This approach is one of the 
most powerful methods available for detecting discrimination in any domain.  In these 
studies two people--one white and one minority (or an individual with a disability)--make 
up a pair of testers. The two individuals are matched on a variety of personal 
characteristics, trained to present and gather information in a consistent manner, and 
assigned comparable “background” information such as family circumstances, job 
characteristics, education levels, and housing preferences.  Testers then visit random 
samples of real estate agencies and rental agents that advertise housing in local 
newspaper and other media.  HUD’s 2000 study of potential discrimination in rental and 
sales housing markets was designed as a means of measuring change relative to the 
agency’s 1989 Housing Discrimination Study.  Its findings, much like those of the 1989 
study, indicate that racial and ethnic discrimination in housing markets remains 
significant and pervasive. 
 
The 2000 HUD study was conducted in 23 metropolitan markets nationwide and involved 
4,600 paired tests.  The tests assessed experiences ranging from geographic “steering” of 
testers to less-desirable communities, to differences in levels of financial assistance 
Equality  50 
offered to testers posing as prospective home buyers.  The study found that the incidence 
of discrimination against African-American and Hispanic home seekers declined slightly 
from 1989 to 2000, but that the likelihood of discriminatory treatment remained 
disturbingly high.  In rental markets, whites were favored over similarly-qualified 
African Americans 22 percent of the time, and over Hispanics 26 percent of the time.  In 
housing sales, whites received favorable treatment over African Americans in 17 percent 
of tests, representing a decline from 1989, when whites were favored in nearly 30 percent 
of tests.  Whites were favored over Hispanics in nearly 20 percent of tests (see Figure 3-
1).lxxix  In many cases, whites received more information about available housing and had 
more opportunities to inspect housing units.lxxx  The 2000 study also assessed 
discrimination faced by Asian Americans, Pacific Islanders, and American Indians, 
finding that these groups also faced significant discrimination at levels comparable to 
African Americans and Hispanics.  Asian Americans, for example, received poorer 
treatment relative to white testers in 22 percent of tests of rental markets and in 20 
percent of housing sales markets.lxxxi  These discriminatory practices are serious, limit 
home options for minorities, and increase the costs incurred by discriminated parties in 
finding housing.   
 
Figure 3-1.  Likelihood of Adverse Treatment Against African 
Americans and Hispanics Relative to Whites in Housing Markets, 1989 
and 2000
Source: Turner et al., 2002
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EMPLOYMENT 
 
People of color, women, immigrants, and other historically marginalized groups have 
made significant strides in gaining access to previously all-white and all-male jobs, 
particularly since passage and enforcement of federal anti-discrimination laws in the 
1960s and 1970s.  For example, women currently make up over half of managers and 
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professionals in the business sector, and some racial and ethnic minorities have achieved 
population parity in some professional occupations.  But barriers to employment equality 
such as race- and gender-based stereotyping and discrimination persist in many sectors. 
 
Labor Force Distribution 
 
America’s workplaces are becoming increasingly diverse with respect to race, ethnicity, 
gender, and other aspects of employee background and status.  This diversity reflects an 
important change in employer attitudes since the 1950s and 1960s, when white male 
workers were far less likely to work side-by-side with women or minorities.  But many 
sectors of the American workforce remain significantly segregated by gender, race, and 
ethnicity.  For example, although about three in five women seek work, women make up 
only 47 percent of the total labor force.  Women remain concentrated in traditionally 
female jobs such as service sector, clerical, and administrative office positions.  Nearly 
one in four nursing and residential care workers are African-American women, over 80 
percent of office and clerical workers are women, and Hispanic women are 
disproportionately employed in crop production, agriculture and forestry support 
services, and personal and laundry service jobs.lxxxii 
 
Women and Women of Color in Management Positions 
 
Women have made important strides in gaining access to management positions in the 
private sector over the last fifty years--although these gains have not been as pronounced 
at the highest levels of corporate leadership.  Labor force data collected by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics are not comparable across all time periods, but they suggest that 
women’s gains in the corporate sector were most dramatic during the 1980s and 1990s.  
In 1950, for example, the percentage of women in “managerial-administrative” positions 
was 13.8 percent, a share that rose to 14.4 percent in 1960 and to 16.6 percent in 1970.  In 
1980 26 percent of workers in these positions were women.  In the 1980s the Census 
Bureau reclassified this occupational category, which became “managerial and 
professional specialty.”  Women’s share of these positions exceeded half of the 
workforce between 1990 and 2002, rising from 45 percent in 1990 to 51 percent in 2002.  
Between 2002 and 2003, the occupational category was changed again, to “management, 
professional, and related occupations,” and again women were found to hold more than 
half of these positions, although the percentage of women managers declined from 50.5 
percent in 2003 to 50.3 percent in 2004.lxxxiii 
 
Women’s presence among top corporate officers, however, has lagged far behind their 
representation among business managers.  In 1995, the first year that data are available on 
women in uppermost management positions, as a result of survey work by Catalyst, only 
about 9 percent of top corporate jobs were held by women.  By 2002 the share of women 
among top corporate officers nearly doubled, to almost 16 percent, but this percentage 
remains far below women’s total representation in the corporate sector (see Figure 3-
2).lxxxiv  In 2002 only about 5 percent of top corporate earners were woman, although this 
rate is four times higher than it was in 1995.  And women comprise only 1.2 percent of 
Fortune 500 CEOs.lxxxv   
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Figure 3-2.  Percentage of Men and Women Corporate Officers, 1995-
2002, Selected Years
Source:  Catalyst, 2005
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Similarly, reports of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission demonstrate 
that while the proportion of women serving as officials and managers in the private sector 
has increased since 1990, the proportion of women of color in these positions remains 
low relative to their share in the overall population.  In 1990 less than three in ten 
officials and managers were women, and fewer than 5 percent were women of color.  By 
2001 the proportion of women in these private sector jobs increased to almost 36 percent, 
and almost 7 percent of these were women of color (see Figure 3-3).lxxxvi  Health care 
sector industries are the most likely and manufacturing industries are the least likely to 
employ women as managers. 
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Figure 3-3.  Percentage of Women and Women of Color as Officials 
and Managers, 1990-2001
Sources: EEOC, 2003 and 2004 
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A recent study by Catalyst of corporate senior managers’ beliefs about leadership styles 
found that both men and women endorse gender-based stereotypes that may significantly 
limit women’s corporate advancement.  Catalyst assessed whether senior managers 
tended to ascribe stereotypically “male” or “female” traits to leadership styles.  The study 
found that senior managers believe that women leaders are superior to men in 
“caretaking” behaviors such as rewarding and supporting subordinates.  On the other 
hand, male leaders were judged as superior to women in “taking charge” behaviors such 
as delegating tasks, problem-solving, making decisions, and influencing superiors.  These 
perceptions persist despite a significant body of research demonstrating that men and 
women corporate leaders display more similarities than differences in organizational 
settings.lxxxvii   
 
Employment Discrimination 
 
Research demonstrates that employment discrimination against women, foreign-born 
individuals, and minorities remains persistent and widespread.  This evidence emerges 
from two sources:  a large body of carefully controlled experimental studies that assess 
how minority and foreign-born job applicants fare relative to identical non-minority and 
U.S.-born applicants; and research examining actual employment practices and the 
representation of women and minorities in specific industries, relative to their proportions 
among qualified employees in the labor market.  Both types of studies are reviewed 
below. 
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Audit Studies of Employment Discrimination 
 
Audit studies of employment discrimination, as with audit studies of housing 
discrimination, find that job applicants of color are more likely than whites to face unfair 
and discriminatory treatment.  These studies find that blatant discrimination is rare, with 
employers rarely stating a preference for white applicants.  Rather, discriminatory 
treatment is often subtle and may not be consciously apparent to the employer.  White 
applicants may be coached to improve their application, may not have to follow the same 
application procedures required of a non-white applicant, or may be offered a position 
more quickly. 
 
A 2003 audit study of temporary employment agencies in California, for example, 
assessed whether African-American female job applicants would receive different 
treatment than white women applicants, even when provided with superior (albeit 
fictitious) qualifications.  To conduct this study, the Discrimination Research Center 
(DRC) selected African-American and white auditors, matched them on a range of 
characteristics (physical presentation, personality, speech, education level), trained them 
to match presentation styles and make objective observations while seeking employment, 
and provided them with resumes that made them ideal candidates for the jobs for which 
they would be applying.  To eliminate any doubt about their qualifications, African-
American testers were given slightly stronger credentials such as more months of relevant 
job experience.  The DRC tested 35 temporary agencies, always assigning the African-
American tester the first contact to avoid preference for white testers based on order of 
arrival.  Findings demonstrated that employment agencies preferred less qualified white 
applicants nearly three times as often as African-American applicants.  In 47 percent of 
all tests, white testers were treated more favorably than their African-American 
counterparts, while in only 16 percent of tests were African Americans preferred.  In 27 
percent of tests the pairs were treated equally, while in 11 percent of instances the data 
were incomplete or inconclusive.lxxxviii 
 
Audit studies have also found that job discrimination occurs not only on the basis of race, 
but that employers are also influenced by applicants’ criminal record.  Sociologist Devah 
Pager, in an audit study that matched African-American and white college students 
posing as job seekers, trained testers, varying only whether auditors were to present a 
fictitious history of a criminal record.  Auditors’ resumes were otherwise constructed to 
make them highly qualified for the entry-level jobs that they were seeking.  Employers 
with actual job openings were selected from listings in the classified ads of a local 
newspaper and from a state-sponsored Web site for employment listings.  Testers were 
then randomly assigned to seek jobs at these establishments, and the rate of callbacks was 
assessed.  In conditions where African-American and white auditors were assigned no 
criminal record, whites were about two and a half times more likely than their African-
American counterparts to be called back (34 percent to 14 percent).  In contrast, callbacks 
were less likely among both African-American (5 percent) and white auditors (17 
percent) who presented criminal records.  But even white auditors who presented 
criminal records were more likely to receive callbacks than African Americans who did 
not present criminal records (17 percent to 14 percent), leading Pager to conclude that 
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“race continues to play a dominant role in shaping employment opportunities, equal to or 
greater than the impact of a criminal record.” lxxxix  
 
Studies of EEO Data 
 
Since 1966 the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the U.S. 
Department of Labor have required that private employers of 100 or more employees and 
government contractors employing 50 or more employees must file annual reports 
detailing the racial/ethnic and gender composition of their workforce.  These EEO reports 
provide rich data about the distribution of women and minorities across a range of 
industries and occupations, allowing researchers to compare how specific businesses fare 
in the racial/ethnic and gender composition of employees compared to similar businesses 
in a given Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA).  Such comparisons allow researchers to 
identify how many businesses employ a disproportionately small number of women and 
minorities, relative to similar businesses in the same labor market. 
 
In one of the most comprehensive studies of EEO data, legal scholars Alfred and Ruth 
Blumrosen analyzed the employment practices of all 160,000 businesses that filed EEO 
reports in 1999.xc  This analysis included data on 37 million U.S. workers in 1999, a 
figure that represents slightly less than half of the U.S. workforce, as it does not include 
establishments with fewer than 50 workers, nor those outside of U.S. MSAs (about 20 
percent of business establishments). 
 
The Blumrosens assessed the “average utilization” of women and minorities across a 
range of business establishments in specific MSAs, then determined the number of 
businesses that employed women and minorities at disproportionately low rates relative 
to other similar businesses in the same MSA.  In this way, employment of women and 
minorities can be compared relative to the pool of qualified candidates performing similar 
work in the same types of occupational categories and industries.  Businesses that 
employed women and minorities at 1.65 standard deviations or more below the mean for 
a given occupational category and industry were classified as “at risk” for discrimination, 
given than the statistical odds of these employers’ workforce composition occurring by 
chance were less than one in ten.  Businesses that employed women and minorities at 
rates 2.0 standard deviations or more below the mean were classified as “presumed” 
discriminators, while those that employed women and minorities at rates 2.5 standard 
deviations below similar businesses in the same MSA were classified as “clearly visible” 
discriminators, since the probability of their employment practices resulting from chance 
factors was 1 in 100.  Finally, businesses that employed women and men at levels 2.5 
standard deviations below average over a ten-year period were classified as “hard core” 
discriminators.xci  These classifications also parallel legal standards for demonstrating the 
likelihood of discrimination through statistical evidence. 
 
This analysis revealed some positive developments:  Over 60 percent of establishments 
did not visibly discriminate against minorities, and over 70 percent did not discriminate 
against women.  Since 1975 women workers increased by 3.8 million and minority 
workers by 4.6 million over and above their rates of participation in the workforce in 
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1975.  And minorities and women made gains in managerial, professional, technical, and 
sales jobs. 
 
Despite these gains, however, women and minorities continued to face widespread 
employment discrimination in 1999, according to the report.  Over 75,000 
establishments--more than one-third of the businesses studied--employed minorities at 
rates 1.65 standard deviations below similar business in the same MSA.  This 
discrimination affected more than 1.3 million qualified minority workers.  Similarly, 
nearly three in ten businesses studied employed a disproportionately low share of women 
in the same types of jobs as similar businesses in the same MSA, affecting more than 
950,000 women.  Overall, minorities were found to face a 30 percent chance of 
discrimination across all occupational categories, while women faced a 23 percent chance 
of discrimination.   
 
Several industries were disproportionately more likely to discriminate against women and 
minorities.  About 44 percent of health service establishments were found to discriminate 
against minority workers.  Eating and drinking establishments, as well as general 
merchandise and food stores, were also disproportionate discriminators against 
minorities.  About four in ten of these businesses were found to have disproportionately 
low minority representation among their employees.  These same types of establishments 
also tended to discriminate at higher rates against women workers.  In addition, nearly 
half of trucking and warehousing businesses and industrial machinery and equipment 
business were found to discriminate against women. 
 
“Hard core” discriminating businesses were also more likely to account for 
discriminatory practices against women and minorities.  Over 22,000 “hard core” 
establishments affected 433,000 minority workers, and over 13,000 hard core 
discriminatory establishments affected 241,000 women workers, accounting for half of 
the total discrimination that these groups faced in 1999. 
 
Discrimination Complaints Filed with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 
 
In one of the few studies to assess trends in discrimination complaints over time, the 
National Partnership for Women and Families found that discrimination complaints filed 
with the EEOC in several gender- and sex-discrimination categories increased between 
1992 and 2003.xcii  The number of complaints filed is not necessarily indicative of the 
scope of discrimination in the workplace, because of data inadequacies, underreporting of 
complaints due to fear or lack of knowledge about how to file, and bureaucratic barriers 
to filing.  But the consistently high number of complaints indicates that gender, race, and 
nationality discrimination continue to require scrutiny.   
 
Sex Discrimination.  The total number of sex discrimination charges--nearly 25,000 in 
2003--increased by 12 percent from 1992.  Over the last decade, sex discrimination 
complaints have constituted about three in ten discrimination charges, the second largest 
category of discrimination claims.  Some groups filed complaints in dramatically 
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increasing numbers.  The number of sex discrimination complaints filed by Hispanic 
women, for example, increased by 68 percent, and the number of complaints filed by 
Asian-American and Pacific Islander women increased by 83 percent.  
 
Sexual Harassment.  Between 1992 and 2003, the number of sexual harassment 
complaints increased by 29 percent, to 13,000 complaints.  Increasing shares of these 
charges are brought by women of color.  The number of complaints filed by Hispanic, 
Asian/Pacific Islander, and American Indian or Alaska Native women more than 
doubled, while the number of complaints filed by African-American women rose by 42 
percent, to nearly 1,300 charges in 2003.   
 
Race Discrimination.  In 2003 race discrimination complaints made up over one-third of 
all EEOC filings, more than any other type of discrimination complaint.  Even so, the 
number of race discrimination complaints filed in 2003 relative to 1992 declined, largely 
due to a decline in the number of charges filed by African Americans.  During the same 
period, however, the number of race discrimination complaints filed by other racial and 
ethnic minorities increased, sometimes dramatically.  The number of complaints filed by 
Hispanic women, for example, increased by 183 percent, and the number filed by 
Asian/Pacific Islander women increased by 77 percent.  Among men, charges filed by 
Hispanics increased by 181 percent, and the number filed by American Indians or Alaska 
Natives increased by 151 percent.  These dramatic changes reflect a range of influences, 
including changes in awareness of discrimination law, increasing diversity of the 
workforce, and the relatively smaller numbers of complaints filed by groups other than 
African Americans. 
 
National Origin Discrimination.  Between 1992 and 2003, nearly 8,500 complaints were 
filed with the EEOC on the basis of national origin discrimination.  The number of 
national origin discrimination complaints filed with the EEOC by women increased 29 
percent during this period.  
 
WAGE INEQUALITY 
 
Wages have grown at strikingly unequal rates for different income groups over the last 
twenty-five years.  Accompanied by differences in the rate of growth of household wealth 
by wealth classes, this trend has stretched the class divide to unprecedented levels.  
Wages and salaries are the largest factor in income inequality trends, as wages make up 
three-fourths of total household income.xciii  Despite the fact that the proportion of 
workers earning poverty-level wages has declined, average wages for different income 
groups have become more unequal in recent years.  Between 1979 and 2003, wages for 
the top 5 percent of wage earners grew by 31 percent, while wages for workers in the 
bottom tenth remained stagnant, declining by 0.9 percent.  Almost all other income 
groups experienced wage gains, but the largest gains were at the highest end.  The top 10 
percent of wage earners, for example, saw their income grow by 27 percent in 2003 
dollars, while those in the bottom 20 percent and 40 percent saw their income grow by 
only 7 percent and 7.2 percent, respectively.xciv 
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During this period, however, wages have not always grown unequally.  Between 1973 
and 1979, wage growth was largely stagnant for most income groups, but grew most 
among the lowest 10 percent of wage earners, at 6 percent.  In the 1980s, however, wage 
inequality began to grow, as the lowest income groups experienced declines of 6 percent 
among the bottom quintile of wage earners and 14 percent among the bottom ten percent 
of wage earners.  Only between 1995 and 2000 did all wage groups realize significant 
and relatively equivalent increases in wage growth.  All income deciles experienced wage 
growth of at least 7 percent, with the highest growth (11 percent) occurring among both 
the top and bottom tenth of wage earners.xcv 
 
Wage Growth Among Male Workers 
 
Wage inequality has increased among men since 1973.  The top 5 percent of male wage 
earners saw a 36 percent gain in real wages, while the top 20 percent of wage earners saw 
an 19 percent gain in real wages.  At the same time, those in the bottom quintile of wage 
earners saw a decline of 6 percent in real wages.  Wage inequality among men increased 
sharply in the 1980s.  Wages for the bottom tenth of men declined by 11 percent between 
1979 and 1989, while wages for the top 5 percent of income earners increased by 7 
percent.  In the 1990s, however, inequality declined slightly as wages for all male income 
groups grew, although the largest growth was observed at both extremes of income.  
These trends were driven largely by across-the-board wage growth experienced by all 
income groups between 1995 and 2000, when wages for men grew by at least 6 percent, 
and as much as 11 percent, for all income quintiles (see Figure 3-4).xcvi 
 
Figure 3-4.  Change in Real Hourly Wages for Men by Wage Percentile, 
1973-2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Growth Among Female Workers 
 
Women have made significant gains in earned wages since 1973.  However, as is the case 
with men, the distribution of wages among female workers has become more unequal.  
The top 5 percent of women wage earners make 67 percent more today than they did 
three decades ago.  Those at the 80th percentile make 49 percent more today than they did 
in 1973, while women wage earners in the 20th percentile earn 19 percent more in 
adjusted dollars than they did in 1973.  Wage growth inequality among women grew at 
the sharpest rates between 1979 and 1989, when wages fell for women in the bottom 
tenth by 16 percent, while increasing among the top tenth and top five percent of wage 
earners by 20 percent and 22 percent, respectively (see Figure 3-5).xcvii 
 
Figure 3-5.  Change in Real Hourly Wages for Women by Wage 
Percentile, 1973-2004
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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The Gender Gap in Wages 
 
The increase in women’s real wages helped to reduce the gender gap in wages between 
1973 and 2004.  In 1973 the ratio of the average female wage to the average male wage 
was 63 percent.  Three decades later the gender wage gap closed by 18 percent, when 
average wages for women were 81 percent of the average wage for men.  This gap was 
reduced among all wage earners at almost all education levels.  The gender wage 
disparity was reduced most dramatically among men and women with less than a high 
school degree, as this gap closed almost 40 percent between 1973 and 2004 (see Figure 3-
6).xcviii  But the gender gap in wages increased between 1973 and 2004 among those with 
an advanced degree.  The wage gap among men and women with an advanced degree 
grew 10 percent between 1973--when women at this educational level could least expect 
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to see a disparity between their wages and that of men--and 2004, when the gender gap 
was largest among men and women at this educational level.xcix 
 
Figure 3-6.  Ratio of Real Wages of Men to Women by Education Level, 
1973-2004
Source: Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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Wage Growth by Education Level 
 
Real hourly wages became more unevenly distributed across education levels over the 
last thirty years, as wages rose for those with higher education levels, remained stagnant 
among those with a high school degree or some college, and declined among those with 
less than a high school degree.  The trend toward increasing levels of wage inequality by 
education level, however, is fairly recent.  In the late 1970s, wages among those with less 
than a high school degree rose most sharply among all education levels before markedly 
declining in the early 1980s.  By 1983 wage growth was relatively even across all 
education levels, before widening sharply by 1985.  That year, those with college and 
advanced degrees began to realize steeper wage increases, while those with high school 
degrees or less saw stagnant or declining wages.  Wage growth at all educational levels 
stalled or fell by the early 1990s, before becoming rapidly unequal again by the late-
1990s.  During that era’s economic expansion, wages fell or stagnated for those with 
lower education levels, and increased rapidly for those with college or advanced degrees 
(see Figure 3-7).c 
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Figure 3-7.  Change in Real Hourly Wage by Education, Indexed to 1973
Source:  Economic Policy Institute, 2005
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
 
Criminal justice inequality, in both enforcement and prosecution of law, has declined 
significantly since the days of state-sanctioned Jim Crow discrimination and police 
brutality.  Despite the initial progress toward equality following the civil rights 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s, evidence of unequal treatment in the criminal justice 
system on the basis of race, ethnicity, immigration status, and gender is persistent and, in 
some cases, growing. 
 
Researchers and policy analysts have only recently had the benefit of better quality, more 
consistent federal, state, and local law enforcement data.  Trend data like the kind we 
present in other chapters, are therefore lacking in most areas of research on criminal 
justice inequality.  The accumulated data, however, support the conclusion of the 
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights Education Fund, in Justice on Trial: 
 
[I]n one critical area–criminal justice–racial inequality is growing, not 
receding.  Our criminal laws, while facially neutral, are enforced in a 
manner that is massively and pervasively biased.  The injustices of the 
criminal justice system threaten to render irrelevant fifty years of hard-
fought civil rights progress.ci 
 
Racial Profiling 
 
Racial profiling--law enforcement practices that target minorities, immigrants, or other 
groups as “suspicious” on the basis of group membership--is hardly a new phenomenon.  
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But despite admonishments from political, civic, and religious leaders to abandon the 
practice, including from the last two U.S. presidents, recent developments suggest that 
the practice is expanding.  In addition to targeting of African Americans and Hispanics in 
past decades, law enforcement has selectively focused attention on young Arabs, Arab 
Americans, Muslims, Sikhs, and South Asians in the wake of the September 11, 2001 
terrorist attacks.cii  
 
Racial Profiling of Travelers and Motorists.  Evidence suggests that “traditional” 
profiling of racial and ethnic minority motorists and travelers persists.  For example, data 
from the Los Angeles Police Department reveal that from July to November 2002, 
African-American drivers were more than three times more likely than whites to be asked 
to step out of their cars, and African-American and Hispanic drivers were more likely 
than whites to be patted down and subjected to a body search.  In Volusia County, 
Florida, nearly 70 percent of drivers stopped on an interstate highway in 1992 were 
African American or Hispanic, despite the fact that these minority groups constituted 
only 5 percent of drivers on the highway.  And in Maryland, monitoring of traffic stops 
mandated by a court consent decree found that stops and searches by state police 
overwhelmingly involved African-American drivers (70 percent), despite the fact that 
only 17.5 percent of drivers, and those found to be speeding, were African American.ciii  
And a 2000 U.S. General Accounting Office report of practices by the U.S. Customs 
Service found that African-American women were nine times more likely than white 
women to be x-rayed following a frisk or pat down--despite the fact that they were half as 
likely as whites to be found carrying contraband.civ  Taken together, these findings 
indicate a pattern of targeting certain groups far out of proportion of any evidence of 
criminal activity. 
 
Race is also a factor in the intrusiveness of police encounters.  In 2002 police stopped 
16.8 million drivers, almost 9 percent of all U.S. drivers.  While the likelihood of being 
stopped by police did not differ significantly among white, African-American, and 
Hispanic drivers, African Americans and Hispanics were 2.5 and 3 times more likely than 
whites, respectively, to be searched during the stop.  Over 1 in 10 African-American and 
Hispanic drivers were searched during traffic stops, compared to fewer than 1 in 25 
whites.  African-American and Latino drivers were also almost 3.5 and 2.5 times more 
likely than whites, respectively, to experience police threat or use of force during the 
contact.  While whites were about as likely as African Americans to be ticketed (56.5 
percent and 58.4 percent, respectively), Hispanic drivers were significantly more likely to 
receive a ticket (71.5 percent).  Moreover, African Americans and Hispanics were more 
likely than whites to be arrested after a traffic stop (see Figure 3-8).cv 
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Figure 3-8.  Police Actions During Traffic Stops by Race and Ethnicity, 
2002
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005
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Racial Profiling and Immigration Enforcement.  The Immigration and Nationality Act of 
1965 was aimed at abolishing discrimination in immigration policy and practice.  But 
some groups still face barriers to equal treatment in immigration enforcement.  A study 
by the National Council of La Raza found that immigration officials and local law 
enforcement disproportionately target people who “appear Hispanic” for interrogation, 
detention, or arrest on suspicion of violating immigration laws, including many who are 
American citizens or legal permanent residents.  In the late 1990s, almost three-fourths of 
those deported by the Immigration and Naturalization Service were of Mexican origin, 
even though Mexicans constituted less than half of all undocumented persons in the 
United States.  And Amnesty International has documented a dramatic rise in the rate of 
law enforcement stops and interrogation of Arab Americans, South Asian Americans, and 
Muslim and Sikh Americans since September 11.cvi  
 
Racial Profiling of Drug Offenses.  The rise of the crack cocaine epidemic in the 1980s 
led many jurisdictions to dramatically increase criminal sentencing and law enforcement 
efforts to combat its trade.  Penalties for distribution of crack cocaine are now far higher 
than for distribution of larger amounts of powder cocaine, and law enforcement has 
disproportionately targeted African-American and other minority communities in the 
effort to halt crack cocaine’s distribution.  But national surveys of drug use and statistics 
on arrests for drug possession and distribution reveal that targeting minority communities 
misses the mark.  In 2000, for example, the National Household Survey on Drug Abuse 
found that 71 percent of crack cocaine users were white, while only 18 percent of those 
who used crack were African American, and just 8 percent were Hispanic.  Yet 84 
percent of those arrested for possession of crack were African Americans, while fewer 
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than 6 percent of those arrested for possession were white.  In contrast, although 81 
percent of users of powder cocaine are white, 30 percent of those arrested for possession 
in 2000 were African American, and half were Hispanic (see Figure 3-9).cvii 
 
Figure 3-9.  Drug Use vs. Drug Arrests, Crack Cocaine and Powder 
Cocaine, by Race and Ethnicity, 2000
Source: Amnesty International, 2004
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Prosecutorial Discretion and Sentencing 
 
Criminal prosecutors enjoy a great deal of discretion in decisions to bring charges against 
defendants in plea negotiations and in sentencing.  For example, the decision to bring 
charges in state versus federal court can have profound implications for defendants, who 
often face stiffer prison sentences if convicted in federal court.  This is especially true in 
drug offenses.   
 
Evidence showed that--whether intentionally or due to subconscious stereotypes and bias-
-prosecutors often exercise their discretion in ways that discriminate based on race, 
ethnicity, or gender.  For example, after 1986, when Congress enacted mandatory 
minimum penalties for crack cocaine distribution offenses, federal prosecutors rarely 
handled cases of white defendants.  A 1992 U.S. Sentencing Commission report, for 
instance, found that only minorities were prosecuted in half of the federal judicial districts 
that handled crack offense cases.  Only a handful of whites were prosecuted for these 
offenses in other federal districts, while hundreds of African Americans and Hispanics 
were prosecuted.cviii  Between 1992 and 1994, over 95 percent of all federal crack 
prosecutions were of non-whites.  As noted above, however, whites are the largest share 
of crack cocaine users, and at least one federal study concludes that users are more likely 
to purchase drugs from dealers of the same race or ethnicity.cix 
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Many studies also show racial and ethnic inequality in sentencing.  Mandatory minimum 
sentencing policies adopted in many jurisdictions have exacerbated racial and ethnic 
inequality in rates of incarceration, while doing little to deter crime.cx  In California, for 
example, the state’s three strikes law resulted in the incarceration of over four times as 
many offenders as any of the other twenty-one states that have adopted such laws.  Over 
two-thirds of those convicted of a second or third offense were incarcerated for non-
violent crimes, and African Americans and Latinos were disproportionately more likely 
to be imprisoned under the three strikes law.  African Americans, for example, make up 
6.5 percent of the California population and nearly 30 percent of the state’s prison 
population, but they represent 36 percent of second strikers and 45 percent of third 
strikers.cxi   
 
While some studies of racial disparities in death penalty application find that the race of 
the defendant alone does not predict a death penalty sentence, significant disparities in 
application of the death penalty emerge when the race of the defendant is considered in 
combination with the race of the victim.  Since 1976 African Americans have been 
murdered at rates seven to eight times higher than whites, resulting in a roughly 
equivalent number of African-American and white murder victims.  But 80 percent of the 
more than 840 people put to death since 1976 have been convicted of the murder of 
whites.  And a 1990 General Accounting Office review of death penalty studies found 
that eight in ten studies were consistent in their findings:   When African Americans 
murder whites, death penalty convictions are several times more likely than when the 
murder victim is a person of color, regardless of who committed the murder.cxii 
 
Gender Inequality in Criminal Justice 
 
As will be noted in the chapter on Redemption, in recent years rates of incarceration of 
women have risen more sharply than those of men.  Since 1980 the number of women in 
state and federal prisons and local jails has increased by more than 800 percent.  Today 
the total number of women involved in the criminal justice system--in prison, on 
probation, or on parole--exceeds one million.  Much of this increase relates to drug-
related offenses.  Between 1986 and 1999 the number of women incarcerated in state 
prisons for drug offenses grew by almost 900 percent, far exceeding the increase in 
imprisonment of male drug offenders during the same period.  Women of color have been 
affected most by the sharp rise in imprisonment of female drug offenders, even though 
rates of drug use among women of color are equal to or lower than rates among white 
women.  In 1997 about 44 percent of Hispanic and 39 percent of African-American 
women in state prisons were convicted of a drug offense.cxiii   
 
Moreover, in an increasing number of instances, much longer sentences are imposed on 
people with remote or passive connections to drug use or transaction, with a 
disproportionately harsh effect on women.  As detailed in a report produced by the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Break the Chains, and The Brennan Center for Justice: 
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Even when they have minimal or no involvement whatsoever in the drug 
trade, women are increasingly caught in the ever-widening net cast by 
current drug laws through provisions such as conspiracy, accomplice 
liability and constructive possession, that expand criminal liability to reach 
partners, relatives, and bystanders.  Sentencing laws fail to consider the 
many reasons–including domestic violence, economic dependence, or 
dependent immigration status–that may compel women to remain silent or 
not to report a partner of family member’s drug activity to authorities.  
Moreover, existing sentencing policies, particularly mandatory minimum 
laws, often subject women to the same, or in some cases, harsher 
sentences than the principals in the drug trade who are ostensibly the 
target of those policies.cxiv 
 
Racial Disparities in Juvenile Justice 
 
A 1999 report by the Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention found that there is “substantial evidence of widespread disparity in juvenile 
case processing.” cxv  For example, while minority youth are more likely than whites to be 
involved in the juvenile justice system, they are also more likely to be placed in public 
secure facilities, while white youth are more likely to be placed in private facilities or 
diverted from the juvenile system altogether.  And the defendant’s race or ethnicity plays 
a significant role at many stages of processing in the juvenile justice system, but appears 
to be particularly salient at intake and detention decision points.  When these disparities 
occur they tend to accumulate as youth are processed, exacerbating racial and ethnic 
differences.cxvi   
 
More recently, a report by Building Blocks for Youth found that: 
 
 Minority juvenile defendants are more likely than white juveniles to be waived to 
adult courts; African-American youth are almost 25 percent more likely than 
whites to have their cases waived to adult courts, even when charged with the 
same offenses; 
 African-American youth are more likely than whites to receive a disposition of 
out-of-home placement such as commitment to a locked facility, while white 
youth are more likely to be placed on probation for the same types of offenses; 
 Controlling for type of offense and prior admissions, incarceration rates for state 
public facilities were higher for African-American and Hispanic youth than for 
whites.cxvii 
 
Taken together, these studies show that significant barriers to equal opportunity remain in 
the criminal justice system, as in other aspects of society.  Moreover, as detailed in the 
chapter on Redemption, the consequences of involvement in the criminal justice system 
are increasingly severe, including the denial of voting rights, public services, and 
education. 
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HOW CAN THE NATION PROTECT AND EXPAND EQUALITY? 
 
The Glass Ceiling 
 
Catalyst’s reports on women in corporate leadership positions show that hiring more 
women executives or instituting more “diversity” or sensitivity training programs are not 
enough to counter persistent gender-based stereotypes that undermine women’s corporate 
advancement.  In fact, many of the corporate leaders who hold some of the strongest 
gender-based stereotypes about women’s leadership are more likely to work side-by-side 
with women than those who work in more male-dominated corporate settings.  Catalyst 
recommends four steps to combat the influence of stereotyping: 
 
 Make the performance evaluation process more rigorous and transparent; 
 Implement checks and balances such as mechanisms to more objectively 
assess personnel decisions to counter the effects of individuals’ implicit biases 
and stereotypes; 
 Educate corporate leaders and managers about the powerful and insidious 
effects of stereotyping; and 
 Highlight the accomplishments of women leaders, to actively challenge 
gender biases.cxviii 
 
In addition, individual employers should assess their own hiring and advancement 
practices with respect to racial, ethnic, and gender diversity by using statistical models 
and analytic tools to compare their workforce diversity to the pool of potential job 
candidates in a region, and by reviewing personnel practices and procedures to ensure 
that they embrace objective criteria.cxix 
 
Employment and Housing Discrimination 
 
The United States has made great strides in reducing barriers to housing and employment 
faced by historically disadvantaged groups.  Yet discrimination in these sectors persists, 
often in subtle forms.  Current methods of detecting and enforcing civil rights laws must 
be supplemented with strategies such as more routine use of matched pairs of testers that 
proactively assess discrimination.  In addition, better and more consistent data collection 
and analysis of potential discriminatory patterns are needed to understand how 
discrimination can persist, particularly in employment, in ways that employers may not 
be aware of.  Blumrosen and Blumrosen offer the observation that individual employers 
and potential employees rarely “see” discrimination at the interpersonal level, particularly 
when employers don’t have a conscious desire to subordinate women and minorities.  
Rather, discriminatory practices are only visible when data are collected and aggregated 
across a series of employment decisions.  “The discriminatory character of [employers’] 
judgments may become visible only when a pattern of similar activity is observed--often 
when employers are compared to similar establishments,” they write.  “When the 
comparison yields a significant disparity, the Supreme Court has concluded that there is 
‘substantial reason, based upon the statistical manifestations of the net effects of the 
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employer’s practices, to believe that the employer has violated Title VII [of the Civil 
Rights Act] on a continuing basis.’” cxx 
 
Criminal Justice 
 
Juvenile Justice.  Juvenile justice systems around the country are facing rapid 
transformation, as the demographic mix of the nation’s youth shifts significantly and 
larger shares of minority youth are involved in the juvenile justice system.   In the late 
1990s the Justice Department’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention 
selected five states to pilot initiatives to assess the disproportionate involvement of 
minorities in youth courts, and to improve how the juvenile justice system responds to the 
needs of communities of color.  Some of the best practices from these programs included 
efforts to address racial and ethnic bias within the system, such as data collection to track 
how minority youth are treated more harshly in the juvenile justice system (e.g., through 
higher rates of minority confinement), and strategies to improve diversion options for 
low-income and minority youth (e.g., through programs to encourage extended family 
placement).  Other strategies include developing programs to reduce barriers to parental 
and family advocacy, such as providing information and assistance to families to help 
them understand and better navigate the juvenile justice system.cxxi 
 
Gender Inequality.  Women are poorly and inequitably served by the criminal justice 
system.  As noted above, many women who are unwittingly or involuntarily co-
conspirators with drug-dealing male partners are treated as harshly as and sometimes 
more harshly than their partners.  Sentencing policies should take into account women’s 
level of culpability and control when their partners commit drug crimes.  Mothers who 
are sent to prison suffer twice the price for their offenses when their parental rights are 
removed.  Criminal justice policies should attempt to preserve families despite 
incarceration, so that families can serve as an important source of support for 
rehabilitation and reentry into the community.  Moreover, harsh penalties for drug 
violations have vastly expanded the role of the criminal justice system in addressing 
substance abuse, which is fundamentally a public health problem.  Yet the criminal 
justice system is poorly equipped to address the needs of women who face substance 
abuse problems.  And it is not at all prepared to correct the conditions--such as mental 
illness, poor economic and social supports, abuse and trauma, and coercive relationships-
-that lead many women to abuse drugs.  Substance abuse treatment and prevention 
programs must be made more widely available to those who need them, and treatment 
programs must address the needs of women with children by allowing mothers to care for 
their children while in treatment.cxxii   
 
Racial Profiling.  Racial profiling, whether based on race, ethnicity, nationality, or 
gender, or some combination, is based on stereotypes about the likelihood that members 
of these groups are involved in criminal activity.  But group stereotypes are an 
inappropriate and inaccurate foundation on which to base law enforcement practice.  
Frequently such practices violate the civil rights of those unfairly targeted, and alienate 
communities that might otherwise serve as allies to law enforcement.cxxiii  The Leadership 
Conference on Civil Rights, Amnesty International, and other organizations concerned 
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about racial profiling have offered several recommendations to curb the practice, 
including: 
 
 Encouraging all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies to expressly 
ban racial profiling, to establish complaint procedures for individuals who claim 
that they are the target of unfair profiling, to collect data on all traffic and 
pedestrian stops to determine if a pattern of profiling exists, and to adopt 
disciplinary procedures against officers who violate the profiling ban; 
 Establishing legal mechanisms to enforce bans on profiling, including by private 
citizens; 
 Developing public education campaigns to debunk myths about profiling and 
explain its flaws as a law enforcement tool; and 
 Establishing nationwide standards for the accreditation of law enforcement 
agencies, including standards to eliminate profiling.cxxiv 
 
More broadly, there is a need for both vigorous enforcement of existing anti-
discrimination protection and a new generation of human rights laws that address 
evolving forms of bias and exclusion.  This includes: 
 
 Increasing the staffing and resources that federal, state, and local agencies devote 
to enforcing anti-discrimination laws in voting, employment, housing, education, 
lending, criminal justice and other spheres.  This includes using data more 
effectively to better detect potential bias, for instance, by comparing companies’ 
workforce diversity with the composition of an area’s qualified workforce.  
 Assisting employers and other institutions committed to providing a fair and 
diverse environment, for example, by promoting model performance evaluation 
practices, greater cultural fluency, and other tools to counter bias and exclusion.  
 Crafting new human rights laws that complement existing civil rights protections 
by addressing subconscious and institutional biases more effectively, protecting 
economic and social rights like the right to education, and correcting exclusion 
based on socioeconomic status and other characteristics not fully covered by 
current laws. 
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Chapter 4 
VOICE 
 
Americans cherish the idea that everyone should be able to express their opinions, 
whether in the town hall, at the office water cooler, in newspaper opinion pages, in the 
voting booth, or face-to-face with elected representatives.  Indeed, democracy depends on 
the ability of all citizens to participate in the public dialogue.  Without the ability to 
express viewpoints and have them represented in government, individuals cannot 
exercise political power to help shape their community and country, nor can they 
participate fully in the nation’s cultural and social life.  And without diverse viewpoints, 
the nation suffers from insularity and fails to reap the benefits of pluralism.  Voice is 
therefore an important element of opportunity.  This notion is also embedded in 
international human rights principles, which the United States was instrumental in 
shaping.  Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, states 
that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes 
freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart 
information and ideas through any media, and regardless of frontiers.”cxxv 
 
The nation has made progress in expanding voice over the last four decades.  A note of 
great promise was sounded with passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act and enactment of 
many of the 1968 Kerner Commission’s recommendations about the importance of 
protecting minority voices in the media. However, significant obstacles to full democratic 
participation and expression remain for many.  More ominously, federal deregulation and 
relaxation of media ownership requirements--and general embrace of the goals of private 
interests at the expense of the public interest--threaten to reverse some of the gains and 
protections put in place in the 1970s and 1980s to protect and expand voice.  These 
findings are summarized in Box 4. 
 
Box 4:  Has Voice Expanded in America? 
Major Gains in Voice 
 While they remain underrepresented among elected officials relative to their 
proportions in the general population, women and minorities have made substantial 
gains over the last three decades in election to local, statewide, and national offices. 
 The presence of women and minorities in news organizations has increased over the 
last three decades, although these groups also remain underrepresented relative to their 
proportions in the general population. 
Areas of Limited, Mixed or No Progress 
 Women continue to be grossly underrepresented as sources in news reporting.  
 Communities of color are rarely the subject of news stories.  When they are the focus,  
the content of these stories remains largely negative. 
 The “digital divide” persists, as rural, low-income, and minority communities continue 
to lag behind wealthier and better-educated communities in access to and use of digital 
communications technologies. 
 Electoral participation among all groups has declined slightly over the last four 
decades, and significant gaps in voting persist among racial and ethnic groups. Asian 
Americans and Hispanics remain disproportionately less likely to vote for reasons of 
language access as well as lower rates of citizenship. 
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Areas Where Voice Has Declined 
 The racial and ethnic diversity of radio news organizations declined by almost half 
between 1995 and 2005. 
 Minority and local ownership of radio, television, and print media has declined in the 
face of greater corporate consolidation of media and communications outlets. 
 Rates of other kinds of political participation such as working for political campaigns 
or giving money remain low, and are declining for most groups. 
 
 
About the Data in this Chapter 
 
This chapter reviews trends in voice, and assesses the nation’s progress in protecting and 
expanding expression and political participation.  We examine a range of indicators 
including measures of political participation, diversity in news media, diversity of media 
ownership, media consolidation, and the digital divide.  Sources of data and information 
include federal data and reports, particularly the Census Bureau’s Current Population 
Survey, which regularly surveys a representative sample of Americans to assess voting 
behavior.  We also summarize federal reports on access to communications technology 
and on diversity among elected federal officials.  Other sources are reports by 
independent research and policy organizations such as the Project for Excellence in 
Journalism and the American Society of Newspaper Editors, and scholarly research 
published in peer-reviewed academic journals. 
  
Where data are available, we present trends over time on measures of voice.  As with the 
measures of opportunity presented in other chapters, common limitations of the data 
persist.  Data on trends over time are often not available, are not available for the same 
time periods across all measures, and are sometimes limited by a lack of data 
comparability.  In most cases trend data are limited by a lack of data on several 
underrepresented racial and ethnic minority groups such as American Indians, Alaska 
Natives, Pacific Islanders, as well as subgroups of Asian Americans and Hispanics.  And 
data are often lacking on the experiences of low-income communities of all racial and 
ethnic backgrounds.  We urge researchers to compensate for these limitations in the 
future by focusing on understudied groups. 
 
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION 
 
Voting in the 2004 Election 
 
Voting is a core function in a democratic society and therefore is an important indicator 
of political voice.  Yet the degree of U.S. electoral participation has fluctuated 
dramatically over the years, both overall and by race, ethnicity, gender, income, and 
education status.cxxvi 
 
The November 2004 elections drew the highest turnout of voters since 1992.  Nearly two-
thirds of people age 18 and older reported registering to vote, and almost 60 percent 
reported voting in 2004.  This relatively high voter turnout rate was good news, as rates 
of electoral participation had declined over the last several decades.  But the 2004 
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elections also revealed gaps in electoral participation among racial, ethnic, income and 
education groups that have persisted over the last forty years, despite a slight narrowing 
of some of these gaps over time.cxxvii  For example, fewer than three in ten Asian 
Americans and Hispanics voted in 2004, a rate half that of white non-Hispanics (see 
Figure 4-1).cxxviii  Women were slightly more likely to vote than men in 2004 (see Figure 
4-2).cxxix     
 
Figure 4-1.  Reported Voting and Registration of the Total Voting-Age 
Population by Race and Ethnicity, 2004
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005
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Figure 4-2.  Reported Voting and Registration of the Total Voting-Age 
Population by Gender, 2004
Source:  U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005
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Important differences in rates of voting emerge when gender, race, education, citizenship 
and income are considered.  About 56 percent of African Americans reported voting in 
2004.  But the gender gap--52 percent of African-American males voted, relative to 60 
percent of African-American females--was larger than that for other racial and ethnic 
groups.  By comparison, the gender difference in voting rates for white males (64.5 
percent) and white females (67 percent) was much smaller.  Hispanics were much less 
likely to report having voted:  Only about 35 percent reported registering and only 28 
percent reported voting.  This appears largely due to the fact that 41 percent of voting-age 
Hispanics are not U.S. citizens and therefore were not eligible to vote.  By contrast, only 
2 percent of white non-Hispanics and 6.3 percent of African Americans reported not 
being U.S. citizens and therefore not being eligible to vote.  Only 25 percent of Hispanic 
males reported voting, compared to 31 percent of Hispanic females.  Asian and Pacific 
Islander Americans had the lowest level of voting:  Only about 30 percent reported voting 
in 2004 and 32.5 percent of adults reported not being U.S. citizens.  Asian-American 
males were slightly less likely to report voting (29 percent) than were Asian-American 
females (30.5 percent).cxxx 
 
Voting is tied to education for all racial groups.  Overall, fewer than 24 percent of people 
with less than a ninth-grade education reported voting, compared to 52 percent of high 
school graduates, 73 percent of college graduates, and 77 percent of people with 
advanced degrees.  Family income also contributes to differences in electoral turnout.  
Reported voting increases with income for all races.  About 36 percent of those with 
family incomes less than $10,000 reported voting in 1994, compared to 49 percent for 
those with family incomes between $20,000 and $29,000, 68 percent for those with 
family incomes between $50,000 and $74,999, and 78 percent for those with family 
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incomes of $150,000 and above.  The increase in voting rates actually doubles between 
the lowest income group and the highest income group for whites, Hispanics, and Asian 
Americans.  Among low-income voters, however, African Americans report higher levels 
of voting than do other racial and ethnic groups.cxxxi   
 
The Census Bureau’s Current Population Survey also asks about reasons for not voting in 
the November 2004 election.  One of the best predictors of not voting was being “too 
busy, conflicting schedule,” which was selected by 31 percent of Asian Americans and 
19 percent of white non-Hispanics.  Asian Americans were also more likely to report 
being out of town on election day (12 percent), another example of conflicting schedules.  
Illness or disability was the most frequent reason for not voting among people age 65 and 
over (46 percent) and for people with less than a high school education (26 percent), but 
was also high for African Americans (16 percent) and for white non-Hispanics (16 
percent).  Registration problems were highest for Hispanics (11 percent) but, surprisingly, 
were lowest for Asian Americans (6 percent), who are more likely than other racial and 
ethnic groups except Hispanics to face language and citizenship barriers stemming from 
recent immigration.  Not surprisingly, only 6 percent of white non-Hispanics reported 
registration problems.  African Americans provided the highest percentage of “don’t 
know, or refused to answer” responses (13 percent), and white non-Hispanics reported 
the highest percentage of “didn’t like the candidates or campaign issues” responses (11 
percent).cxxxii   
 
Trends in Voting Over Time 
 
Data on trends in voting behavior over time reveal that registration and voting rates have 
generally declined since 1964.  This trend extends to men and women and to all racial 
and ethnic groups (see Figures 4-3 and 4-4).cxxxiii  Men were slightly more likely than 
women to vote until the early 1980s, when women’s rates of electoral participation 
overtook those of men.  Since then, women have been more likely to vote than men.  In 
2004 this difference reached almost four percentage points, as 56 percent of men voted, 
compared to 60 percent of women.  Racial and ethnic minorities, in contrast, have voted 
at lower rates than whites, although voting rates among African Americans have 
generally increased since 1992, narrowing the African-American/white voting gap 
significantly.cxxxiv 
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Figure 4-3.  Percent of Population Voting by Gender, 1964-2004
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2005
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Figure 4-4.  Percent of Population Voting, by Race and Ethnicity, 1964-
2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005
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Although not displayed in the figures above, the overall decline over the last forty years 
in electoral participation extends to almost all age groups.  The youngest age group, age 
18 to 24, who report the lowest level of voting today (42 percent), reported higher voting 
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rates in 1964 (51 percent). Although people age 18 and 19 became eligible to vote in 
1972, they slid to an all-time voter participation low of 16.6 percent in 1998.  The youth 
turnout for the 2004 election (42 percent) marked a large rebound from its 17 percent 
voting rate in the 2002 election.  This contrast is partly explained by the lower voting 
rates for congressional elections every two years, compared to the presidential elections 
every four years.  Although white non-Hispanics appeared to have the highest voting rate 
among young people in 2004 (48 percent), this rate was less than that of young whites 
who reported voting in 1964 (52 percent).  In 2004 young Hispanics voted at rates far 
lower (20 percent) than their highest level in 1972 (31 percent), although their 2004 
turnout was far greater than it was in 2002 (8 percent) and 1990 (8 percent).  On the other 
hand, two positive trends emerged among young voters of color in 2004.  Nearly one-
quarter of young Asian Americans reported voting, which more than doubled their voting 
rate relative to 1994.  And in 2004 young African Americans reported voting at rates as 
high as those in 1964.cxxxv 
 
Rates of voting among African Americans were highest in 1964, when 58.5 percent of the 
U.S. African-American population cast ballots.  This rate declined through the late 1970s, 
before increasing slightly in the early 1980s.  African Americans age 25 to 44 reported 
higher voting rates in 1964, 1968, and 1972 than in 2004, and those aged 45 to 64 also 
had higher voting rates in 1964, 1968, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2000 than in 2004.  
African Americans over age 65 voted at rates almost as high as in 2004 (64 percent) as in 
2000 (65 percent), which was considerably higher than their 45 percent turnout in 1964, 
before passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act.   
 
In 2004 younger Hispanics voted at rates below their rate for 1972 and 1984.  In 2004 
Hispanics over age 65 increased their voting rate to 46 percent. This figure was much 
higher than their voting rate of 27 percent in 1972, but lower than their peak of 50 percent 
in 2000. 
 
Asian Americans were more likely to vote at older age groups in each of the last eight 
election cycles, and have gradually increased their voting rate over time.  But Asian 
Americans over age 65 remained virtually tied with the low voting rate of Hispanics, 
before dropping to the lowest rate of 38 percent in 2004. 
 
Other Forms of Political Participation 
 
Voting is the most significant form of political expression in a democracy, but other 
political activities such as helping political campaigns or making contributions to 
political parties or candidates are also important elements of voice.  Without public 
engagement in these activities, the political process is likely to be dominated by narrow 
private interests. 
 
Unfortunately, Americans’ level of involvement in political activity, as with voting, has 
been low and declining slightly over the last three to four decades.  With some important 
exceptions, Americans are less likely to volunteer time or contribute money to political 
campaigns than they were a generation ago.  And although men and women don’t vary 
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significantly in these activities, gaps in measures of political activity do exist among 
racial and socioeconomic groups.cxxxvi  
 
The National Election Studies (NES) database, assembled by the University of Michigan, 
has tracked public opinion and electoral behavior for a random sample of the U.S. 
population from 1948 to 2002.  The thousands of respondents in this database are 
representative of a range of demographic groups, including people with different income 
and education levels, although data on racial and ethnic groups are limited to African 
Americans and whites.  These data reveal large overall declines in activities such as 
attending a political meeting.  Fewer than 6 percent of NES respondents reported 
attending a political meeting in 2002, compared to 9 percent in 1968.  These data reveal 
minimal differences between men and women and between African Americans and 
whites on this variable.  But people with higher incomes and higher levels of education 
are more likely to attend a political meeting, although these gaps have narrowed as rates 
of participation in political meetings have declined overall (see Figures 4-5 and 4-6).cxxxvii 
 
Figure 4-5.  Percentage of Respondents Who Attended a Political 
Meeting by Education Level, 1968-2004
Source: National Election Studies, 2005
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Figure 4-6.  Percentage of Repodents Who Attended a Political 
Meeting by Income Percentile, 1968-2004
Source: National Election Studies, 2005
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Similarly, the percentage of NES respondents who worked for a political campaign is 
small and has declined over the last thirty years.  Both men and women and African 
Americans and whites volunteered at roughly equivalent levels (not shown).  However, 
those with lower levels of education and income historically have been less likely than 
their better educated and better off counterparts to work for political campaigns.  
However, these gaps reversed dramatically in 2002, when more people with less than a 
high school degree reported working for political campaigns (see Figures 4-7 and 4-
8).cxxxviii 
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Figure 4-7.  Percentage of Respondents Who Worked for a Political 
Party or Candidate by Education Level, 1968-2002
Source: National Election Studies, 2004
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Figure 4-8.  Percentage of Respondents Who Worked for a Political 
Party or Candidate by Income Percentile, 1968-2000
Source: National Election Studies, 2004
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People with higher levels of education and income historically have been more likely to 
report contributing money to a political campaign, although NES data suggest that these 
Voice  80 
trends are shifting dramatically, as individuals with a high school degree or less reported 
sharply increased levels of political giving in 1998, 2000, and 2002 (see Figure 4-9).cxxxix   
 
Figure 4-9.  Percentage of Respondents Who Gave Money to Help a 
Campaign, by Education Level, 1970-2002
Source: National Election Studies, 2004
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It is not clear whether this increase in reported political giving reflects an actual rise in 
political activity, or is driven by a response bias--a tendency to respond positively or the 
creation of skewed responses due to elimination of respondents who refuse to answer 
questions about income level.  Other NES data, however, do not suggest high rates of 
response bias.  It is therefore possible that these trends reflect increasing levels of 
political engagement among groups whose voice is less often heard in the political arena. 
 
Diversity Among Elected Officials 
 
The doors to elective offices are opening for groups that historically have been 
underrepresented in government.  Women and racial and ethnic minorities have made 
substantial gains in election to local, statewide, and national offices.  These gains have 
been particularly pronounced in the last three decades, when the percentages of women 
and minority elected officials grew severalfold.  However, these groups remain 
underrepresented in these positions relative to their proportions in the overall population.  
Moreover, the gains that women and minorities have made in attaining elective office 
appear to have leveled off in the last ten years, halting progress toward greater 
inclusiveness in government. 
 
Over the last thirty years women have been elected to local, statewide, and national 
offices in substantial numbers.  More recently, several gender barriers were broken in the 
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2004 election cycle.  Today, 12 of the nation’s 100 largest cities are led by women 
mayors, and over 16 percent of cities with populations over 30,000 are led by women.  In 
six states--Maryland, Delaware, Arizona, Nevada, Vermont, and Washington--women 
hold one-third or more of seats in the state legislature.cxl  Women hold 15 percent of the 
seats in the U.S. Congress, and nationally women hold almost 26 percent of statewide 
elective offices and 23 percent of seats in state legislatures.  But these gains still leave 
women underrepresented relative to the proportion in the overall population.  Moreover, 
as displayed in Figure 4-10, women’s gains in attaining elective office in the 1970s and 
1980s have leveled off, and in some cases have declined slightly.cxli 
 
Figure 4-10.  Percentages of Women in Elective Offices
Source:  Center for American Women and Politics, 2005
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Racial and ethnic minorities have similarly made gains in attaining elective office.  
African Americans, for example, now hold more than 9,000 elected offices across the 
nation, six times the number of African-American elected officials in 1970.cxlii  And 
Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders now hold over 2,000 elected and appointed 
positions in 37 states, the District of Columbia, American Samoa, Guam, and the Mariana 
Islands.cxliii 
 
As with women elected officials, however, these gains appear to have leveled off since 
the mid-1990s.  The number of racial and ethnic minorities elected to the U.S. Congress, 
for example, has remained relatively stagnant since 1993, following a period from 1970 
to 1990 in which congressional members of color increased two- and three-fold for most 
groups (see Figure 4-11).cxliv  And the U.S. Senate has only recently regained an African-
American senator, and for the first time includes two Hispanic senators in the same 
congressional session. 
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Figure 4-11.  Elected Officials in Congress by Racial/Ethnic Minority 
Group, 1970-2005
Sources: CRS, 2005, and Arab-American Institute, 2005 
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DIVERSITY IN NEWS MEDIA 
 
In the summer of 2005 most American consumers of national broadcast television news 
received almost daily stories of missing people, but these stories were hardly 
representative of the thousands of missing person cases that law enforcement confronts 
each year.  In almost all of these stories, the missing individuals were young, white, 
attractive women.  Similar stories involving women or children of color were rarely 
covered, prompting columnists such as Eugene Robinson and others to observe that 
“Cable television executives, producers and anchors have decided that viewers will stay 
glued to the set to hear endlessly about young, photogenic, missing women--but only if 
they're white.”cxlv 
 
Media critics argue that such omissions are to be expected in a ratings-driven 
environment, where major media outlets compete to be the first to provide a narrow range 
of content that meets the public’s appetite.  But negative consequences can arise from 
insufficient diversity of news content and attention to the concerns of all communities.  A 
2001 poll conducted by the Kaiser Family Foundation, The Washington Post, and 
Harvard University found that a majority of white Americans were unaware of the wide 
social and economic gap that persists between African Americans and whites.  “Whether 
out of hostility, indifference or simple lack of knowledge,” Richard Morin and Claudia 
Deane of The Washington Post wrote, “large numbers of White Americans incorrectly 
believe that African Americans are as well off as Whites in terms of their jobs, incomes, 
schooling, and health care.”cxlvi 
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Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Diversity in the News Media Workforce 
 
Many factors influence why and how news content is assessed, produced, and delivered.  
But some factors are likely to be important influences on the extent and quality of 
diversity in news coverage:  the degree of diversity in the news media workforce, 
particularly at the level of editors, supervisors, and managers; attitudes of the media 
workforce toward the importance of covering marginalized communities and diversity 
issues; diversity of media ownership; and the level of commitment of news organizations 
to serve a public interest mission and present a representative picture of the 
community.cxlvii  Below we assess part of this equation by reviewing trends in the gender 
and racial/ethnic diversity of the news media workforce. 
 
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Diversity in the Print Newspaper Workforce.  Have the 
newsrooms of America’s print media, still a major source of news coverage and analysis, 
despite the growth of electronic media sources, changed over the years?  Have they 
become more or less racially and ethnically diverse?  Have women been able to 
overcome historical barriers to leadership roles?  Since 1978 the John S. and James L. 
Knight Foundation has supported an annual survey of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors (ASNE) to answer these questions.  The survey allows comparisons 
of the racial composition of newspaper staffs to the racial composition of the 
communities they serve.  The ASNE’s annual census of newsroom employment, also 
conducted since 1978, tracks the number of racial and ethnic minorities and women who 
serve as full-time journalists in daily English-language newspapers nationwide. cxlviii  Of 
the 1,410 daily English-language newspapers surveyed by the ASNE in 2005, 924 
responded to the survey--a 66 percent response rate.   
  
Figure 4-12 displays ASNE data on the percentage of minorities in the professional 
workforce of newspapers in eight circulation categories. cxlix  Minority employment has 
gradually increased from 4 percent to 13 percent between 1978 and 2005, and diversity 
has increased across all circulation categories.   Diversity is greatest among the mid-size 
(100,000 circulation) and largest circulation newspapers, and continues to increase 
modestly in most circulation categories.  However, since 2000 this expansion has leveled 
off and is declining in the largest newspapers (above 500,000 circulation).  In fact, almost 
three-quarters of the nation’s 200 largest newspapers experienced declines in the number 
of minority professionals working in their newsrooms between 1990 and 2004. 
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Figure 4-12.  Minorities as a Percentage of the Professional Workforce 
of Newspapers in Eight Circulation Categories, Selected Years 1980 - 
2005
Source:  American Society of Newspaper Executives, 2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
1980 1983 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
 o
f 
M
in
o
ri
ti
e
s
 i
n
 N
e
w
s
p
a
p
e
r 
W
o
rk
fo
rc
e
Over
500,000
250,001 to
500,000
100,001 to
250,000
50,001 to
100,000
25,001 to
50,000
10,001 to
25,000
5,001 to
10,000
5,000 and
under
 
 
Of all newspapers participating in the ASNE study, only about one in eight achieved 
ASNE’s goal of reaching parity between the paper’s professional staff and the 
community it serves.  Nearly two of every five newspapers reported having no minorities 
among their professional staffs.  In ASNE’s 2005 survey this latter group included 346 
newspapers.  Many of these papers are very small and serve majority-white communities.  
But the survey revealed that several all-white newspapers serve “majority minority” 
communities, and forty all-white newspapers serve communities where at least 25 percent 
of the population is non-white.  Perhaps of greater concern is the fact that more than half 
of the 486 dailies that did not respond to the survey had reported in a previous year’s 
response that they had no minorities in the newsroom.  This suggests that as many as 44 
percent of all newspapers (621 out of 1,410) may have had all-white newsrooms.cl 
 
Women have increased as a proportion of the newspaper workforce, but gains have been 
slow or stagnant in recent years.  Published ASNE data do not report the proportion of 
women in newsrooms prior to 1999.  But women have made few gains in proportion to 
men in newsrooms over the last seven years.  Women are disproportionately more likely 
to serve as copy or layout editors, and are underrepresented among newspaper 
supervisors and photographers.   
 
Racial, Ethnic, and Gender Diversity in Radio and TV News Broadcasting.  As with print 
news organizations, radio and television broadcast news organizations appear to have 
achieved peak levels of racial, ethnic, and gender diversity in the 1990s.  But this 
diversity has since leveled off and, in some cases, has declined in recent years.  These 
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trends occur when the percentage of U.S. racial and ethnic minorities has increased 
sharply, far outpacing these groups’ representation in the TV and radio news workforce. 
 
The Radio and Television News Directors Association (RTNDA) sponsors an annual 
survey to monitor the presence of minorities and women in radio and TV news station 
workforces around the country.  The RTNDA’s 2005 survey reached all 1,624 
nonsatellite television stations and a random sample of 1,509 radio stations.  With more 
than three-quarters of television stations responding, this survey provides one of the most 
complete assessments of gender and racial/ethnic diversity in the radio and TV 
marketplace.  The RTNDA’s surveys began in 1990, and comparable forms of data 
gauging the progress of women and minorities are available beginning in the mid-1990s.  
This timeframe therefore only permits an assessment of trends over the last ten years. 
 
Although the representation of women and minorities in television news hasn’t changed 
much over the last decade, the percentage of minorities in radio news has declined since 
1998, when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) suspended rules requiring 
that all radio, television, and cable broadcast licensees report the participation of women 
and minorities in the news media workforce.  This change came in response to the D.C. 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling in Lutheran Church Missouri Synod v. FCC, which held 
that aspects of the FCC’s Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) requirements were 
unconstitutional.  In 2000 the FCC reinstated the requirement that broadcasters file 
annual employment reports, but the agency uses the data only to monitor employment 
trends and to prepare reports for Congress.  It no longer uses the data to ensure that 
stations are making sufficient efforts to recruit minorities.cli   
 
The percentage of racial and ethnic minorities in the radio workforce declined by almost 
half, from 15 percent to 8 percent between 1995 and 2005.  In 2005 over 92 percent of 
the radio news workforce was white.  In contrast, minority representation in television 
news grew from 17 percent in 1995 to 21 percent in 2005, although the latter figure is 
much lower than the percentage of minorities in the U.S. population (30 percent).  
Minority participation rates in the radio and TV news workforce are displayed in Figures 
4-13 and 4-14.clii 
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Figure 4-13.  Percentage of Broadcast TV News Workforce, by 
Race/Ethnicity, Selected Years 1995 - 2005
Sources: Papper, 2003, 2004, 2005, and RTNDA, 2000
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Figure 4-14.  Percentage of Broadcast Radio News Workforce, by 
Race/Ethnicity, Selected Years 1995-2005
Sources:  Papper, 2003, 2004, 2005, and RTNDA, 2000
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Women made inconsistent gains in the radio and TV broadcast news industry, although 
published RTNDA data do not track their representation before 2000.  A larger 
percentage of women hold jobs in the television news workforce than in the radio news 
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industry, but the percentage of women news directors in radio news has surpassed that of 
television news in 2004 and 2005 (see Figure 4-15).cliii 
 
Figure 4-15.  Percentage of Women in Broadcast TV and Radio News 
Workforce by Position, Selected Years 2000-2005
Sources:  Papper, 2005, 2004, 2003 and RTNDA, 2000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
2000 2003 2004 2005
P
e
rc
e
n
ta
g
e
TV News
Directors
TV News
Workforce
Radio News
Directors
Radio News
Workforce
 
 
Women and Minorities as Sources for and Subjects in the News 
 
Women and minorities also face barriers to being sources for and subjects of the news 
media.   
 
Women as News Sources. In a 2005 study of news media sources appearing in more than 
16,000 news articles published by 45 news outlets, the Project for Excellence in 
Journalism found that women are grossly underrepresented as news sources.  More than 
three-fourths of news stories contain male sources, but only one-third include a woman as 
a source.  This disparity extends beyond primary sources--reporters are three times more 
likely to cite two or more males than two or more females in news stories.  Newspapers 
tend to use women as sources to a higher degree than do other media, as just over two in 
five newspaper stories contain a female source.  Cable network news, on the other hand, 
tends to overlook women as sources, as fewer than one in five cable news stories contain 
a female source.  Not surprisingly, lifestyle stories are the only type of news story across 
all news media that tend to feature women as sources:  Over half of these stories include 
female sources.cliv 
 
Research by the White House Project that was released in 2001 showed that women and 
people of color are almost absent as speakers on influential Sunday news shows such as 
This Week (ABC), Face the Nation (CBS), Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer (CNN), Fox 
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News Sunday (FOX), and Meet the Press (NBC).  The research showed that “while the 
topics and areas of expertise of the guests may differ, one factor remains constant: the 
vast majority of guests are white and male.” clv 
 
Minorities as News Subjects 
 
Minorities are still rarely covered in news media.  When they are, coverage tends to be 
negative, subtly reinforcing racial and ethnic stereotypes.  A study commissioned by the 
National Association of Hispanic Journalists, for example, found that of 16,000 stories 
covered on four network news channels in 2002, only 120 (0.75 percent) were about 
Latinos.  This represented an increase of more than 20 percent from previous years, when 
only 99 stories were about Latinos.  But the proportion of news stories on these networks 
was far below the 13 percent representation of Latinos in the U.S. population.  Two-
thirds of the 2002 network news coverage of Latinos involved crime, terrorism, or illegal 
immigration, and 47 stories involved Latinos as victims or perpetrators of crime.clvi   
 
Negative media depictions of poverty are inextricably linked to notions of race.  For 
example, although African Americans represent only 29 percent of poor Americans, 65 
percent of poor Americans shown on television news in 2002 were African American.clvii  
TV news, where most Americans get their news, reinforces negative racial stereotypes 
more than other news media.  As media scholar Robert Entman has noted, “scientific 
surveys designed to measure racist attitudes suggest a connection between exposure to 
television news and the extent of anti-black racism in the public.” clviii  
 
DIVERSITY OF MEDIA OWERNSHIP 
 
For many of the same reasons that diversity is important in the news media workforce, 
diversity of media ownership has been a national goal, as expressed in U.S. Supreme 
Court rulings, policy, and law.  As former U.S. Department of Commerce secretary 
Norman Mineta has stated, 
 
For almost a century, we have promoted diversity of independent editorial 
viewpoints and guarded against undue media concentration.  We have 
labored to prevent the potential monopolization of the marketplace of 
ideas, to protect the needs of local communities, and to promote the free 
exchange of diverse viewpoints and information.  We have supported 
policies that would increase opportunities for minorities, women, and 
small businesses to participate fully in the broadcast industry.clix   
 
Since 1990 the National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA) has 
collected data on minority ownership of commercial radio and television stations.  But 
since 2000 it has not reported these data publicly, as had been the Commerce 
Department’s practice.  This decade-long view does not fully capture how minority 
ownership has fared in the forty years since federal efforts were initiated to increase 
ownership opportunities for minorities.  But it does provide a glimpse into the challenges 
and opportunities for increasing media ownership diversity.  
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According to NTIA data, minority broadcasters owned almost 4 percent (449) of all 
commercial radio and television stations in 2000, compared to almost 3 percent in 1991.  
Minority ownership has therefore remained dismally low.  Moreover, about half of the 
increases captured in the NTIA data are due to improvements in the methodology used to 
identify minority owners.clx   
 
A comparison of commercial radio and TV station ownership shows that minority 
ownership is more prevalent in the commercial radio industry.  In 2000, 175 minority 
broadcasters owned 426 stations, a sharp increase from the 305 minority-owned stations 
in 1998.  (About half of this increase, however, is due to better methods for identifying 
existing owners.)  Only 23 television stations were owned by minorities in 2000, less than 
2 percent of the nation’s 1,228 stations.  Just five years earlier--prior to passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which increased incentives for consolidation of media 
ownership--minorities owned 38 television stations.  The number of both African-
American- and Hispanic-owned TV stations declined significantly between 1996 and 
2000 (see Figure 4-16).clxi  On the other hand, ownership of radio stations increased 
among all racial and ethnic groups, with the sharpest increase occurring among Hispanic-
owned stations (see Figure 4-17).clxii 
 
Figure 4-16.  Minority-Owned TV Stations, 1990-2000
Source: National Telecommunications and Information Agency, 2000
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Figure 4-17.  Minority-Owned Radio Station Ownership, 1990-2000
Source: National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 2000
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The link between minority ownership and diversity of content has been established in 
several studies, which find that minority-owned media tend to produce more content 
focused on the interests and concerns of minority communities.  In 1988 the 
Congressional Research Service analyzed FCC media ownership data and concluded that 
minority-owned outlets tended to feature a higher degree of programming directed to a 
range of minority groups.clxiii  More recently, the FCC issued a series of reports that 
evaluated program content and ownership, concluding that minority-owned radio stations 
(and to a lesser extent, television stations) tend to produce content that appeals to 
minority interests and delivers more news and public interest programming relevant to 
minority communities.clxiv 
 
Although minority media ownership remains low, ethnic media outlets play a prominent 
role in providing news content to diverse communities.  A survey conducted by New 
California Media (now New American Media) of nearly 2000 racial and ethnic minority 
households found that 45 percent of African-American, Hispanic, Asian-American, 
Native American, and Arab-American adults prefer ethnic media to their “mainstream” 
counterparts.  Ethnic media are a primary news source for 29 million U.S. adults of color 
and reach another 22 million on a regular basis.  More than half of the Hispanic adults 
surveyed indicated that they are primary consumers of ethnic media.  And about 40 
percent of African Americans and Arab Americans and one-fourth of Asian Americans 
and Native Americans indicated a preference for ethnic media.clxv 
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MEDIA CONSOLIDATION 
 
With the growth of communications technology, Americans have witnessed a dramatic 
expansion of media sources.  Today there are more media outlets than ever before.   
But mass media organizations have consolidated at a rapid rate since passage of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, a trend that has alarmed policymakers across the 
political spectrum. clxvi  At issue is whether consolidation undermines the public interest 
by concentrating decisions about media content in the hands of a small number of 
corporations.  In an increasingly competitive corporate market, this concern is not trivial: 
Today, six corporations (General Electric, AOL Time Warner, Disney, News 
Corporation, Viacom, and Bertelsmann) control more than 90 percent of media content in 
North America.clxvii 
 
How might this trend affect the ability of diverse communities to express themselves and 
access independent content?  Critics of media consolidation raise several concerns, 
arguing that consolidation limits the diversity of media opinions and voices; increases the 
likelihood that commercial and market forces will dictate media content; reduces local 
interest and public affairs content; and squeezes out smaller, independent voices, which 
are more likely to include minority community perspectives.clxviii  
 
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, which eased ownership rules, preceded a decline 
in minority-owned television stations, as noted above.  In its 2000 report on minority 
ownership, the NTIA found that over 61 percent of minority-owned commercial radio 
and television stations were stand-alone operations, which are less likely to be able to 
compete with larger group owners.  At the same time, the number of media owners 
declined nationally.  From March 1996 to November 1997, for example, the number of 
radio station owners declined by almost 12 percent, while the number of radio stations 
grew by 2.5 percent. clxix  In many communities, far fewer radio licensees compete against 
one another, thus squeezing smaller competitors.  The NTIA found that minority-owned 
stations were less likely to be part of a duopoly (two or more stations of the same type in 
the same market), and were less likely to participate in a local market agreement.  The 
agency concluded that “consolidation still threatens the survival of most minority 
owners.” clxx 
 
THE DIGITAL DIVIDE 
 
The gap in different demographic groups’ access to new communications technology 
such as broadband high-speed Internet, dubbed the “digital divide,” has drawn significant 
national attention.  Concerns surround the fact that some new technologies are also public 
resources that are vital for democracy and free expression, full participation in the 
nation’s growing electronic and high-tech economy, and access to vital educational and 
other information resources. clxxi 
 
Data on access to and use of new technology dates back only a decade, therefore limiting 
our ability to analyze trends.  But these data show that lower income households, racial 
and ethnic minorities, and households in rural areas are less likely to access the Internet--
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at home, work, school, or public library.  For African Americans and Latinos, this gap 
was larger when Internet technologies began to explode in the mid-1990s, and it has 
narrowed slightly (see Figure 4-18).clxxii 
 
Figure 4-18.  Internet Use from Any Location by Race/Ethnicity, 1997, 
2001, 2003
Source:  National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 2000 and 2004
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Digital gaps among income groups remain large but have decreased slightly.  Households 
earning less than $15,000, for example, were more than four times less likely than those 
earning $75,000 or more to have Internet access at home in 1997.  By 2001 this gap 
closed to the point where households earning less than $15,000 (in adjusted dollars) were 
slightly more than three times less likely to have Internet access at home (see Figure 4-
19).clxxiii 
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Figure 4-19.  U.S. Households with Internet Access by Income
Source: National Telecommunications and Information Agency, 2000 and 2004
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HOW CAN THE NATION EXPAND VOICE? 
 
This analysis suggests that many factors influence the diversity of voices that participate 
in the national discourse.  Deregulation and its sequel, media consolidation, threaten to 
absorb or push smaller, independent media stations out of major markets.  Ownership of 
major media outlets is increasingly in the hands of a small number of international 
communications corporations.  Broadband Internet will be vital to future educational and 
commercial applications, yet many marginalized communities lack access, and racial, 
ethnic, and socioeconomic divides in access persist.  Moreover, political participation 
such as voting and contributing time and money to campaigns remains low among 
Americans overall.  Racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic divides contribute to this low rate 
of political involvement. 
 
Several opportunity strategies hold promise for enhancing Americans’ voice in the public 
discourse and in public decisionmaking. 
 
Electoral and Political Participation 
 
Ensuring and expanding political participation among diverse groups remains a highly 
partisan and controversial issue.  However controversial, all sides agree that the nation 
should strive toward greater engagement in the political process. 
 
Equal access to the vote, however, continues to be impeded by problems caused by 
geographic and language barriers, faulty voting equipment and infrastructure, 
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inadequately trained poll workers, state laws disenfranchising ex-felons, and other state 
and federal policies that disproportionately limit voting among marginalized groups.  In 
the wake of the disputed 2000 election, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights identified 
18 barriers to electoral participation that disproportionately affect communities of color 
and other marginalized groups.  Some of the barriers identified by the commission 
include: 
 
 Considerable state and local variability in the quality of voting equipment, voter 
identity verification standards, sample ballots, and use of absentee ballots; 
 Lax or non-existent enforcement of federal voting rights laws; 
 Early registration deadlines; 
 Restrictive hours of polling stations for voting; and, 
 Inaccessible and/or overburdened polling stations.clxxiv 
 
These structural problems, coupled with a growing sentiment among the general public 
that government is beholden to narrow, well-heeled interests at the expense of grassroots 
voices, contribute to worsening problems of voice and expression in the nation overall 
and for disenfranchised groups. 
 
Voting infrastructure must be improved by universally employing new technologies such 
as direct record electronic voting systems, which offer more accurate vote counts, ballot 
screens in multiple languages, and low error rates.  Mechanisms for public accountability 
such as printed voter ballots should be incorporated into these systems.clxxv  Voter 
education programs can help familiarize new voters with registration and voting 
processes.  Similarly, training poll workers and recruiting multilingual poll workers can 
improve local jurisdiction compliance with federal and state voting rights laws, 
particularly language assistance provisions.clxxvi  
 
Barriers to voting must be addressed by establishing minimum federal standards for 
voting procedures and equipment; providing federal funds to help local jurisdictions 
improve training, equipment, and polling stations; improving voting rights laws 
enforcement and placing jurisdiction for review of complaints within the U.S. 
Department of Justice; easing voter registration requirements; establishing uniform 
nationwide voting hours; creating federal guidelines for verifying voter identity; restoring 
voting rights of people who have previously served time in prison; and assisting new 
Americans in obtaining the right to vote.clxxvii 
 
Finally, vigorous enforcement of the Voting Rights Act and full implementation of the 
Help America Vote Act are essential to ensuring equal access to electoral participation. 
 
Diverse Media Ownership 
 
Today’s radio and television stations are less likely to be locally owned and operated than 
at any previous time in the modern communications age.  Large multinational 
corporations have control over the vast majority of media content.  Until recently the 
federal government exercised oversight of the communications and broadcast media 
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industries to ensure that they served the public interest.  But deregulation and 
consolidation of several large media and telecommunications industries have resulted in 
diminished opportunity for independent and minority-owned media to gain a foothold. 
 
In 1995 Congress eliminated the FCC Minority Tax Certificate program, which provided 
tax incentives to encourage minority ownership of broadcast and cable properties.  
During the program’s fifteen years of operation, more than 360 media outlets were 
acquired by minority operations--including 288 radio stations, 43 TV stations, and 31 
cable systems.  Only 40 of 8,500 broadcast stations were owned by minorities prior to the 
policy’s enactment.clxxviii   
 
Encouraging diverse ownership is an important public interest goal that is reflected in 
law, policy, and judicial rulings.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, upholding the consideration of racial diversity in admission at the University 
of Michigan Law School, reaffirmed that carefully crafted consideration of race and 
gender is permissible in pursuing the compelling government interest in diversity.  A new 
federal tax incentive program is needed that provides modest incentives for sellers of 
communications outlets, to defer capital gains taxes when franchises are sold to minority 
investors.  As with the former tax certificate program, such a policy provides an 
unobtrusive, revenue-neutral means of helping minority investors compete in a market 
that is tilted against them because of rising station prices and a lack of access to 
capital.clxxix  Other policies such as expanding the FCC’s Distress Sale Policy, which 
allows broadcasters to sell properties to minority investors at reduced rates, must be 
explored. clxxx  Such policies are a means of balancing private market interests with those 
of the communities that own a share of the public infrastructure with which broadcasters 
are entrusted.  Moreover, the FCC should resume public reporting of data on minority 
and women-owned broadcast and cable properties.  This practice, which was 
discontinued in 2001 after ten years of data collection and reporting, is important to 
assess whether diverse viewpoints are adequately represented, and whether the interests 
of diverse communities are being met. 
 
Digital Divide 
 
The explosion of new communications technologies has coincided with a dramatic policy 
shift in Washington, one that assumes that market forces will increase access to digital 
technology by fostering competition that will reduce costs and improve quality.  New 
policies adopted by the FCC reflect this philosophy, yet connectivity costs remain high 
and many Americans continue to lack access to digital technology, particularly 
broadband.  Penetration of Internet access into U.S. households has stagnated, and the 
United States has fallen behind internationally in broadband adaptation.clxxxi  Broadband 
is not simply a luxury that should be available to those who can afford it.  It is a tool with 
“special transformative power” that is increasingly important for participation in new 
economic and educational opportunities that will become less available via narrowband 
connections.clxxxii Broadband and other advanced technologies should be classified as 
telecommunications services that provide essential functions.  They therefore should be 
subject to a universal service policy that encourages true competition and extends access 
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as broadly as possible.  Federal programs such as the Technology Opportunities Program 
and the Community Technology Centers Program have provided innovative community-
based technology and infrastructure support to improve nonprofits’ use of 
telecommunications and digital network technologies.  These programs have also 
promoted model educational technology programs, and have had a special focus on inner 
city and rural underserved areas.  But they have also been slated for elimination in federal 
budgets.clxxxiii 
 
Media Democracy 
 
All of the trends noted above--the growing rate of media consolidation, increasing 
privatization of public communications resources, and dampening of federal incentives to 
encourage diverse media ownership--threaten to limit public voice. They therefore 
require greater government vigilance in order to protect the public interest and stimulate 
greater civic and democratic uses of media and communications technology. 
 
Media democracy advocates have advanced ideas such as electronic or “dot-commons” 
policies, which would protect public interest programming in the same way that the non-
profit sector is promoted through tax-exempt status and charitable contributions.  These 
policies are built on the principle that the civic sector should flourish online, just as civic 
interests are protected in other electronic media.   
 
Finally, new technologies to use the electromagnetic spectrum portend an explosion of 
new applications such as “third generation” wireless telephone services, and therefore 
growth in new commercial enterprises.  These technologies will use the public airways 
and therefore should be managed so that the public interest is protected.  Some policy 
organizations have called for a portion of the proceeds from spectrum auctions to be 
devoted to public interest use.  As digital technology increases the application and use of 
the spectrum, some portion of use should be set aside for open, community-access 
communications systems or for other civic and public interest uses.clxxxiv
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Chapter 5 
REDEMPTION 
 
Over the last two decades, the scope of the criminal justice system has been expanded as 
a means of social control.  But this expansion has had a dampening effect on opportunity.  
Opportunity is threatened by high rates of incarceration and the disproportionate impact 
of the criminal justice system on low-income communities of color.  Policies that limit 
access to educational resources, provide inadequate resources to address prisoners’ health 
problems, and deny the vote and access to public benefits, also hurt opportunity--often 
well after offenders have paid their debts to society.  Measures of these problems 
demonstrate that opportunity for redemption is in crisis and may be more threatened than 
any other dimension of opportunity (major findings of this chapter are summarized in 
Box 5). 
 
Box 5:  Has the Nation Made Gains in Redemption? 
Major Gains in Redemption 
 None 
Areas of Limited, Mixed or No Progress 
 While multi-year data are largely unavailable, a large percentage of inmates have untreated 
substance abuse or mental health problems.   
Areas Where Redemption Has Declined 
 The number of incarcerated Americans has increased dramatically since 1980, despite the fact 
that crime rates began declining in the 1970s and 1980s.  More than 2.1 million people 
incarcerated in the United States, a rate of incarceration far higher than that of any other 
nation, and unprecedented in U.S. history. 
 Mass incarceration has had disproportionate effects on communities of color.  At the current 
rate, about 1 in 3 African-American males, 1 in 6 Hispanic males, and 1 in 17 white males 
born in 2001 will spend time in prison at some point in their lifetimes-rates much higher than 
in 1991.  
 The rate of incarcerated women has increased more then twelvefold since 1970. 
 A growing number of children are being adjudicated in adult courts and sentenced to prison 
terms, despite the fact that the incidence of serious and violent crimes by youth is decreasing.  
The number of juvenile offenders (under age 18) in state prisons more than doubled between 
1985 and 1997, from 3,400 to 7,400. 
 The number of children with a parent in state or federal prison increased from 936,500 in 
1991 to 1.5 million in 1997, the last year that prisoners were surveyed by the federal 
government.  In 1997 an estimated 336,300 children were directly affected by the 
imprisonment of a parent who lived with them. 
 
 
People grow and change over time in response to their circumstances, and those who 
falter or break societal rules warrant the chance for rehabilitation and a new start.  
Redemption is an element of opportunity that provides the conditions that allow people to 
rebuild their lives and to take full responsibility for their actions after mistakes or 
misfortune.  Redemptive policies use rehabilitative approaches that are appropriate and 
proportionate to a person’s conduct, culpability, and circumstances. Those who design 
these policies recognize that rehabilitation can be a rocky road that requires patience and 
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compassion as well as swift and sure intervention.  Redemptive policies reject the 
principle of retribution, which delivers punishment as revenge. 
 
Accordingly, redemptive policies treat problems of drug addiction and mental illness 
through public health responses designed to help people conquer these problems.  
Designers of redemptive policies view incarceration as an opportunity-ending event that 
is a last resort, and use restorative approaches that address the harms caused by 
misconduct.  They recognize that the best way to protect the public from crime and 
violence is by addressing their causes and by reducing recidivism by building the social 
and economic skills of people who have resorted to crime.  They consider the impact of 
crime and punishment on individuals, families, and communities.  And they realize that 
denying the fundamental rights to vote, to housing, and to education is contrary to the 
goal of a return to productive citizenship. 
 
These ideals are reflected in human rights law, including the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, which provides that, “The penitentiary system shall comprise 
treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and social 
rehabilitation.” clxxxv  Many states have made these ideals part of their constitutions.  
Illinois’s constitution for example, provides that “All penalties shall be determined both 
according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the 
offender to useful citizenship.”clxxxvi  
 
The idea of redemption is especially powerful when it comes to children, who have 
virtually unlimited potential to develop and change with age and experience, and who are 
by nature less responsible for their circumstances.  A century ago the United States 
developed a separate juvenile justice system that aimed to reform children’s behavior, 
shield them from adults convicted of crimes, and protect their ability to enter adulthood 
with a clean record and a fresh start.   
 
Similarly, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “Juvenile offenders 
shall be segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and 
legal status.”  The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that “the arrest, 
detention or imprisonment of a child shall be used only as a measure of last resort and for 
the shortest appropriate period of time,” and that “every child deprived of liberty shall be 
treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person, and in a 
manner which takes into account the needs of persons of their age.”clxxxvii  
 
For the better part of the last century, criminal justice policies of most states and the 
federal government were guided by rehabilitative philosophies.  Today, many criminal 
justice policies and practices have closed the door to opportunity.  Moreover, the stigma 
of incarceration damages employment prospects and increases the likelihood of being 
discriminated against when seeking a job.  Stigma and discrimination also affect 
opportunity prospects for the children of the incarcerated, more than 300,000 of whom 
are directly affected by the imprisonment of a parent.  Finally, whole communities suffer 
opportunity losses when large segments of residents are involved in the criminal justice 
system.  High levels of incarceration render families less stable; siphon off resources that 
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are needed for social, health, and education programs; and keep streets unsafe as 
offenders cycle in and out of prisons with few skills or resources to right their 
course.clxxxviii 
 
We measure redemption here by national progress in adopting and expanding criminal 
justice policies that provide opportunity for those in the criminal justice system who can 
contribute positively to society.  Indicators of redemption are based on measures of 
incarceration trends over time, federal treatment of immigration offenses, mental health 
and substance abuse testing and treatment, drug offenses over time, and juvenile justice 
policies. 
 
About the Data in this Chapter 
 
For this chapter we use data and analyses published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS), the research branch of the Department of Justice.  The Bureau publishes regular 
reports on a wide range of criminal justice measures and is the preeminent resource for 
criminal justice data.  As with other federal sources, the BJS reports suffer from 
inadequacies in racial and ethnic data, as well as other data limitations.  Few reports 
include racial or ethnic groups other than whites, African Americans, and Hispanics, and 
data are often unavailable for Hispanics earlier than 1990.  Data on female prisoners is 
lacking for many measures.  Finally, some of the time trends presented here are based on 
only a few years of data.  Trends are therefore interpreted with caution, as even dramatic 
changes in data in a short time may reflect only a fleeting trend.   
 
INCARCERATION 
 
The United States has witnessed a dramatic rise in the rate and number of people 
incarcerated in federal, state, and local prisons.  There are currently more than 2.1 million 
people incarcerated in the United States, a rate of incarceration far higher than that of any 
other nation, and unprecedented in U.S. history.clxxxix  This increase began in the 1980s 
and continued through the 1990s, and has leveled slightly within the last ten years (see 
Figures 5-1 and 5-2).cxc  This increase was more dramatic among women than men. cxci  
The rate of incarceration of women increased more than twelvefold between 1970 and 
2003.cxcii   The unprecedented growth in the nation’s incarcerated population has occurred 
despite a significant decline in rates of crime and violence. 
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Figure 5-1.  Rate of Sentenced Male Prisoners Under Jurisdiction of 
State and Federal Correctional Authorities, 1960-2003
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003
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Figure 5-2.  Rate of Sentenced Female Prisoners Under Jurisdiction of 
State and Federal Correctional Authorities, 1960-2003
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2003
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In mid-2004, 2.13 million people were incarcerated.  Of these, more than 1.4 million 
were in state or federal prisons and more than 713,000 people were in local jails.cxciii  In 
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2003 more than 5.6 million U.S. adults had ever been incarcerated, about 1 in every 37 
U.S. adult residents.cxciv 
 
If this rate of incarceration persists, an estimated 6.6 percent of all babies born in the 
United States in 2001 will go to prison at some point in their lives, an increase from a 5 
percent likelihood in 1991 and a 2 percent likelihood in 1974.cxcv   
 
Based on current trends, about 1 in 3 African-American males, 1 in 6 Hispanic males, and 
1 in 17 white males born in 2001 will spend time in prison at some point in their lifetimes 
(see Figure 5-3).cxcvi 
 
Figure 5-3.  Lifetime Likelihood of Going to Prison by Race, Ethnicity 
and Gender, 1974, 1991, and 2001
Source:  Bonczar, 2003
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About two-thirds of the 3.8 million increase in people incarcerated between 1974 and 
2001 is due to an increase in the rate of first incarceration. 
 
In 1997 over three-quarters of nonviolent offenders about to be released from state 
prisons were convicted of a nonviolent offense, defined as property, drug, and public 
order offenses that do not involve threats or actual harm to a victim.cxcvii 
 
The number of children with a parent in state or federal prison increased from 936,500 in 
1991 to 1.5 million in 1997, the last year that prisoners were surveyed by the federal 
government. cxcviii  Slightly less than half of state and federal prisoners reported living 
with their children prior to incarceration.  As a result, in 1997 an estimated 336,300 
children were directly affected by the imprisonment of a parent who lived with them.cxcix 
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A Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of state prisoners in 1997 found that over 40 percent 
of nonviolent offenders about to be discharged from state prison had less than a high 
school degree, and only 26 percent of them had earned a G.E.D. 
 
IMMIGRATION OFFENSES 
 
Changes in federal law and practice regarding immigration, such as severe penalties for 
minor crimes because of past immigration violations, also reduce opportunities for 
redemption.  Changes in federal sentencing policies in the 1980s and 1990s, as well as 
the Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, stiffened immigration violation penalties, 
expanded the types of crimes that are considered aggravated felonies, and increased the 
likelihood of sentencing offenders to prison.  These policies also increased enforcement 
and prosecutions. 
 
As a result, between 1985 and 2000 the number of immigration offenders serving federal 
prison sentences increased almost ninefold, from 1,600 to 13,700 (see Figure 5-4).cc  The 
average time served by these prisoners increased from 4 months in 1985 to 21 months in 
2000 (Figure 5-5), despite the fact that these immigration violators were not likely to be 
repeat offenders.  Only 13 percent of immigration violators were returned to federal 
prison within three years of their release.cci   
 
Figure 5-4.  Number of Immigration Offenders Serving Time in Federal 
Prisons, 1985-2000
Source: Scalia and Lintras, 2002
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Figure 5-5.  Average Time to be Served by Immigration Offenders 
Entering Federal Prisons, 1986-2000
Source:  Scalia and Lintras, 2002
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DRUG TREATMENT FOR SUBSTANCE-ABUSING PRISONERS 
 
Rates of substance abuse among incarcerated populations are so high that the U.S. 
criminal justice system is arguably the nation’s largest portal for people with mental 
illness and substance abuse problems. 
 
The BJS’s 1997 survey found that over 80 percent of state and 70 percent of federal 
prisoners had used drugs in the past, and that 57 percent used drugs in the month before 
their conviction.ccii  Nearly two-thirds of nonviolent offenders about to be discharged 
used illegal drugs in the month prior to committing the crime for which they were jailed, 
and about 40 percent reported using drugs at the time that they committed the offense.cciii  
 
A 1998 BJS survey found that although 71 percent of local jails have policies to control 
drug use in their facilities, smaller jails (those with fewer than 50 inmates) were 10 
percent less likely to test for substance abuse among inmates or staff.  Only about half of 
inmates in local jails were in facilities that tested for drug use.cciv  Of these jails, over 
two-thirds (69 percent) found at least one positive test.  Only 5 percent of local jails, 
however, have a policy to test all inmates at admission.ccv 
 
The vast majority (73 percent) of local jails surveyed by the BJS in 1998 offered some 
type of substance abuse treatment program, but as with testing policies, smaller jails were 
less likely (63 percent) to offer substance abuse treatment.  And far fewer jails (43 
percent) provided substance abuse treatment services such as detoxification, a residential 
treatment facility, or professional counseling.  A larger share of jails (68 percent) offered 
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other programs such as self-help groups or education and awareness programs.  Three in 
ten jails offered only this latter category of programs.ccvi 
 
Despite the reported prevalence of substance abuse programs, these programs often fail to 
reach inmates who need them most.  The BJS’s 1997 survey revealed that only about 
one-third of state prisoners and about one-quarter of federal prisoners had participated in 
drug or alcohol treatment since admission.ccvii  Moreover, the availability of substance 
abuse treatment for the incarcerated--detoxification, professional counseling, or 
residential treatment--is declining.  The percentage of inmates in state and federal prisons 
who received treatment for a substance abuse problem declined between 1991 and 1997, 
from 25 percent of state and 16 percent of federal prisoners to less than 10 percent of 
both state and federal prisoners.  In contrast, a larger share of prisoners (20 percent of 
both state and federal inmates) with substance abuse problems received other kinds of 
drug abuse programs such as self-help groups, peer counseling, and education awareness.  
This percentage increased by 5 percent since 1991.  Prisoners who abuse substances at 
the time of their offense were generally more likely to receive services than inmates with 
lower levels of substance abuse involvement (see Figure 5-6).ccviii 
 
Figure 5-6.  Prisoners with History of Drug Use Who Reported 
Participating in Drug Treatment, by Levels of Prior Use, 1991 and 1997 
Source:  Mumola, 1999
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WOMEN 
 
Women involved in the criminal justice system often face different circumstances and 
have different needs than those of male offenders.  Forty-four percent of women under 
correctional authority report that they have been physically or sexually assaulted at some 
time in their lives.ccix  Nearly seven in ten (69 percent) of those reporting assaults say it 
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occurred before age 18.  About half of women in state prisons had been using drugs or 
alcohol at the time they committed the offense for which they were incarcerated.  About 
seven in ten women involved in the criminal justice system have minor children.  And in 
1997 an estimated 2,200 women in state prisons, about 3.5 percent of the female inmate 
population, were HIV-positive. 
 
As with men, the criminal justice system responds to women offenders more harshly than 
it did three decades ago.  For example, despite the fact that the rates of women convicted 
of homicide are at their lowest levels since 1976, the number of women sentenced to 
death has increased more than fourfold since 1980.ccx 
 
DRUG OFFENSES 
 
State and federal laws enacted from the 1970s to the 1990s in response to drug trafficking 
stiffened sentences and increased prosecution for drug offenses.  But critics have charged 
that these laws have merely increased the rate of incarceration of low-level drug dealers 
and nonviolent drug offenders.  Moreover, these laws (and their enforcement) have had a 
disproportionate racial impact.   
 
This disproportionate impact can be seen in the numbers of individuals incarcerated for 
drug crimes.  Although African Americans and whites use illegal substances at about the 
same rates, African Americans are more likely to be incarcerated for drug offences.  
Between 1990 and 2000 the number of African Americans incarcerated in state prisons 
for drug offenses increased by over 80 percent to 145,000, a number that is 2.5 times 
higher than that for whites and 3.4 times higher than that for Hispanics (see Figure 5-
7).ccxi 
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Figure 5-7.  Drug Offenders in State Prisons by Race and Ethnicity, 
Selected Years 1990 - 2000
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2004.
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JUVENILES 
 
Involvement with the juvenile justice system can be a pivotal point in the life trajectory 
for many youth.  For some, it represents an opportunity to correct course, to take 
advantage of services that help restore them to productive society.  For others, however, 
brushes with the juvenile justice system can be an opportunity-ending event. 
 
Since the 1980s juvenile justice policies nationwide have increasingly emphasized 
punitive measures at the expense of rehabilitative efforts.  All states currently have 
provisions allowing waiver of juvenile offenders to adult courts, depending on the 
seriousness and circumstances of the offense.  In three states, juvenile offenders over age 
16 are processed in adult courts, and in ten states juveniles over age 17 are handled in 
adult courts.  The number of juvenile offenders in state prisons more than doubled 
between 1985 and 1997, from 3,400 to 7,400. ccxii  This dramatic increase occurred 
despite the fact that the juvenile arrest rate for violent offenses declined by 23 percent 
from 1994 to 1997.ccxiii  And relative to the number of juvenile arrests, the likelihood that 
offenders under age 18 would be incarcerated in state prisons increased between 1986 
and 1997.ccxiv 
 
The increase in the number of African-American youths in state prisons has been more 
dramatic than it has been for white youths.  Between 1985 and 1997, for example, the 
number of African-American juveniles incarcerated in state prisons increased by 226 
percent, while the number of white juveniles in state prisons doubled.  And in 1985 only 
20 white male juveniles and 30 African-American male juveniles were incarcerated in 
state prisons for drug offenses.  By 1997 the number of African-American juveniles 
Redemption  107 
admitted to state prisons for the same offenses increased twentyfold to 640, 
outnumbering white male juveniles by more than 5 to 1 (see Figure 5-8).ccxv 
 
Figure 5-8.  Number of Males Under 18 Admitted to State Prison by 
Race, 1985-1997
Source:  Strom, 2000
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DISENFRANCHISEMENT AND DENIAL OF PUBLIC BENEFITS 
 
Another outgrowth of the “war on drugs” and other public policies that purport to “get 
tough” on offenders has been the trend toward denial of public benefits and voting rights 
for some types of offenses.  Despite high levels of need for social services that help ex-
drug offenders to reintegrate into their communities, several state and federal policies 
enacted in recent years deny a range of public services that reduce recidivism.  As Gwen 
Rubinstein and Debbie Mukamal note: 
 
Low-income individuals affected by addiction and criminal records . . . 
need access to public benefits–including welfare, food stamps, Medicaid, 
and public housing–as they learn to live drug-free in the community.  
Without these temporary supports, it is unrealistic to expect full recovery 
without relapse and recidivism.  Yet, laws enacted in recent years 
counterproductively act as barriers to these benefits, virtually (and sadly) 
ensuring failure for thousands of Americans affected by addition.ccxvi 
 
In 1996 Congress passed (and President Clinton signed into law) the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, which, among other 
provisions, imposed a lifetime ban on eligibility for Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families and Food Stamps for those convicted of drug use, possession, and distribution.  
States may opt out of the provision or modify it, but the ban is otherwise permanent and 
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applies regardless of an ex-offender’s status, such as pregnancy or participation in drug 
treatment.  As of 2001, 22 states have retained the ban, and another 20 enforce the ban 
but have narrowed its scope.  While the exact number of ex-offenders affected by this ban 
is unclear, as many as 15 percent of women in drug treatment programs in a recent survey 
were found to have a drug felony conviction that may result in the denial of benefits 
needed to complete treatment.  And many treatment programs that relied on funding from 
the federal benefits of their clients have reported drops in revenue as a result of losses of 
eligibility.ccxvii 
 
Similarly, many states have limited or severely curtailed voting privileges among 
currently and/or formerly incarcerated populations.  Forty-eight states and the District of 
Columbia do not allow inmates to vote, 32 states deny the vote to felons while on parole, 
and 28 states block voting among offenders on probation.  But 13 states disenfranchise 
felons for life, even after the ex-offenders have completed their sentence.  Nearly 4 
million currently or formerly incarcerated Americans were denied the vote in 2000, about 
2 percent of the adult population.  An estimated 1 in 7 African-American males is 
currently disenfranchised.ccxviii    
 
HOW CAN THE NATION RESTORE REDEMPTIVE VALUES IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE? 
 
The nation’s criminal justice policies should punish offenders, provide restitution to 
victims, and protect the public.  But they should also restore and redeem individuals and 
communities whose lives are affected both directly and indirectly by criminal justice 
policies.  Several strategies accomplish these goals. 
 
Drug Courts 
 
Drug courts are specialized judicial processes that provide substance abuse treatment, 
testing, probation supervision, case management, and a range of other coordinated 
services for drug offenders who might otherwise face costly, often less effective 
incarceration.  This combination of intensive services and legal requirements to complete 
treatment increases the likelihood that offenders’ underlying substance abuse can be 
addressed, while ensuring accountability to communities harmed by high rates of drug 
offenses.  More than a thousand drug courts are currently in operation; the Department of 
Justice provides formal court planning and training for these courts. 
 
Noting the difficulties faced by rural communities hit hard by trafficking of 
methamphetamine, a Bureau of Justice Statistics report finds that the drug court model “is 
unprecedented in its ability to effectively intervene with the methamphetamine-abusing 
population and unequalled by any other criminal justice response.”ccxix  A 2001 review of 
published studies of drug court effectiveness found that drug courts increase the 
likelihood that offenders will complete treatment, reduce drug use and criminal activity 
of offenders while in treatment, decrease the likelihood of recidivism after treatment 
(although few longitudinal studies follow ex-offenders over long periods of time to assess 
effectiveness), and provide cost savings compared to traditional adjudication.ccxx 
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Community Policing 
 
The 1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act encouraged the adoption of 
community policing, a strategy characterized by high levels of community input and 
collaboration and tailored responses to crime and disorder.ccxxi  In response to the unique 
needs of different communities, community policing strategies vary considerably across 
jurisdictions.  Because of this variability there is “little systematic evidence on what 
industry structure best promotes effectiveness, innovations, and experimentation.”ccxxii  A 
nationwide study of community policing found that these policies had little effect on 
crime control or the decline in violent crime seen in many U.S. cities in the 1990s.  But 
this study did find, as did dozens of other studies, that structural indicators of 
disadvantage such as family and community instability and poverty are the most powerful 
predictors of urban crime and violence.ccxxiii 
 
Given that policing policies in and of themselves cannot undo the impact of social 
inequality and disadvantage on crime, they should instead be judged by the extent to 
which they address community needs and preserve opportunity and human rights.  Many 
community policing models emphasize a problem-solving framework that shifts the 
emphasis from intervention, arrest, and punishment to addressing community needs.  
Other models encourage prevention strategies that engage and provide support to youth 
and families.  This policing framework therefore draws heavily on the goals and law 
enforcement needs of the community, which suffers most when crime is poorly addressed 
and redemption is denied. 
 
Restorative Justice 
 
Restorative justice programs have gained attention in recent years, as some communities 
have begun raising different questions about the costs and impact of crime--and how to 
correct its damage.  Restorative justice programs seek to repair the harm caused to 
victims and communities, while holding perpetrators responsible for restitution.  These 
programs include practices such as family group conferences, victim-offender mediation, 
community decision making, victim impact statements, and mechanisms for offender 
restitution.  Restorative justice seeks to identify what harm has been caused, how it can 
be repaired, and who is to be held accountable, while finding a balance among the needs 
of the victim, the offender, and the community.ccxxiv   
 
Studies of the effectiveness of restorative justice programs have generally examined three 
types of outcomes: victim, offender, family, and relevant community members’ level of 
satisfaction with the program; compliance with reparation agreements; and rates of 
offender recidivism.  Several Canadian studies have found mild to moderate positive 
effects of restorative justice on recidivism, generally high levels of satisfaction with the 
programs among all participants, and high rates of restitution compliance.ccxxv  These 
studies have also found that adult rates of recidivism are reduced more than youth rates 
are.  But other studies find restorative justice programs to be promising even among 
youth.  Young juvenile offenders are more likely to reoffend than those who commit 
Redemption  110 
crimes at later ages.  The risk of reoffending among child delinquents (ages 7 to 12) is 
two to three times higher than that among adolescent offenders.  The Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention supported a “family conference” restorative justice 
program among early offenders in an urban setting that generated high satisfaction among 
victims, offenders, and their family members.  Over 80 percent of offending youth who 
participated in the family conferences completed their restitution agreement.ccxxvi 
 
Reentry Programming 
 
Three forces--the rising number of prisoners released each year, the growing caseloads of 
parole officers, and the decline in educational and drug treatment services available to the 
incarcerated--have contributed to the growing level of concern over how to facilitate the 
successful transition of ex-inmates.ccxxvii  These factors, combined with the recognition 
that unless prisoners die in prison or are executed, all of them must eventually be returned 
to society, have led to interest among policymakers in developing and supporting 
prisoner reentry programs.  Planning for reentry must therefore begin at the point of 
incarceration, or even at sentencing.ccxxviii   
 
A large-scale analysis of Canadian studies that embrace comprehensive reentry strategies 
(including intensive programs in behavioral techniques to help model social and job 
skills, and programs that emphasize family and community involvement) found that 
reentry programs significantly reduce recidivism.ccxxix  However, few studies have 
assessed the effectiveness of reentry programs in facilitating community reintegration, 
broadly defined.  Future studies should examine a broader range of outcomes other than 
remaining arrest-free for a defined period of time.  These outcomes should include 
employment, connection to the community, sobriety, and support of family.ccxxx 
 
Promising reentry practices include Project Greenlight, a partnership of the Vera Institute 
and the New York State Department of Correctional Services.  Project Greenlight offers 
family-focused services such as family counseling, workshops on practical skills and job 
readiness, community counseling, and housing assistance.ccxxxi  Other successful reentry 
programs have received support from the Department of Justice’s Serious and Violent 
Offender Reentry Initiative.  The Justice Department’s evaluation of that program found 
that the most effective reentry outcomes result from collaboration among public and 
private partners, particularly key criminal justice actors (police, corrections, and 
community service providers) to coordinate services and policies.ccxxxii 
 
Justice Reinvestment 
 
At a broader level, communities and governments must weigh the costs and benefits of 
criminal justice philosophies that emphasize arrest and incarceration against those that 
prioritize investment in communities as a means of social control.  The stark contrast 
between these options becomes apparent in newspaper articles reporting that a handful of 
urban neighborhoods costs taxpayers millions of dollars in criminal justice enforcement 
that could have been averted by a small investment in social and educational programs 
proved to reduce crime.ccxxxiii  The Open Society Institute’s Justice Reinvestment project 
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seeks to identify and promote such practices.  Noting that the national strategy of 
increasing incarceration actually sacrifices public safety, the Open Society Institute has 
funded initiatives that seek to reallocate funding throughout the U.S. criminal justice 
system toward education, housing, health care, and jobs--all priority areas that can 
directly influence crime rates.ccxxxiv 
 
One of the largest examples of a justice reinvestment program is being implemented in 
Maryland, where the state has entered into an agreement with private partners to establish 
the Maryland Opportunity Compact.  The compact is designed to spur public and private 
investment in strategies such as drug treatment, after-school programs, and job training, 
and to reduce the state’s funding in costly remedial and corrective services such as 
prisons and foster care.  Under this agreement, private and philanthropic partners agree to 
commit seed money to second-chance interventions such as substance abuse treatment, 
prisoner reentry programs, and family reunification for children in foster care.  The state, 
in turn, commits to reinvesting 60 percent of the expected savings from reduced criminal 
justice and foster care costs to expand the availability of second-chance programs such as 
educational and wraparound services for nonviolent youth offenders.  Such strategies 
have drawn bipartisan support in Maryland, as they are expected to provide greater public 
accountability and a more responsible investment of public resources.ccxxxv 
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Chapter 6 
COMMUNITY 
 
Americans have long adhered to a strong belief in individualism and self-reliance. But 
this ethic is accompanied by a conviction that we share responsibility for each other and 
our communities, just as we are responsible for ourselves.  Furthermore, we recognize 
that the strength of our people and our nation depends on the vibrancy and cohesiveness 
of our diverse communities.  Social capital--the degree of trust, cohesiveness, reciprocity, 
and feelings of collective empowerment among community residents--is therefore an 
important indicator of community and national strength.  But also important to this 
assessment are measures of Americans’ attitudes toward newcomers and diverse groups, 
and of the policies that the nation adopts in response to their needs.  Finally, evaluating 
community strength also requires assessing how the nation responds to diversity.  
Perhaps the most sensitive measure of diversity is the degree of residential segregation of 
diverse groups.  We assess these dimensions of community in this chapter, the major 
findings of which are presented in Box 6. 
 
 
 
A strong and cohesive sense of community is essential to expanding opportunity for all.  
When we care about the progress of all members of our society, opportunity is no longer 
just about personal success but also about our success as a people. This ideal is embodied 
in the motto E Pluribus Unum--“from many one”--that John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, 
and Thomas Jefferson proposed for the first Great Seal of the United States in 1776.  It 
symbolizes both the American resolve to form one nation from a collection of states, and 
our determination to forge one unified country from people of different backgrounds and 
beliefs.  Our enduring national commitment to seeking unity while respecting diversity is 
crucial to our progress as a nation. 
 
The interdependence of community and opportunity is also expressed by the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, which states that “everyone has duties to the community in 
Box 6:  Has the Nation Protected and Enhanced Community? 
Major Gains in Community 
 Americans’ attitudes toward racial and ethnic minorities and the value of racial 
equality have improved significantly over the past several decades. 
Areas of Limited, Mixed, or No Progress 
 Rates of residential segregation on the basis of race, ethnicity, and income declined 
in the 1990s, but many disenfranchised groups, particularly poor African Americans 
and Hispanics, female-headed households, and immigrants, remain more likely to 
live in high-poverty neighborhoods relative to poor whites. 
Areas Where Community Has Declined 
 Social capital has declined in many communities, as Americans are less involved in 
civic, community, and other volunteer activities. 
 Anti-immigrant policies enacted in recent years have decreased immigrants’ access 
to social, health, and education programs, and immigrant integration programs have 
not kept pace with need. 
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which alone the free and full development of his personality is possible.”  It is only 
through our relationships with other members of society that we can achieve our own 
aspirations and protect our own rights.  This is the notion of mutuality or “the 
interrelatedness of all communities and states” described by Martin Luther King, Jr., and 
the idea that “whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly” and that ”injustice 
anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.”  Indeed, it is a central teaching of virtually all 
of the world’s major religions, expressed most familiarly in Western culture as “love thy 
neighbor as thyself.”  
 
The value of community goes beyond the notion of assimilation, which usually means 
expecting newcomers to adapt to the dominant culture and give up their own.  Instead, 
community embraces mutual respect, diversity, and integration, which mean learning 
from each other’s experiences and beliefs to build a common and evolving national 
character.  As people who came here from other lands--some as immigrants, some in 
chains, and some as the first indigenous settlers of untamed wilderness--we are 
committed to welcoming new generations as a personal and political expression of 
community. 
 
We all benefit in different ways from being Americans, and we all must contribute our 
fair share to the larger society as well as to our own pursuit of happiness.  That 
sometimes means that those of us who have benefited most from being part of the 
American venture must give back the most, sharing our national prosperity with those 
who have benefited the least.  It means willingly sharing the risks, burdens, and 
advantages of making America work.  It also means remembering that our national 
embrace of human rights and fundamental freedoms is based not on hostility toward 
government but on hostility toward the excesses of government.  And that there are 
certain things--from public transportation to national defense, from protecting human 
rights to providing health care for all--that we cannot do on our own as individuals or as 
individual cities, states, or corporations.  
 
Finally, community comprises the connections, rights, and responsibilities that we have 
as world citizens and as members of the world’s most powerful nation.  Those ties 
obligate us to search for solutions that move us forward together rather than pitt us 
against one another.  If, as the Universal Declaration states, “recognition of the inherent 
dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,” it is incumbent upon us always to 
seek common ground. 
 
About the Data in this Chapter 
 
This chapter examines four aspects of community that are essential to opportunity:  social 
capital, or the degree to which members of a community share feelings of reciprocity, 
trust, and cohesiveness; national policies on immigrant integration; Americans’ attitudes 
about racial and ethnic minorities and the value of diversity; and the degree of residential 
integration/segregation across racial, ethnic, income, and national origin groups. 
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Many measures of social capital such as the Social Capital Community Benchmark 
Survey provide detailed data on levels of general social trust, interracial trust, civic and 
faith-based engagement, informal social ties, volunteerism, and other dimensions of 
social capital.  The Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey comprises both a 
national sample of 3,000 respondents and an additional 26,700 community respondents in 
41 communities nationwide across 29 states.  Initiated in 2000, the survey does not 
provide data on trends over time.  We therefore supplement this assessment with national 
trend data from the National Election Studies survey from the University of Michigan (to 
assess trends in attitudes toward government), the General Social Survey conducted by 
the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, and data from 
Independent Sector reports that assess national levels of volunteerism and giving. 
 
Our assessments of attitudes about racial and ethnic minorities and the value of diversity 
and of immigrant integration policies are guided by a review of relevant literature.  
Finally, we examine trends in residential segregation through a literature review and 
original data analyses performed specifically for this report. 
 
SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Policymakers, community leaders, researchers, and the business community are 
increasingly recognizing the importance of social capital to the economic and social 
health and well-being of groups ranging from small communities to large nations.  
Research on social capital has found associations between the strength of informal 
networks and the success of organizations, the safety of neighborhoods, and the health of 
individuals and whole communities.  For example, research has found an association 
between social capital and levels of crime and violence in communities.  Communities 
that have fewer informal social ties and lower levels of trust and cohesion also face 
higher rates of serious and violent crime.ccxxxvi  “Bonding” social capital may emerge 
from networks of people who share common interests and backgrounds, while “bridging” 
social capital encompasses more diverse groups and individuals.  Both types of social 
capital are essential, but bridging social capital is harder to create and presents different 
challenges.  In an increasingly diverse society, however, social networks that bridge the 
various splits in contemporary communities are critically important.ccxxxvii 
 
The measurement and interpretation of trends in social capital are controversial, but 
research indicates that Americans are less involved in some types of volunteer and 
community activities than they were a generation ago.ccxxxviii  For example, rates of 
participation in clubs and civic organizations have declined by half over the last twenty-
five years, and involvement in public meetings has declined by over one-third during the 
same period.ccxxxix   
 
However, some aspects of social capital such as rates of volunteerism and charitable 
giving may have improved in recent years.  These dimensions are influenced by 
economic conditions.  For example, the economic recession of the early 2000s suppressed 
some aspects of charitable giving.  But events such as the December 2004 tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean and 2005 hurricanes in the U.S. Gulf Coast region may have spurred recent 
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charitable giving.  U.S. charitable giving reached a record in 2004 of nearly $250 billion, 
including nearly $188 billion from individuals.ccxl  And according to the U.S. Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS), rates of volunteerism in the United States increased from 27.4 
percent in 2002 to 29 percent in 2004.ccxli 
 
Independent Sector, a nonprofit, nonpartisan coalition of more than 700 national 
organizations, foundations, and corporate philanthropy programs, conducts regular 
surveys of charitable giving and volunteering in the United States.  Using a different 
survey and methodology than the federal Current Population Survey (on which BLS data 
cited above are based), Independent Sector finds much higher rates of volunteering than 
does the BLS.  In 2000, 44 percent of adults over age 21 were found to volunteer with a 
formal organization, with 63 percent of these individuals lending time on a regular basis 
(monthly or more often).  Independent Sector’s biennial national survey is not completely 
comparable over time due to changes in survey methodology, but it suggests that rates of 
volunteering have declined slightly since 1989 (see Figure 6-1).ccxlii 
 
Figure 6-1.  Volunteers as a Percentage of Population, 1989-2000
Source: Independent Sector, 2 002
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The 2000 Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey does not provide data on trends 
over time, but that year found generally low levels of community engagement and trust, 
particularly in institutions such as government and the media.  For example, fewer than 
half (47 percent) of respondents felt that “most people can be trusted.”  Whites (54 
percent) were more than twice as likely as African Americans (27 percent) or Hispanics 
(23 percent) to endorse this view.  Twenty percent of respondents reported participating 
in a neighborhood association, and only 9 percent reported participating in a political 
group.  Only 14 percent of respondents stated that they trust their local news media “a 
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lot.”  And only 28 percent of respondents stated that they trust the federal government 
“just about always” or “most of the time,” while only 43 percent reported that they trust 
their local government “just about always” or “most of the time.” On the other hand, a 
large majority of survey respondents felt a strong sense of community in their 
neighborhoods, places of worship, schools, and workplaces.  Eight in 10 respondents felt 
that people in their neighborhood gave them a sense of community, a response rate that 
does not vary greatly on the basis of respondent race, ethnicity, or education level.ccxliii   
 
The National Election Studies (NES) survey, conducted since 1948, provides trend data 
on a range of measures including trust of government.  NES’s measure of trust in 
government is a composite index constructed from response data to the following 
questions:  
 
 How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington 
to do what is right--just about always, most of the time or only some of the time? 
 Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking 
out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 
 Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, 
waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it? 
 Do you think that quite a few of the people running the government are crooked, 
not very many are, or do you think hardly any of them are crooked? 
 
This index reveals considerable variation for the nation as a whole over time, but little 
variation among gender, racial, and income groups.  Peak levels of trust in the federal 
government occurred in 1986 for all income groups, before declining through the early 
1990s and rising again in 2000.  Figure 6-2 displays trends in this measure for different 
income groups between 1970 and 2002.ccxliv  
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Figure 6-2.  Trust in Government by Income Percentile, 1970-2004
Source: National Election Studies, 2005
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IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION 
 
Many Americans would likely be surprised to learn that immigration to the United States 
is no greater today than it was at earlier points in the nation’s history.  Between 1901 and 
1925, 17.2 million immigrants were admitted to the United States, a record number at the 
time.  Similarly, 17.1 million immigrants were admitted between 1971 and 1995.ccxlv  The 
impact of immigration on the U.S. population was greater in the early 1900s, however, 
when the immigration rate–11.1 per 1,000 native-born residents–was more than two and a 
half times higher than contemporary immigration rates.ccxlvi  Perhaps more significantly, 
the face of immigration has changed.  In the early part of the last century, immigrants 
were overwhelmingly from European nations.  Since the 1980s, almost 90 percent of 
immigrants have come from Central and South America and Asia, while only one in ten 
are from Europe.ccxlvii 
 
Immigrants historically have greatly benefited from migration networks formed by 
family, kinship, and friendship ties.ccxlviii  But many immigrants have always needed 
assistance in integrating into U.S. society.  Immigrant integration programs are therefore 
important to assist newcomers with basic needs such as health care and English-language 
classes, and to establish themselves in their new communities.  But no national immigrant 
integration policy exists.  And despite the fact that federal funding for adult basic 
education and English classes increased by almost 50 percent between 1992 and 2000, 
funding has not kept pace with the growing demand for English-language and civic 
education programs.ccxlix   
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Moreover, recent federal and state policy developments have limited opportunity for 
many immigrants.  The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity 
Reconciliation Act and other legislation barred many documented and undocumented 
immigrants from federal programs such as Food Stamps, Social Security benefits, student 
loans, and other benefits.  And state referenda such as California’s Proposition 187, 
which sought to bar undocumented children from attending public schools, have 
contributed to a growing trend of anti-immigrant legislation, even though some of these 
policies have been successfully challenged and blocked in federal courts.ccl 
 
AMERICANS’ ATTITUDES TOWARD RACIAL AND ETHNIC MINORITY 
GROUPS 
 
Americans share a broad national consensus about the importance of racial and ethnic 
equality and integration.  Survey data consistently reveal a strong positive shift in racial 
attitudes over the last half century, as whites increasingly express tolerance and 
egalitarian attitudes about non-whites.  Similarly, minorities’ attitudes toward whites 
have improved significantly.ccli   
 
Despite these positive trends, however, in many instances Americans’ attitudes stand in 
contrast with their observable preferences.  Sociologists have noted, for example, the 
consistent tendency in many U.S. communities for whites to leave neighborhoods when 
African Americans integrate at levels higher than 20 percent.cclii  Americans also continue 
to endorse negative racial and ethnic stereotypes at high rates.  Findings from the General 
Social Survey, for example, reveal that significant majorities of whites believe that 
African Americans are less intelligent, lazier, and more prone to violence than whites.ccliii  
Moreover, despite the strong plurality of opinion about the need for racial equality, large 
proportions of white Americans remain opposed to social policies that address inequality, 
and tend to disagree with minority Americans about the persistence of racial 
discrimination.ccliv 
 
RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION 
 
Historically, the United States has been characterized by high levels of residential 
segregation on the basis of race, ethnicity, income, and nativity.  From the late 1960s 
through the 1980s, poverty became increasingly concentrated in inner city 
neighborhoods.cclv  Encouragingly, levels of racial, ethnic, and income segregation 
declined in many U.S. communities in the 1990s.cclvi  These trends are not consistent 
across all demographic groups, however.  A 2002 study by the U.S. Census Bureau, for 
example, found that while levels of African American segregation declined across many 
dimensions between 1980 and 2000, residential segregation is still higher for African 
Americans than for any other group.  In addition, this study found that Hispanics and 
Asian and Pacific Islanders also face high levels of residential segregation.  On some 
measures of segregation, such as the degree of isolation from other groups, Hispanics and 
Asians and Pacific Islanders experienced increases in segregation over the last two 
decades.cclvii   
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Residential segregation is particularly problematic when race, ethnicity, and poverty 
converge.  An analysis of trends in the residential segregation of poor families of color, 
prepared for The Opportunity Agenda by the Washington, D.C.-based Poverty and Race 
Research Action Council, examines Census Bureau data on the poverty status of 
neighborhoods.  Using data on census tracts within metropolitan areas defined in 1960, 
this analysis finds that the percentage of poor whites, African Americans, Hispanics, and 
female-headed households living in high-poverty neighborhoods (those with 30 percent 
or more residents living in poverty) generally declined between 1960 and 2000.  But the 
rate of decline for poor white families was much sharper than for poor families of color.  
While poor African-American families were 3.8 times more likely than poor white 
families to live in high-poverty neighborhoods in metropolitan areas in 1960, they were 
7.3 times more likely than poor whites to live in high-poverty neighborhoods in 2000.  
Similarly, poor Hispanic families were 5.7 times more likely than poor white families to 
live in high-poverty neighborhoods in 2000, but were only 3.0 times as likely as poor 
white families to live in such communities in 1960.  And while poor female-headed 
households were 2.5 times more likely than poor whites to live in high-poverty 
neighborhoods in 1970, they were 5.3 times more likely than poor whites to live in these 
conditions three decades later.  These findings confirm other research that demonstrates 
that even when family income is similarly low, families of color are more likely to be 
relegated to high-poverty communities (see Figure 6).cclviii 
 
Figure 6-3.  Percentage of Poor Families Living in High Poverty (30 
Percent or More in Poverty) Neighborhoods. 1960-2000
Source: Poverty and Race Research Action Council, 2005
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HOW CAN THE NATION ENHANCE COMMUNITY? 
 
Social Capital.  At least two trends have been found to contribute to the decline in social 
capital in many communities: the increase in television consumption, and the expansion 
of “exurban” communities far from traditional urban and suburban cores.  These trends 
suggest that government policies to enhance social capital should first carefully consider 
how regional development strategies and land use such as the placement of parks, 
recreation centers, and community centers may contribute to social cohesion, and second, 
assess how television and other media can enhance democratic participation, connection, 
and expression (see the chapter on Voice for a discussion of media democracy).  Other 
strategies such as congregation-based community organizing, civic environmentalism, 
and participatory school reform are promising strategies to enhance public problem 
solving.cclix 
 
Immigrant Integration.  An effective comprehensive immigration integration policy is 
needed to assist newcomers to fully participate in the social, cultural, and political life of 
the nation.  Several strategies are needed, including greater support for programs such as 
health care, English-language classes, and other social services that provide basic 
assistance to immigrants.  Immigrant workers also require assistance in learning about 
workplace rights, fair wages and benefits, and means to garner legal assistance to protect 
these rights.  Other programs should encourage public education and outreach to raise 
newcomers’ awareness of the federal naturalization process, and increase the availability 
of civics education and other programs that are needed to gain citizenship.  Among new 
citizens, voter education programs and other efforts to increase political participation 
(discussed in the chapter on Voice) are important to stimulate political engagement and 
empowerment.  
 
Residential Segregation.  Communities that are highly segregated on the basis of race, 
ethnicity, and poverty receive fewer and poorer quality public services, are 
disproportionately victimized by high levels of crime and violence (often accompanied 
by aggressive law enforcement tactics), face higher levels of environmental health risks, 
and are plagued with a host of other problems.  Moreover, the costs of segregation--both 
in human and economic terms--burden all communities.  As noted in the chapter on 
Mobility, housing policies should encourage the development of mixed-income 
communities, and land use policies should consider the impact of zoning decisions on the 
isolation of racial, ethnic, and high-poverty communities.  Because a high level of 
housing discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity persists (as discussed in the 
section on Equality) stepped-up state and federal enforcement of anti-discrimination laws 
is necessary, perhaps enforced through audit studies.  And because mortgage lending 
discrimination also may limit the housing options of many low-income and minority 
families, federal enforcement of the 1968 Fair Housing Act must be strengthened. 
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Chapter 7 
SECURITY 
 
Americans believe that we are all entitled to a basic level of education, economic well-
being, health care, and other protections necessary to human dignity.cclx  Without this 
security, it is impossible to access society’s other rights and responsibilities, or to enjoy 
full opportunity.  Moreover, international human rights commitments--many of which, as 
noted in the introduction to this report, were spearheaded by the United States--obligate 
our nation to ensure basic levels of health, housing, and income security for its residents.  
In this chapter we review threats to the security of our nation and assess our progress over 
time.  We examine measures of income security, health and health care security, housing 
and food security, and physical safety.   
 
This review shows that Americans are more secure on some measures of opportunity, 
such as rates of criminal victimization, than we have been in more than two decades.  But 
for most other measures of security, national progress is stagnant or declining.  
Increasingly, threats to security are found in rising social and economic inequality, the 
eroding safety net, and unequal access to our vast resources.  Moreover, these threats 
affect all Americans, both directly and indirectly, as our communities and public 
institutions are weakened by a lack of basic security.  A summary of the major findings 
of this chapter are presented in Box 7.  
 
Box 7: Has the Nation Made Gains in Security? 
Major Gains in Security 
 Many Americans are now more secure from criminal victimization than in decades.  
The percentage of U.S. households that were victimized by crimes (including both 
violent crimes and property crimes) fell from 25 percent to 15 percent between 1994 
and 2003, and homicide rates have declined by more than 50 percent since 1970. 
 Overall health status has steadily improved for all Americans, and life expectancy 
has increased to record levels for all groups. 
Areas of Limited, Mixed or No Progress 
 Poverty has increased over the last five years, despite declines in the 1990s.  Today, 
5.4 million more Americans live in poverty than did in 2000.  In 2004 nearly 37 
million people, about one in eight U.S. residents, lived in poverty.  Over one-third of 
these individuals are children under age 18.  
 Gaps in health status among racial and ethnic groups, citizenship groups, and 
socioeconomic groups have not narrowed much in nearly a generation.  African 
Americans, American Indians, Alaska Natives, and Pacific Islanders have 
dramatically poorer health relative to national averages.  The same is true for whites 
who live in poverty compared to those who are better off.  And although women can 
expect to live longer than men, their longer lifespan is offset by higher rates of 
functional impairment and disability.  
Areas Where Security Has Declined 
 The number of Americans without health insurance has risen steadily over the last 
thirty years to unprecedented levels.  More than 45 million Americans lack health 
insurance, and more than 87 million Americans were uninsured at any point over the 
last two years. 
 Affordable high-quality housing is increasingly out of the grasp of working families 
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who make less than a living wage. 
 Hunger and food insecurity rates rose for the fourth year in a row between 2003 and 
2004.  Most alarming is the rise in food insecurity among children.  About 31 percent 
of African-American, 30 percent of Hispanic children and 43 percent of all low-
income children live in homes that experienced periods of food insecurity in 2004.   
 
Americans generally view the United States as a land of boundless opportunity, where 
individuals can achieve their dreams regardless of their gender, race, nationality, family 
background, or the circumstances of their birth.  But increasingly, Americans experience 
threats to opportunity arising from a lack of basic health, education, income, and other 
protections.  These threats affect all Americans, as a lack of basic security weakens our 
community institutions and violates our nation’s core principles and values.  Moreover, 
these threats disproportionately affect groups who historically have been most vulnerable 
to exploitation and marginalization.  These include women, communities of color, rural 
communities, immigrants, poor and working poor families, and others whose security is 
threatened on a daily basis. 
 
This chapter reviews threats to the personal security of the nation’s residents and assesses 
progress in providing a basic level of security that is necessary for opportunity.  We 
define security of opportunity as a basic level of health, income, food security, and 
physical safety, below which no one should be allowed to fall if our nation remains 
committed to full opportunity.  Specifically, we examine trends in income security 
(poverty, bankruptcies, and pension participation); health security (health status, health 
care access and quality, occupational safety, and housing); food security; physical safety 
(homicide, serious and violent crimes); and environmental security.  Many of these same 
indicators are also used in domestic and international human rights reports, as they reflect 
the human rights community’s consensus about the basic rights that are key to 
opportunity.  Where data are available, we document national trends as well as data 
disaggregated by gender, race or ethnicity, immigration and citizenship status, and 
income or education level.   
 
About the Data in this Chapter 
 
The main data sources for this chapter include federal data on trends in health, poverty 
and economic security, food security, and criminal victimization; federal research reports 
published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the National Center for Vital Health 
Statistics, and other federal agencies; research published in peer-reviewed literature; and 
other research reports published by policy research organizations such as the Economic 
Policy Institute. 
 
Where data are available, we summarize trends in measures of security over time.  In 
addition, we review literature on the impact of selected measures on Americans’ 
opportunities.  As noted earlier in this report, there are several limitations of the data.  
Federal data collected prior to 1997 rarely include racial and ethnic groups other than 
whites, African Americans, and Hispanics.  Further, these broad racial and ethnic 
categories often fail to adequately capture the diversity within U.S. racial and ethnic 
groups, which may vary considerably on the basis of immigration status or nativity, 
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primary language, cultural identification, and area of residence.  A full assessment of 
opportunity should include a consideration of how opportunity varies along these 
dimensions.  Where possible, we present subgroup information such as variations among 
Asian-American and Hispanic nationality groups. 
 
Similarly, federal data are rarely disaggregated by both race or ethnicity and measures of 
social class or socioeconomic status.  Yet the opportunity barriers for low-income whites 
may differ in important ways from those of better-off whites and some minorities.  We 
encourage future analyses to examine how opportunity indicators differ by race or 
ethnicity and income, as well as their interaction.   
 
INCOME SECURITY 
 
Poverty  
 
Poverty remains a persistent threat to the security of millions of Americans.  In 2004 
nearly 37 million people--about one in eight U.S. residents--lived in poverty.  More than 
one-third of these individuals are children under age 18.cclxi  Women, people of color, 
non-citizens, and people who live in urban and rural areas are disproportionately 
represented among the impoverished.  These gaps have persisted for decades, but they 
narrowed after periods of progressive policies that focused on increasing economic 
opportunities for the working poor and creating more equitable employment practices 
(e.g., the Earned Income Tax Credit and federal minimum wage increases). cclxii  
Disturbingly, however, these gaps have widened in recent years.  This trend threatens to 
increase not only the number of Americans living in poverty, but also the economic gaps 
between men and women, racial and ethnic groups, new arrivals and old, and between 
those with higher levels of education and skills and those without them. 
 
Gender Gaps in Poverty.  The economic surge of the 1990s produced unprecedented job 
growth that helped to substantially reduce rates of U.S. poverty.  But the gap in poverty 
between women and men has persisted, and overall poverty rates have since risen.  
Annually since 2000, between 22 percent and 27 percent more women than men have 
been among the ranks of the impoverished in the United States--a gap that, by and large, 
has not changed since 1966 (see Figure 7-1).cclxiii  For example, the percentage of women 
in poverty dropped to its lowest levels in almost thirty years in 2000, with about one in 
eight women living in poverty, but poverty rates among men that year dropped further, to 
slightly under one in ten.cclxiv 
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Figure 7-1.  Poverty Rate by Gender, 1966-2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2005
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Racial and Ethnic Differences in Poverty Rates.  The prosperity of the 1990s also led to a 
diminution of the racial and ethnic gap in poverty rates (see Figure 7-2).  In 2000 the 
poverty rate among African Americans and Hispanics was a little over 2.6 times greater 
than that for white Americans, the smallest racial and ethnic difference in poverty rates 
between these population groups in more than three decades.  Similarly, in 2000 the 
poverty rate among Asian Americans and Pacific Islander Americans was one-third 
higher than that for whites, the smallest gap between these groups in ten years.  From 
2001 to 2003, however, poverty rates for all racial and ethnic groups increased more 
dramatically than they did for whites, widening the racial poverty gap.  This gap declined 
slightly in 2004 for all minority groups except African Americans.cclxv 
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Figure 7-2.  People (Age 18-64) in Poverty by Race or Ethnicity,
1974-2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005
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Poverty among Children.  Child poverty may pose the most significant barrier to 
opportunity for individuals, their families, and their communities.  Not only are 
impoverished children and their families less likely to have material resources necessary 
for adequate nutrition, housing, and health care, they are also more likely (as detailed 
elsewhere in this report) to live in communities characterized by high rates of violence, 
instability, poor quality schools, and inadequate safety net resources.cclxvi  Children who 
live in conditions of poverty face multiple barriers to full participation in the economic, 
cultural, and political life of the nation.  They face longer odds of economic mobility, are 
less likely to earn a high school or college degree, more likely to experience greater 
health problems later in life, and more likely to have children who will likely face the 
same economic circumstances as they did, repeating a generational cycle of poverty. 
 
A large body of research demonstrates the importance of basic levels of health, housing, 
nutrition, economic, and physical security for children’s development and educational 
and health outcomes. For instance: 
 
 Children who are undernourished during infant and toddler years are at greater 
risk for behavioral and neurological impairment, as well as cognitive delays.  
Similarly, undernutrition during pregnancy is associated with prematurity, low 
birth weight, and cognitive impairment, all of which are linked to poorer health 
and educational outcomes for children.cclxvii 
 Nearly one-third of uninsured children did not receive medical care in 2003, 
compared to 12.5 percent of insured children; uninsured children are ten times 
more likely than insured children to fail to receive needed medical care.cclxviii 
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 Studies demonstrate that children who are exposed to at least one period of 
poverty have poorer health than children who never experience poverty.  But 
longitudinal studies also show that children’s health status has a direct, negative 
relationship to the duration of poverty.  In other words, the longer children live in 
poverty, the poorer their health.cclxix 
 
Racial and ethnic gaps in child poverty rates reached their greatest points in 1982 and 
1992, when over 45 percent of African-American and 40 percent of Hispanic children 
lived in poverty, relative to 13.2 percent (in 1992) and 14.4 percent (in 1982) of white 
children (see Figure 7-3).  Similarly, Asian-American and Pacific Islander-Islander 
children experienced higher poverty rates than white children.  In 1987 and 1998, rates of 
child poverty among Asian-American and Pacific Islander-American children were more 
than twice those of white children.  These gaps declined to their lowest levels in 2000 and 
2001, at the end of the economic expansion of the 1990s.  Since 2001, however, overall 
child poverty rates have increased, as have racial and ethnic gaps in child poverty, erasing 
many of the gains of the 1990s.cclxx 
 
Figure 7-3.  Percentage of Poor People Under Age 18 by Race or 
Ethnicity
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2005
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Poverty and Citizenship Status.  The United States has long been considered a “land of 
opportunity” for newcomers.  Data on poverty among native-born citizens, naturalized 
citizens, and non-citizens suggest that opportunity varies considerably by citizenship 
status.  In 2003 non-citizens were twice as likely as naturalized citizens to live in poverty, 
although this gap has narrowed significantly since 1993, when the rate of poverty among 
non-citizens was nearly three times that among naturalized citizens (see Figure 7-4).cclxxi   
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Figure 7-4.  People in Poverty by Nativity, 1993-2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2005
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Workers Living in Poverty.  In 2003 more than 24 million people who worked full- or 
part-time lived in poverty, and over one in ten impoverished individuals worked full-
time.cclxxii  A parent who works full-time at the federal minimum wage to support a 
family of three makes $5,000 under the poverty line.cclxxiii  And, as depicted in Figure 7-5, 
the percentage of full-time workers who fall below the poverty line has increased by 42 
percent since 1978.  The number of these workers has more than doubled since 1978, 
rising from about 1.3 million to almost 2.9 million workers in 2004.cclxxiv 
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Figure 7-5.  Year-round, Full-time Workers as a Proportion of All Poor 
People, 1978-2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Survey, 2005
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Bankruptcies 
 
Personal bankruptcy, perhaps the most sensitive indicator of economic insecurity, has 
increased dramatically.  More than 1.5 million people filed for bankruptcy in the United 
States in 2003.  The rate of consumer bankruptcies more than tripled from 1980 to 2003, 
rising from fewer than 2 of every 1,000 adults to more than 7 of every 1,000 adults in 
2003.cclxxv  These individuals are not merely people who have amassed high consumer or 
credit card debt.  A recent study showed that half of all bankruptcies involve unpaid 
medical and health care debts.  Among those whose medical bills contributed to 
bankruptcy, average out-of-pocket costs approached $12,000, and three-quarters of these 
individuals possessed health insurance at the onset of illness.cclxxvi 
 
Pension and Retirement Security 
 
A slightly growing number of American households can expect to retire and receive 
retirement income that is at least half of their current income, based on personal savings, 
pensions, and Social Security income.  In 2001, 72 percent of households headed by 
someone age 47 to 64 expected to be able to retire with retirement income at least half of 
their current income, an increase of 2.3 percent since 1989. Yet less than half of the U.S. 
workforce (46 percent) is covered by employer-sponsored pensions, a decline of 4.7 
percent since 1979.cclxxvii  And wide gaps in pension participation remain among 
demographic groups, gaps largely explained by differences in education, income, and 
types of employment.  Women and minorities are less likely to be covered by an 
employer-sponsored plan. 
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African-American and Hispanic workers have lower levels of participation in pension 
plans than do whites, a gap that appears to be growing.  From 1987 to 2001, pension plan 
participation among white wage and salary workers increased from 48 percent to 54 
percent, while participation rates for African Americans increased only 3 percent during 
the same period, from 43 percent to 46 percent.  Pension participation among Hispanics 
during the same period declined from 32 percent to 29 percent (see Figure 7-6).cclxxviii  
These racial and ethnic gaps persist at lower- and middle-income levels, but narrow 
significantly between Hispanics and whites at the highest income levels.  Relative to 
whites, African Americans have equal or higher levels of participation in employer-
sponsored pension plans at upper- and middle-income levels.  Pension participation is 
highest among public employees, and the racial and ethnic gap in pension participation is 
narrowest in this sector.  More than two-thirds of Hispanic public employees, 70 percent 
of African-American public employees, and 78 percent of white public employees 
participated in an employer-sponsored pension plan in 2001.  Conversely, the racial and 
ethnic gap in pension participation is greatest among employees in small- and medium-
sized firms.cclxxix 
 
Figure 7-6.  Percentage of Wage and Salary Workers Age 21-64 Who 
Participated in an Employment-Based Retirement Plan by Race or 
Ethnicity, 1987-2001
Source: Copeland, 2003
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Women’s rate of participation in employer-sponsored pension plans increased more 
rapidly than did men’s between 1987 and 2001, from 41 percent to 48 percent.  Men’s 
rate of participation increased just one percentage point to 52 percent (see Figure 7-
7).cclxxx  But part-time workers are less likely to be eligible for participation in employer-
sponsored plans, and women are disproportionately employed as part-time workers.  In 
2001, 35 percent of older women reported that they worked too few hours to be eligible 
for employer pension plans, compared to 20 percent of older men.  And older women 
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workers are less likely than older male workers to expect a pension from any source.  
Only about one-third of older men expected not to receive a pension, compared to 44 
percent of older women.cclxxxi   
 
Figure 7-7.  Percentage of Wage and Salary Workers Age 21-64 Who 
Participated in an Employment-Based Retirement Plan by Gender, 
1987-2001
Source: Copeland, 2003
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Among current retirees, the pension gap is particularly striking, reflecting the historical 
lack of opportunities for women and people of color to work in jobs that provide pension 
benefits.  For example, almost half of male retirees in 2000 received a pension, compared 
to 30 percent of women retirees.  And among those who received pensions, women’s 
pensions were half those of men--including women’s benefits received through their 
husbands’ pensions.cclxxxii  This gap in pension income contributes to higher rates of 
financial insecurity among older women, particularly older women of color. 
 
HEALTH SECURITY 
 
Health Status 
 
In the twenty-first century Americans are enjoying unprecedented longevity and good 
health.  This is largely due to increases in wage and education levels, improvements in 
public health programs such as child immunization and smoking cessation, greater 
awareness of health risks and healthful behaviors, and better access to health care.  But 
many groups experience poor health relative to national averages, and do not enjoy the 
same access to high-quality health care and health information as do more advantaged 
groups.  Others who appear healthy based on national statistics may experience “hidden” 
health problems.  For example, women live longer than men but experience greater 
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functional limitations and chronic health problems that can erode their quality of 
life.cclxxxiii  These health gaps weaken our security and diminish basic human rights and 
opportunities that Americans cherish. 
 
Life Expectancy.  Americans can expect, on average, to live longer today than at any 
other point in history.  White women’s life expectancy has crept above 80 years, and 
white men’s and African-American women’s life expectancy is now slightly over 75 
years.  But African-American women continue to trail white women in life expectancy, 
although these trends have narrowed slightly, and African-American men continue to 
face lower life expectancy than other groups, as their estimated life expectancy has yet to 
climb above 70 years.  Moreover, African-American men have experienced two periods 
of significant declines in life expectancy, from 1962 to 1971 and from 1984 to 1990 (see 
Figure 7-8).  Federal data on life expectancy among other racial, ethnic, and gender 
groups are not available, but given the growing size of these groups, future federal vital 
statistics reports should include them. 
 
Figure 7-8.  Estimated Life Expectancy at Birth in Years by Race and 
Sex, 1964-2002
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2004
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Mortality.  Overall mortality has declined steadily in the United States over the last four 
decades, with the greatest declines occurring during periods when economic growth 
equitably benefited all income groups and when the overall population attained higher 
levels of education.  One such period occurred shortly after World War II, when the G.I. 
Bill increased access to higher education for thousands of returning veterans.cclxxxiv  But 
for some groups mortality gaps persist and in some cases are increasing, despite overall 
gains in mortality.  African-American men, for example, died at rates that were 32 
percent higher than the national average for men in 2002.  This gap is 7 percent higher 
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than the gap in 1980 (see Figure 7-9).cclxxxv  Similarly, mortality rates among African-
American females have been consistently 25 percent higher than those for women 
overall.  And despite the national trend toward declining mortality, not all groups 
benefited.  American Indian and Alaska Native women, for example, experienced a 19 
percent increase in mortality rates from 1990 to 1999, before those rates declined in 2000 
(see Figure 7-10).cclxxxvi  
 
Figure 7-9.  Death Rates for All Causes Among U.S. Males by Race and 
Ethnicity, Selected Years 1950-2002
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005
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Figure 7-10.  Death Rates for All Causes Among U.S. Females by 
Race/Ethnicity, Selected Years 1950-2002
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005
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Infant Mortality.  Infant mortality has progressively declined in the United States, 
particularly during periods of economic growth that greatly reduced poverty, such as 
during the mid- and late-1990s.   The nation has made strides in increasing access to 
prenatal care services and building healthier communities, but these gains still leave gaps 
among racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic groups (see Figure 7-11). cclxxxvii  African-
American and American Indian infant mortality rates, for example, remain almost two 
and three times higher than those for whites, respectively, and lower income groups of all 
races have nearly double the mortality rates of those for wealthier groups. 
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Figure 7-11.  Rates of Infant Mortality by Race and Ethnicity, Selected 
Years 1983-2002
Source: National Center for Health Statistics, 2004
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Physically Unhealthy Days.   Today Americans are just as likely, and in some cases more 
likely, to feel sick for two or more weeks in a year than they were a decade ago (see 
Figures 7-12 and 7-13).cclxxxviii  The percentage of Americans who report being physically 
unhealthy for 14 or more days has increased slightly for almost all racial and ethnic 
groups since 1993, with the sharpest increase found among Native Americans and Alaska 
Natives.cclxxxix   Moreover, disparities between racial and ethnic groups in physically 
unhealthy days has not diminished.  In 2003 almost 20 percent of Native Americans 
reported two weeks or more of unhealthy days, almost twice the rate of their white 
counterparts. 
 
Similarly, almost 30 percent more women than men report two or more weeks of 
physically unhealthy days in a year, the same difference observed in 2003 as in 1993.  
This rate, however, is trending upward for both men and women (see Figure 7-13), 
suggesting that the gender gap in physically unhealthy days is not likely to diminish in 
the near future.ccxc   
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Figure 7-12.  Percentage of Respondents with 14 or More Unhealthy 
Days by Gender, 1993-2003
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005
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Figure 7-13.  Percentage of Respondents with 14 or More Physically 
Unhealthy Days by Race and Ethnicity, 1993-2003
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2005
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Health Care Access and Quality 
 
Access to Health Insurance.  More than 45 million Americans lack health insurance, and 
more than 80 million Americans lacked health insurance for all or part of the last two 
years.ccxci  A lack of health insurance creates staggering costs, in human and economic 
terms, for the uninsured, for the insured, and for entire communities and their institutions.  
People who lack health insurance are less likely to receive preventive health services, 
thereby increasing their risk for preventable chronic and infectious diseases.  Fewer 
hospitals and health systems can afford to provide indigent care, and the health care that 
the uninsured may receive is often of poor quality.  The Institute of Medicine estimates 
that the aggregate annual cost of poorer health and shortened life spans attributable to 
uninsurance is between $65 billion and $130 billion.ccxcii Nearly 80 million insured and 
uninsured Americans have experienced difficulty paying medical bills and/or have 
accrued debt related to medical care costs.  More importantly, two-thirds of people who 
experience problems with medical bills or debt go without needed care because of cost--a 
rate three times that for people without medical care-related financial problems.ccxciii  A 
report by Families USA finds that in 2005 premium costs for private employer-provided 
family health insurance coverage rose by $922 due to the cost of caring for the uninsured, 
while premiums for individual coverage cost an extra $341 for the same reason.ccxciv 
 
Trends in the Number of Uninsured Individuals.  The number of uninsured Americans 
currently stands at an all-time high, although it briefly had trended downward in the late 
1990s before increasing at a rapid rate (Figure 7-14).ccxcv  The number of whites who 
were uninsured declined by 20 percent between 1997 and 1999, while the number of 
uninsured among other racial and ethnic groups increased steadily.  The number of 
uninsured Hispanics more than doubled between 1987 and 2004, largely due to new 
immigrants, who were less likely to receive health insurance through an employer. 
 
Perhaps more significantly, the percentage of U.S. families who receive health insurance 
coverage for the entire family has also declined, and an increasing number of families are 
relying on public sources of health insurance such as Medicaid or the State Child Health 
Insurance Program to provide coverage.  This is the case even though one or more other 
family members may continue to receive employer-sponsored health insurance, and it is 
particularly true among families of color who work.  Between 1999 and 2002, the 
proportion of Hispanic and African-American children covered by Medicaid living in a 
family where at least one member had employer-provided health insurance increased by 
11.3 percent and 8.8 percent, respectively.ccxcvi  State and federal sources are therefore 
increasingly subsidizing health insurance for families who work. 
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Figure 7-14.  Uninsured People in America by Race and Ethnicity, 1987-
2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
40,000
45,000
50,000
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
P
e
o
p
le
, 
in
 T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
s
All
White
African
American
Hispanic
Asian/Pacific
Islander
 
 
Racial and ethnic minority and immigrant communities are disproportionately uninsured.  
For example:  
 
 While Hispanic children constitute less than one-fifth of children in the United 
States, they represent over one-third of uninsured children.ccxcvii  And among 
children in fair or poor health who lack insurance (nearly 570,000 children in 
2002), over two-thirds are Hispanic.ccxcviii   
 More than 11 million immigrants were uninsured in 2003, contributing to one-
quarter of the U.S. uninsured.  The uninsurance rate among immigrants increased 
dramatically in the late 1990s, following the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, which imposed a five-year limit on most 
new immigrants’ ability to participate in public health insurance programs.  Prior 
to and shortly following passage of the Act (between 1994 and 1998), immigrants 
accounted for about one-third of the increase in the number of uninsured 
individuals.  Between 1998 and 2003 they accounted for 86 percent of that 
growth.ccxcix 
 Foreign-born people are 2.5 times more likely than the native-born to lack health 
insurance, a gap that remains unchanged since 1993 (see Figure 7-15). 
 
Security  138 
Figure 7-15.  Percentage of Uninsured People in the United States by 
Nativity, 1987-2004
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2005
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Regular Source of Health Care.  Having a regular source of health care--a local 
physician, clinic, or health center--is important, particularly for individuals who are at 
risk for illness or injury.  When patients are able see a health care provider consistently, 
they are better able to build trusting relationships, ask questions, and give and receive 
information.  Patients who lack a regular source of health care often report 
miscommunication, misdiagnoses, and greater frustration about their ability to receive 
needed care.ccc  The uninsured and underinsured, many racial and ethnic minorities, 
people who are not proficient in English, those who live in rural communities, and those 
who have low incomes are more likely to report not having a regular source of health 
care.ccci  This problem poses serious risks for personal health security, as well as for the 
health of communities as a whole. 
 
Yet the regular-source-of-health-care gap among racial/ethnic and income groups is 
growing.  Causes include the poor distribution of health care resources across 
communities, insufficient funding of public and safety-net health systems, and a dearth of 
culturally appropriate health care in some communities.cccii  
 
African Americans, Hispanics, and the poor and near poor (of all racial and ethnic 
groups) are more likely than white non-poor groups to face barriers to having a regular 
source of health care.  But these gaps have increased since 2000.  Over 42 percent of 
Hispanic poor and 37 percent of Hispanic non-poor people lacked a regular source of 
health care in 2001 and 2002, an increase of more than 30 percent and 18 percent, 
respectively, since 1995 and 1996.  During this same period, the percentage of poor and 
near-poor African Americans and whites without a regular source of health care went 
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largely unchanged.  But these groups were up to 75 percent more likely than non-poor 
African Americans and whites to lack a regular source of health care in 2001 and 2002.  
And the percentage of Hispanics from all income groups who lacked a regular source of 
health care increased between 1993 and 2002, despite a 15 percent decline over the same 
period in the ranks of white poor individuals who lacked a regular source of health 
care.ccciii 
 
Reproductive Health Care.  Publicly funded family planning clinics are an important 
means of expanding access to affordable sexual and reproductive health care in the 
United States. The Alan Guttmacher Institute estimates that more than 34 million U.S. 
women needed contraceptive services in 2002, nearly half of whom needed public 
services because of low income and/or other barriers to receipt of contraceptive care.  Of 
these, only about 6.7 million women, or four in ten, were served in publicly funded 
clinics.ccciv  These clinics have experienced only a 2 percent increase in clients since 
1994, despite modest growth in the number of publicly funded family planning clinics 
providing contraceptive services to eligible women.cccv   Public expenditures on 
contraceptives services totaled $1.26 billion in 2001, almost completely reversing 
declines in public funding in the 1980s (adjusted for 2001 dollars).cccvi  Funding for 
public family planning services is severely threatened, however, by pending state and 
federal cuts in Medicaid programs; more than eight in ten family planning agencies 
receive Medicaid funding for contraceptive services.  And in many states capacity is well 
behind need.  Since 1980, thirty states have reduced their spending on contraceptive 
services.cccvii  In the last decade, a large number of states experienced a decline in met 
need or an increase in women in need living in counties without a publicly funded 
clinic.cccviii 
 
Occupational Safety  
 
Many people of color, immigrants, and low-income families tackle some of the most 
dangerous jobs in America.  They do so as a means of providing for their families and as 
a way to attain better, safer work ahead.  But historically these groups have also faced 
higher rates of occupational injury and death, making the workplace a disproportionate 
threat to their security.  Although overall rates of occupational injury and death have 
declined--the result of improved workplace health and safety policies enacted in the 
1990s--Hispanics remain at greater risk for work-related death, as depicted in Figure 7-
16.cccix   Hispanic workers face a 28 percent greater risk of workplace-related death than 
do whites, and they are at 42 percent greater risk than are African Americans. 
 
Security  140 
Figure 7-16.  Occupational Injury Death Rates by Race and Ethnicity, 
1995-2003
Source:  National Center for Health Statistics, 2005
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
5.5
6.0
6.5
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
D
e
a
th
s
 p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 E
m
p
lo
y
e
d
 W
o
rk
e
rs
Total
White
African
American
Hispanic
 
Housing 
 
Safe, affordable, quality housing is another important dimension of security, yet adequate 
housing is increasingly difficult for even average wage earners to afford.   
 
Federal standards define affordable housing as housing costs that do not exceed 30 
percent of family income.  Today, many families pay far more than this proportion of 
income for housing.  According to the National Low Income Housing Coalition, U.S. 
workers must earn an average hourly wage of $15.37 to afford the rental costs of a two-
bedroom unit, yet the national hourly wage average is about $14, and more than one-
quarter of the population earns less than $10 an hour.cccx  For families earning extremely 
low incomes--less than 30 percent of the median income in an area--the situation is even 
more dire: 
 
 On average, families with extremely low incomes can afford to rent a two-
bedroom house at fair market price in only nine U.S. counties, and in only four 
counties in the nation can a person working full-time at the minimum wage afford 
even a one-bedroom apartment.cccxi 
 Of the 4.4 million “working poor” households in the United States, nearly 60 
percent pay more than half of their incomes for housing or live in dilapidated 
conditions.  Nearly three in five of these households have children.cccxii 
 Working families that pay more than half of their incomes for housing are more 
likely than other working families to have trouble paying household bills, to lack 
health insurance, and to experience food insecurity.cccxiii 
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For groups such as female heads of households and families of color, affording a home is 
particularly difficult because of lower incomes and fewer mortgage lending options.  
Unmarried women are more likely than men of all age groups to spend more than half of 
their monthly income on housing.  This is particularly true among women age 35 to 44, 
who are twice as likely as men to experience severe housing cost burdens.cccxiv  One-
quarter of the nation’s single mothers spend more than half of their income on housing, 
compared to one in ten households headed by single fathers.cccxv  And, as discussed in the 
chapter on Mobility, rates of subprime home mortgage lending--characterized by higher 
interest rates and fees--are increasingly concentrated in low-income and predominantly 
minority communities, leading to rising default rates.  From 1993 to 2001, for example, 
rates of subprime home lending increased severalfold in low-income and predominantly 
minority communities.cccxvi 
 
Some groups also face a greater likelihood of living in severely inadequate housing, 
defined by the Census Bureau as housing that has deficiencies in any of five problem 
areas, such as lacking hot water, heat, or electricity, or having significant upkeep 
problems.  Low-income, unmarried female-headed, immigrant, and minority households 
experience a greater percentage of severely inadequate housing than higher income and 
white households.  But gaps in rates of severely inadequate housing among racial/ethnic 
minorities, immigrants, and whites persist at all income levels, including households 
above moderate income (see Figure 7-17).cccxvii 
 
Figure 7-17.  Percentage of Households with Severely Inadequate 
Housing, by Race, Ethnicity, and Income Level, 2003
Source:  Poverty and Race Research Action Council, 2005
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FOOD SECURITY 
 
Having an inadequate supply of food and nutritional resources can greatly hamper 
opportunity, particularly among young children, whose early physical and cognitive 
development depends on access to nutritious food.cccxviii  Households characterized by 
food insecurity, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture, are those that 
experienced uncertainty about adequately feeding all members of the family or were 
unable to acquire enough food because of a lack of funds or other resources at some time 
during the last year.  These households avoid having one or more family member go 
hungry because they are able to participate in a federal food assistance program, receive 
emergency food from a community food pantry, “stretch” meals, eat less varied diets, 
and/or adopt other coping mechanisms.cccxix  But some households experience periods 
when one or more family member is hungry.  In 2003 nearly 4 million families 
experienced food insecurity with hunger, the fourth straight year in which the number of 
families experiencing hunger increased.cccxx 
 
Federal data on rates of food insecurity are available only from the mid-1990s, and a 
change of methodology only allows a comparison of these rates from 1998 to the present.  
The percentage of families experiencing food insecurity has increased since 1999, but 
this percentage is below the rate of households reporting food insecurity at the first 
measurement point in 1998.  Households with children are more likely to experience food 
insecurity than those without children.  In 2003 nearly 17 percent of all U.S. households 
experienced food insecurity, while slightly over 11 percent of households without 
children experienced food insecurity (see Figure 7-18).cccxxi 
 
Figure 7-18.  Rates of Food Insecurity by Household
Source: Economic Research Service, USDA, 2004
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PHYSICAL SAFETY 
 
Rates of homicide and other serious crimes are sensitive indicators of personal security.  
Overall rates of violent and serious crimes have declined over the last decade, coinciding 
with the economic boom of the 1990s and continuing through 2003.cccxxii  Homicide rates 
have declined dramatically since the 1970s.cccxxiii  Some communities, however, continue 
to experience high rates of violence.  Communities with high rates of concentrated 
poverty, joblessness, dislocation, and minimal political power--more often than not, poor 
urban communities of color--continue to experience higher rates of serious crime and 
criminal victimization than do their white and higher income counterparts.  Geographic, 
cultural, and linguistic isolation experienced by other marginalized racial and ethnic 
minority groups can contribute to insecurity from violence.  And violence against women 
continues to be underreported and inadequately addressed by criminal justice policy and 
practice. 
  
Homicide 
 
Racial and ethnic disparities in female homicide rates have declined dramatically over the 
last thirty-five years.  As shown in Figure 7-19, in 1990 African-American women were 
five times more likely than white, non-Hispanic women to be murdered.  In 2002 this 
ratio declined to 3.6.  Over this same time period, American-Indian or Alaska-Native 
women were usually twice as likely as white women to be homicide victims.cccxxiv     
 
For men, the racial gap in mortality due to homicide has been more persistent.  In 1990 
African-American men were more than eleven times more likely than white men to be 
killed; in 2002, this ratio declined to just under ten-to-one (Figure 7-20).  Among Latino 
and white males, the homicide gap was about five-to-one in 1990; in 2002 Latino men 
were three times more likely than white men to die by homicide.  And Asian-American 
and Pacific Islander-Americans have been consistently more likely than white men to die 
by homicide since 1990.cccxxv 
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Figure 7-19.  Female Death Rates From Homicide by Race and 
Ethnicity, Selected Years 1950-2002
Source:  Fox and Zawitz, 2004
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Figure 7-20.  Male Death Rates From Homicide by Race and Ethnicity, 
Selected Years 1950-2002
Source:  Fox and Zawitz, 2004
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Violent Victimization 
 
The downward trend in rates of violent victimization, which includes crimes such as rape, 
sexual assault, robbery, and aggravated assault, has been steady for both men and women 
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and for all racial and ethnic groups.  Rates of violent victimization are now less than half 
what they were in 1993, when the Department of Justice’s National Crime Victimization 
Survey (NCVS) was redesigned.cccxxvi  Since 1995 the NCVS sample has also declined as 
a result of the escalating costs of data collection.  The declining crime rate, combined 
with sample reductions, has led to a diminished federal capacity to track victimization 
rates among racial and ethnic groups other than whites, African Americans, and 
Hispanics.  Trends in victimization rates, as assessed by the NCVS, are presented in 
Figures 7-21 and 7-22. 
 
Figure 7-21.  Rate of Violent Victimization per 1,000 Persons Age 12 or 
Older by Gender, 1993-2003
Source:  Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 2004
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
V
io
le
n
t 
C
ri
m
e
s
 p
e
r 
1
,0
0
0
 P
e
rs
o
n
 A
g
e
 1
2
 o
r 
O
ld
e
r
Male
Female
 
Security  146 
Figure 7-22.  Rate of Violent Victimization per 1,000 Persons Age 12 or 
Older by Race/Ethnicity, 1993-2003
Source:  Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice, 2004
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Intimate Partner Violence 
 
Intimate partner violence (IPV) is pervasive, affecting more than 32 million Americans 
each year.  Almost one-quarter of women and 7.6 percent of men in the Justice 
Department’s National Violence Against Women survey reported that they had been 
raped or physically assaulted by a spouse, co-habiting partner, or date at some point in 
their lifetime.cccxxvii  Victims of IPV, however, are overwhelmingly women (85 percent).  
Domestic violence is the largest single cause of injury to women age 15 to 44 in the 
United States, constituting 20 percent of nonfatal violence against women in 2001.cccxxviii  
Almost 5.3 million incidents of IPV occur each year among U.S. women age 18 and 
older.cccxxix  An estimated 1.5 million women annually are victims of rape or sexual 
assault by a domestic partner.  Many are repeatedly assaulted, resulting in about 4.8 
million intimate partner assaults per year.cccxxx  Women living in poverty, as well as 
American Indian/Alaskan Native, African-American, and Hispanic women are 
disproportionately at risk.cccxxxi 
 
Trends suggest that although rates of IPV are declining in some measures, women remain 
at risk for victimization.  For example, the number of women who are victims of 
domestic homicide was more than three times higher than that for men in 2002.  This gap 
is considerably larger than in 1976, when the female/male IPV-related homicide ratio was 
only about 1.2 (see Figure 7-23).cccxxxii  One-third of all homicides among women are the 
result of intimate partner violence, a proportion that has not changed substantially over 
the last three decades.cccxxxiii   
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Figure 7-23.  Homicide of Intimates by Gender of Victim, 1976-2002
Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2005
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ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY 
 
Environmental insecurity occurs when communities disproportionately bear the burden of 
man-made environmental degradation, toxins in the built environment, and other 
environmental health hazards.  These environmental insults include “physical, chemical, 
and biological pollution of the air, water, soil and biota.”cccxxxiv  The most common 
environmental hazards include lead, hazardous waste sites, and air pollution.  
Environmental risks harm residents of the communities that harbor them--directly in the 
form of health risks and indirectly in their effects on community property values, the tax 
base, and business climate.   
 
These problems disproportionately affect American Indians and African Americans, poor 
communities, and communities in the South.cccxxxv  Several studies demonstrate the 
greater prevalence of environmental degradation in marginalized communities, as well as 
their health effects.  But no single study has systematically collected national data on the 
prevalence of environmental hazards and the demographic composition of the 
communities that unwillingly host them.  It is therefore not possible to assess the nation’s 
progress in addressing this threat to personal security.  Nonetheless, environmental 
inequity remains an important civil and human rights problem that poses a large barrier to 
opportunity.cccxxxvi 
 
Environmental risks arise from many sources.  Municipal landfills, incinerators, 
hazardous waste treatment plants, and industrial waste storage and disposal facilities are 
some features of the built environment that contribute to environmental risks.  Other 
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factors include elements of the transportation infrastructure such as those associated with 
placement of highways and bus depots near residences.cccxxxvii  Substandard housing also 
can contribute to environmental risks through residents’ exposure to lead and asbestos, 
vermin infestation, and other health risks.  And occupational hazards such as those faced 
by migrant workers who are exposed to known carcinogens in pesticides and herbicides 
or unsafe work conditions in illegal “sweatshops” remain widespread.cccxxxviii 
 
Evidence of environmental inequity is consistent across several large studies, but such 
studies have been limited.  In 1983 the U.S. General Accounting Office found that three 
out of four off-site commercial hazardous waste landfills in the southeastern United 
States were situated in predominantly African-American communities.  The United 
Church of Christ’s 1987 study found that three in five African Americans and Hispanics 
lived in communities with abandoned waste sites.  And in 2000, more than half of low-
income public housing units were located within a mile of factories that produce toxic 
emissions.cccxxxix 
 
The impact of environmental hazards on health has been widely documented.  A 1998 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services study found that poor children in urban 
and rural regions are more likely to have blood lead levels that far exceed federal 
standards.cccxl  African-American and Hispanic children suffer from higher rates of both 
lead exposure and asthma induced by air pollution.  And the Environmental Protection 
Agency estimated that pesticide exposure causes between 10,000 and 20,000 illnesses a 
year among farm workers, and countless thousands of illnesses later in life.cccxli 
 
HOW CAN WE ENSURE SECURITY FOR ALL IN THE UNITED STATES? 
 
A range of opportunity policies can enhance the security of our nation and its residents.  
The description of policy initiatives below is not meant to be comprehensive; rather, it 
provides examples of policies that can enhance security in many of the domains 
described above. 
 
Poverty and Income Insecurity 
 
Problems of poverty and income insecurity can be reduced by expanding a range of 
existing living wage, job training, child care, education, and temporary financial 
assistance programs; by developing programs that help lower income families to save and 
to acquire assets and financial skills; and by addressing structural inequality that allows 
poverty to persist and fester.  Ways to reduce structural inequality include promoting 
mixed-income housing, encouraging regional planning to address inequality between 
urban and suburban jurisdictions, and supporting public transportation programs that 
reliably and efficiently help people who live in areas of high unemployment to commute 
to areas of high job growth and opportunity. 
 
Expand Living Wage Laws.  Living wage ordinances help to ensure that full-time 
minimum wage earners (70 percent of whom are adults) can support their families.  
Living wage laws have been enacted in more than seventy localities, ensuring that city or 
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county governments will not contract with businesses that pay workers wages less than 
what would be needed to live above poverty levels, given local economic conditions.  
Living wage standards range from a low of $6.25 an hour in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, to a 
high of $12 an hour in Santa Cruz, California.cccxlii 
 
Increase the Federal Minimum Wage.  An increase in the federal minimum wage to $7.25 
per hour would raise the wages of 7.3 million workers, and an additional 8.2 million 
workers would likely receive pay increases as a result of “spillover” effects.  Such a hike 
would increase the real value of the minimum wage, which currently is about one-third of 
the average hourly wage, the minimum wage’s lowest value since 1949. Women and 
workers of color would reap the most benefit from a minimum wage increase, as would 
families with children.  Low-wage workers who support families with children contribute 
to half of family earnings, on average, and 36 percent of workers who would be affected 
by a minimum wage increase to $7.25 contribute 100 percent of their family's 
earnings.cccxliii 
 
Help Low-Income Families Develop Assets.  Policies that help poor and low-income 
families to develop long-term assets like savings accounts, homeownership equity, and 
savings for college education are gaining bipartisan support.  These strategies shift the 
emphasis of poverty reduction strategies from solely providing cash assistance to helping 
poor and low-income families acquire resources necessary to achieve greater financial 
security.  Several states are successfully experimenting with approaches that encourage 
asset development.  These approaches include creating Individual Development Accounts 
(IDAs) and state-level earned income tax credits, increasing homeownership programs, 
reducing or eliminating asset limits for public benefit programs, and implementing 
antipredatory lending measures.  Evidence suggests that many of these strategies yield 
broader social and economic benefits, including increased educational attainment among 
children, greater levels of civic participation, and better health outcomes.cccxliv  IDAs--
matched savings accounts for low-income households--have been found to increase the 
likelihood that the poor will develop savings and assets, but they do not necessarily 
increase beneficiaries’ net worth.cccxlv  Nonetheless, when implemented with policies that 
protect the poor from predatory lending and improve beneficiaries’ knowledge of 
personal financial management, such strategies are promising means to allow low-income 
families to gain financial security. 
 
Address Geographic Influences on Poverty.  One of the greatest structural obstacles to 
reducing poverty is geography.  Impoverished families often live in communities where a 
large percentage of other residents are also impoverished or subsist on low incomes.  This 
geographic isolation increases the likelihood that poor families will live in substandard 
housing, face barriers to attaining job opportunities and commuting to communities 
where jobs are available, and have few options to access high-quality education.  The 
federal Moving To Opportunity (MTO) demonstration program provides low-income 
families living in high-poverty neighborhoods with the option of relocating to mixed-
income neighborhoods.  A rigorous evaluation of the MTO program found that MTO 
yielded broad opportunity benefits for families that moved to mixed-income 
neighborhoods, including significant positive impacts on personal safety, housing quality, 
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adult mental health and obesity, teenage girls’ mental health, school dropout rates, 
delinquency, and risky behavior.cccxlvi 
 
Health Insecurity 
 
Health inequality and insecurity must be tackled by state and federal efforts to develop a 
universally accessible, comprehensive, and equitable health care system.  The United 
States is the last modern, industrialized nation without a universal health care program.  
Health insurance coverage is primarily provided by employers, but as benefit costs rise 
employers are declining to offer coverage or are purchasing plans that require greater 
employer cost sharing.  Health insurance coverage is increasingly unequal, 
disproportionately hurting those who need health care the most--racial and ethnic 
minorities, children, and lower income families.  Less than half of low-wage workers 
have employer-provided health insurance from their own employer or a family member’s 
employer, and female low wage workers are half as likely as male low-wage workers to 
receive health insurance from their employer.cccxlvii 
 
Federal programs such as Medicare, which is much more efficient than private plans 
because of its low administrative costs, should be expanded to include uninsured 
individuals.  The ultimate goal would be to create a “Medicare for all” single-payer 
program that efficiently and equitably insures all Americans.  Because Medicare is a 
federal program, subject to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (particularly Title VI, which 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, language status, and other factors), 
it contains mechanisms of accountability that can be expanded and enhanced to ensure 
that inequitable health care is addressed. 
 
Food Insecurity 
 
Food insecurity should be eliminated by expanding existing state and federal food 
assistance programs such as food stamps and school lunch programs.  The Food Stamp 
Program, for example, has successfully assisted millions of families that face food 
insecurity.  The program currently feeds 17 million food stamp recipients, but benefits 
provide an average of 78 cents per meal, and program participation has declined 22 
percent since 1996, in part due to tightened eligibility requirements.  Yet an estimated 43 
percent of those eligible for the program do not participate.  Other federal programs such 
as the Women, Infants and Children (WIC) Program and school feeding programs 
provide for about 7.2 million pregnant low-income women and their infants and children 
each month.  The National School Lunch Program serves more than 27 million meals 
daily.cccxlviii  A recent study found that children who benefit from federal safety net 
programs such as food stamps, WIC, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families have 
better health status, less food insecurity, and show less evidence of undernutrition than 
comparable children who are not enrolled in these programs.cccxlix  Expanding program 
eligibility, easing the enrollment process, and expanding outreach activities to enroll 
eligible families will help to ensure that avoidable health, education, and behavioral 
problems linked to poor nutrition and food insecurity among children will be avoided. 
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Moreover, local, state and federal governments should ensure that all communities have 
access to high-quality, low-cost nutritious foods by creating incentives for major grocery 
chains and other commercial food vendors to set up stores in areas with few such 
resources.  High-poverty urban and rural communities are less likely than higher income 
areas to have full-service grocery stores or supermarkets, and are more often served by 
smaller, independent stores that do not or cannot offer high-quality, low-cost foods, 
particularly fresh produce.  Residents of low-income communities are more likely to face 
transportation barriers that restrict their access to low-cost, high-quality foods that are 
more commonly available in supermarkets.cccl  Several local jurisdictions have 
established public-private partnerships to bring supermarkets to underserved areas.  For 
example, the city of Rochester, New York, which experienced an 80 percent decline in 
grocery stores in the 1970s and 1980s, used public resources (the Federal Enterprise 
Community Zone program, the Community Development Block Grant program, and 
other sources) to attract a major supermarket chain to open stores in the city.  This move 
provided jobs, greater economic growth, and improved access to healthful, low-cost 
foods for urban residents.cccli  More recently, Pennsylvania awarded a $500,000 grant to 
help establish a supermarket in the Yorktown section of Philadelphia, part of a broader 
initiative to support the development of supermarkets and other food retailers in urban 
and rural communities that lack adequate access to supermarkets.ccclii 
 
Personal Security and Safety 
 
Protection against crime and violence should be enhanced by adopting proven criminal 
justice policies that focus on prevention and do not rely solely on incarceration as an 
“after-the-fact” approach to deterring crime.  Community policing, substance abuse 
prevention and treatment, and other crime prevention programs have proved effective in 
reducing low-level criminal activity before it escalates.  Fundamentally, however, rates of 
crime and violence are linked to broader opportunity problems within some communities, 
such as high unemployment rates, insufficient job training, and community dislocation.  
To the extent that crime and violence reflect a lack of opportunity, many of the other 
opportunity policies described here and elsewhere are likely to contribute to a decline in 
crime rates.  
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